Establishing client credentials (TGT etc.) with GSSAPI

Chris chriscorbell at gmail.com
Mon Feb 23 18:52:16 EST 2009


On Feb 23, 3:08 pm, Nicolas Williams <Nicolas.Willi... at sun.com> wrote:
> On Mon, Feb 23, 2009 at 02:00:55PM -0800, Chris wrote:
> > FWIW, I was slightly confused with the language in the GSSAPI RFC
> > which seems to indicate that an implementation of a mechanism (e.g.
> > Kerberos) is not necessarily compatible with that mechanism used on
> > its own.  [...]
>
> I suspect that may have been a reference to how the Kerberos V GSS-API
> mechanism is not wire compatible with raw Kerberos V.  Do you remember
> what specific text you're referring to, and can you point me at it?

The main spot is in RFC 2743, near the end of section 1.1.3. Tokens:

" The format of GSS-API tokens defined in conjunction with a
particular mechanism,
   and the techniques used to integrate those tokens into callers’
   protocols, may not be interoperable with the tokens used by non-
GSS-
   API callers of the same underlying technique."

I read that as suggesting that e.g. a Kerberos Ticket (including a
TGT) obtained
via native Kerberos calls might not be interoperable with GSS context-
wrapped
Kerberos tickets, so I wrongly assumed there must be some way to
acquire
a TGT via GSSAPI.

Also, RFC 1964 section 3 throws me off a little - I thought the last
sentence
was saying that the mechanism should be implemented to request a TGT,
but perhaps it's actually a directive for what the client application
should do:

  "However, when the Kerberos V5 mechanism attempts to obtain
initiating
   credentials for a service principal which are not available in a
   credentials cache, and the key for that service principal is
   available in a Kerberos V5 key table, the mechanism should use the
   service key to obtain initiating credentials for that service.
This
   should be accomplished by requesting a ticket-granting-ticket from
   the Kerberos Key Distribution Center (KDC), and decrypting the
KDC's
   reply using the service key."

Chris



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