Pending OpenSSH release: contains Kerberos/GSSAPI changes
Wachdorf, Daniel R
drwachd at sandia.gov
Fri Jan 30 16:52:12 EST 2004
No, there is another place in the code where GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG is checked.
It then either verifies the MIC or processes an EXCHANGE_COMPLETE message.
-dan
-----Original Message-----
From: Jeffrey Hutzelman [mailto:jhutz at cmu.edu]
Sent: Friday, January 30, 2004 2:44 PM
To: Wachdorf, Daniel R; 'Darren Tucker'; kerberos at mit.edu; krbdev at mit.edu;
heimdal-discuss at sics.se
Cc: OpenSSH Devel List; ietf-ssh at NetBSD.org
Subject: RE: Pending OpenSSH release: contains Kerberos/GSSAPI changes
On Friday, January 30, 2004 09:41:26 -0700 "Wachdorf, Daniel R"
<drwachd at sandia.gov> wrote:
> The client sets this to true, not really a problem. Our modified f-secure
> client does the same thing. However, if GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG is not set,
> then the open ssh server rejects the connection. The following line of
> code (from gss-serv.c):
>
> /* Now, if we're complete and we have the right flags, then
> * we flag the user as also having been authenticated
> */
>
> if (((flags == NULL) || ((*flags & GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG) &&
> (*flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG))) && (ctx->major ==
> GSS_S_COMPLETE)) {
> if (ssh_gssapi_getclient(ctx, &gssapi_client))
> fatal("Couldn't convert client name");
> }
>
>
> This requires the client to set GSS_C_MUTUAL, which conflicts with the
> draft.
Indeed, it does. The server is not supposed to check the state of the
mutual_flag of a context accepted for gssapi-with-mic user auth. I know
the draft is not entirely clear on this point; would it help if there were
text indicating the server MUST NOT do this?
Also, I've not actually read this code, other than what's quoted above, but
I hope that's not the only place that flags are checked. I'm assuming the
openssh code actually implements -07 and 'gssapi-with-mic'. In the new
method, the client's final message is either SSM_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_MIC or
SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_EXCHANGE_COMPLETE, depending entirely on whether
GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG is set. The server is REQUIRED to fail the authentication
if the client sends the wrong message; this means the value of
GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG must be tested.
-- Jeffrey T. Hutzelman (N3NHS) <jhutz+ at cmu.edu>
Sr. Research Systems Programmer
School of Computer Science - Research Computing Facility
Carnegie Mellon University - Pittsburgh, PA
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