[LCM Articles] Let's declare victory and start talking

Loai Naamani loai at MIT.EDU
Sat Jul 29 00:19:35 EDT 2006


www.haaretz.com

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Last update - 11:19 28/07/2006

Let's declare victory and start talking

By Ze'ev Sternhell

 

It's a widely accepted idea that an Israeli who returns home, even after a
short period of time, feels as if he has come to another country. But the
opposite is the case: He returns to the same situation, the same problems,
the same thought patterns and mainly, the same solutions. Apparently, we did
not learn a thing from the first Lebanon War or from the American defeat in
Iraq. If the definition of Israel's strategic goal given by the head of
Military Intelligence at the beginning of the week reflects the government's
position, we are in big trouble. 

 

If Israel really did embark on the war in order to force Lebanon to impose
its authority on the south, which is in Hezbollah's hands - or in other
words, to force the Lebanese government to begin a civil war in the service
of Israel - that is a sign that it is dominated by thinking even more
primitive than the thinking that led Ariel Sharon to Beirut about a quarter
of a century ago. 

 

But this time, we have exacerbated the problem: At the beginning of the
third week of fighting, in spite of the determination and courage of the
attacking soldiers, the war seems only to be beginning. That is why we
should achieve a cease-fire before the campaign gets out of control, claims
victims in vain and, in the long run, even turns into a strategic failure.
In the more distant future, it will be necessary to carry out a fundamental
structural reform of the government's work procedures and to examine its
dependence on the Israel Defense Forces' General Staff. These are truths
that are not pleasant to voice at this time, but that is the reality, and we
are obliged to confront it. 

 

And in fact, considering the means that the IDF is employing and the ratio
of forces in the field, any outcome less than the elimination of Hezbollah
as a fighting force will be considered an Israeli failure and a great
achievement for the enemy. But since it is impossible to uproot Hezbollah
from among the Shiites without destroying the population itself, wisdom
requires us to refrain from positing goals that are unachievable. 

 

The inability of a major power to put an end to a guerrilla war is not a new
phenomenon: From Napoleon in Spain, through his successors in Algeria, to
the Americans in Vietnam and now in Iraq, well-organized armies equipped
with modern technology have always failed in attempts to defeat irregular
forces. The latter know how to adapt themselves to their surroundings, they
are an inseparable part of the population and they serve its material,
religious and emotional needs. 

 

When there is fighting, guerrilla organizations want the entire population
to be harmed. When everyone is a victim, the hatred will be directed at the
enemy more forcefully. That is why bombing residential neighborhoods, power
plants, bridges and highways is an act of folly, which plays into
Hezbollah's hands and serves its strategic goals: An attack on the overall
fabric of life creates a common fate for the fighters and those standing on
the sidelines. At the same time, the greater the population's suffering, the
greater its alienation from the formal ruling institutions - the government,
the parliament and the various security forces that are powerless to save
them. 

 

It is an illusion to hope that the 700,000 Lebanese refugees will direct
their fury at their government, or that the population that still remains in
place will evict the Hezbollah members from among it. As far as the
population is concerned, responsibility for its catastrophe lies entirely
with Israel, and failure to cooperate with whoever fights against Israel
would be considered national treason. It was foolish to assume that the
Lebanese political elite would dare to confront Hezbollah and use force
against it. And anyway, who was even capable of using force? The Lebanese
Army, whose bases were bombed as well? 

 

That is why Israel's interest must be to isolate Hezbollah, to strike a hard
blow at its bases and camps, but to avoid harming the infrastructure of life
for the general population, even when its gives refuge to those bearing
arms. This is not a matter of military ethics, but of a cold practical
considerations. 

 

The goal of the war is to restrain Hezbollah, because nobody is dreaming any
longer of destroying it. As things look today, at best, Israel will make do
with removing it from the border. There, behind the back of an international
force, which in the Arab world will in any case be seen as protecting
Israel, Hezbollah will be able to reorganize, train, equip itself with more
modern weapons and prepare for the next round. 

 

There is no military solution for this situation. IDF Chief of Staff Dan
Halutz has already implied that the solution is political. The prime
minister, who bears overall responsibility and will be required to give an
accounting in the future, would do well not to lag behind the person who in
any case will pass him the hot potato. 

 

And a word about the price of American support. Sometimes it seems as if
U.S. President George W. Bush wants Israel both to destroy Lebanon and to
sustain painful losses. That way, Israel provides him with an excellent
alibi for the war in Iraq: The fight against terror is global, the blood
price is the same, the methods of operation and the means are identical, and
the time needed for victory is long. The Israeli vassal is serving its
master no less than the master is providing for its needs. 

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