Getting a DES-encrypted TGT from AD server
davespam at microsoft.com
Fri Oct 17 17:35:27 EDT 2003
You can prevent Windows from issuing RC4 tickets by doing the following:
1. set UF_USE_DES_KEY_ONLY on the accounts involved
2. change the accounts' passwords (to the same password, if you like)
You can set this flag through the MMC Users and Computers snapin...
Under Account, it's a "Use DES for encryption" checkbox that you have to
scroll down a bit to get to, IIRC.
With this, the Windows KDC will only issue DES-CRC or DES-MD5 tickets.
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> -----Original Message-----
> From: kerberos-bounces at MIT.EDU
> [mailto:kerberos-bounces at MIT.EDU] On Behalf Of Tim Alsop
> Sent: Thursday, October 16, 2003 4:31 AM
> To: kerberos at MIT.EDU
> Subject: Re: Getting a DES-encrypted TGT from AD server
> Thankyou. We have been using kerbtray. I am pleased that you
> are able to see
> same problem, but was hoping you (or somebody else) could give us a
> solution. I am aware that there are some registry hacks
> available from MS to
> change the behaiviour of Kerberos, so I wondered if such a
> registry key
> existed to cause forwarded tgt to be issued using same key
> types as the
> initial tgt. Also, if we could disable rc4 on Active
> Directory somehow this
> might help us.
> "Calimer0" <cryos98 at yahoo.com> wrote in message
> news:3e217f40.0310160320.4b454995 at posting.google.com...
> > The actual issue is not on the intiial tgt, but on the tgt
> obtained when
> > initial tgt is forwarded.
> > On IIS we receive the forwarded tgt, but the keytype for
> the forwarded
> > of the initial tgt seems to be RC4-HMAC and not DES.
> I've tried in my little test network and I've got the same strange
> behaviour: the forwarded ticket granting ticket is encrypted with RC4,
> even if the session key in still encrypted with DES. Sorry, I'm not
> able to help you. Just a little tip: if you need to know what tickets
> are in your credential cache you can use kerbtray or a network sniffer
> like ethereal.
> you can find kerbtray from microsoft here:
> Kerberos mailing list Kerberos at mit.edu
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