pam-krb5 4.5 released
Stephen Frost
sfrost at snowman.net
Fri Feb 10 15:35:24 EST 2012
Russ, all,
* Russ Allbery (rra at stanford.edu) wrote:
> I'm pleased to announce release 4.5 of pam-krb5.
As this is the users list that pam-krb5 is announced on, I figured
this would be an alright place to ask a few questions about both it
and the MIT KDC.
First- I *think* I've done everything correct to get pam-krb5 to use
FAST (which is to say, set up k5start, verified it gets a valid
ticket, configured krb5.conf w/ the fast_ccache parameter, etc), but I
have no idea how to tell if it's *actually* getting used. I'm using
the 'stock' config of the MIT KDC from Ubuntu, with the slight caveat
that I made the RSA SDK available, so it includes SAM2 and secureID
support.
Regarding securID support- that all seems to be working just fine from
kinit and through ssh/pam-krb5 (with ChallengeResponse and PAM
enabled, of course). However, as you might expect, both pam-krb5 (as
tested with OpenSSH) and kinit prompt for the principal's 'normal'
password before prompting for the token code (and it cares- it won't
work if you don't provide the correct PW).
Is there any way to eliminate the need for this first password? I had
been hoping that FAST would take care of it, or that, with FAST, I
could remove the "requires_preauth" flag from the princ and that it
wouldn't require the initial password, but neither of those seemed to
work. Would the pkinit approach work better to allow this setup to
work as I desire?
Any thoughts or pointers on this would really be appreciated. I feel
very, very close to having a good, working solution which leverages
Kerberos, RSA/securID, and SSH. I've been hoping for this combination
to work nicely for, literally, *years*.
Thanks!
Stephen
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