[LCM Articles] The Financial Times' take on the war

[Omar Kanafani]

Hizbollah has redrawn the Middle East

Published: August 17 2006 20:29 | Last updated: August 18 2006 01:49

The perceived victory of Hizbollah in Lebanon may be short term but has
highlighted some new and important developments. For the first time, the
Israel Defence Forces were unable to prevail in an all-out war. More
significantly, the winner this time is a Shia Muslim, non-state, armed
movement supported by Syria and Iran. In Israel's previous wars, from 1948
to 1982, the challengers were Sunni Arabs.

In fact, Israel's effort this time to eradicate Hizbollah was no remake of
past Israeli-Arab wars. It signified several complex – and seemingly
contradictory – trends in the Middle East. First is the revival of a radical
Islamic front that rejects the Arab-Israeli peace process. Second is the
growing divide between Shia and Sunni Muslims in the Gulf region. Finally
there is the changed political dynamic after the recent entry by radical
Islamist movements – such as Hizbollah and Hamas – to mainstream electoral
politics.

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The alignment between Hizbollah, Syria and Iran in a radical front against a
peace settlement with Israel promotes anti-US and Arab nationalist mottoes
more than any Islamic ideology could do. The Sunni "Arab street" has
embraced Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, Hizbollah's leader, as the new Arab hero,
the "Nasser of our time". But Mr Nasrallah's elevation also works partly to
lessen the appeal of Osama bin Laden in the Arab Middle East.

That this radical front is led by Shia or secular Shia (as in Syria) is also
significant. Since the US military intervention in Iraq in 2003, Sunni Arab
conservative regimes in the Gulf and Jordan have been concerned not with the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict but what they saw as a growing Shia "crescent",
bringing under Iranian patronage oil fields north of the Gulf (Iraq, Bahrain
and the Saudi north-east). Saudi Wahabi clerics had issued fatwa, or
religious edicts, condemning the Shia as heretics. But they and the Sunni
clerics were forced to retreat after Hizbollah's perceived victory. The same
clerics who earlier condemned the Shia have issued new fatwa supporting
Hizbollah in its fight with Israel. On the government level, the deafening
silence from Jordan, Egypt and Saudi Arabia after the Lebanon ceasefire is a
clear sign of embarrassment after their earlier hostility to Hizbollah's
actions.

On the other hand, Iran and Syria have been quick to claim victory for
themselves, too. Syria wants to regain its influence in Lebanon and is quite
happy to see Israel destroying an already weak central state – as long as
Israel does not retaliate inside Syria. But, paradoxically, Damascus is
protected by its own weakness: a collapse of the regime would sooner or
later put the Muslim Brotherhood radical Islamist movement in charge and,
even if it is more moderate than its Egyptian or Jordanian cousins, neither
Israel nor the west wishes to give any more opportunities to Islamist
parties.

The Iranians are taking revenge for their defeat at Iraq's hands back in
1988, when Arab Sunni nationalist and Islamist movements supported Iraq
against Iran, and only part of the Shia population supported Iran (hence
Tehran's desire to help create Hizbollah as a client party from the Shia
movement in Lebanon). Iran has never been able to unite the Shia under its
patronage on a religious basis nor a purely political one. Now Tehran is
playing the "Arab street" and undermining the legitimacy of the ruling Arab
regimes by leading this new alliance of Islamism and Arab nationalism in the
near east. In Iraq, however, the same alliance works against Iran. Hence
Iran's leadership of the new radical front will not necessarily help bridge
the Shia-Sunni gap in Iraq.

Besides settling their account with Arab regimes, the Iranians are managing
a conflict by proxies against the west. Tehran wants to avoid a possible
military strike on its nuclear facilities and in this respect welcomes
western anxiety about the high costs of military intervention. Cleverly,
Iran has adopted a low profile on its borders with Iraq and Afghanistan,
knowing that time is working in its favour, while fuelling the crisis in the
near east. To have European troops stuck in southern Lebanon, hostage to any
escalation of tensions between Tehran and the United Nations Security
Council on sanctions, suits Tehran well.

Clearly the Iranians were the real winners of the Lebanon conflict and will
maintain their upper hand as long as Hizbollah is seen as a legitimate
champion of the Arab cause, and not as part of the Shia crescent.

The key issue now is Hizbollah, which is positioning itself on three levels:
first, it is signalling Shia solidarity with Iran. Second, it is appealing
to Lebanese nationalism by presenting itself as a pivotal element in
Lebanese domestic politics. Third, it is fomenting Arab militancy against
Israel and the US. Hizbollah triggered the conflict with Israel as an
internationalist movement eager to relieve pressure on Hamas. But Mr
Nasrallah's recent "victory speech" portrayed the organisation as the
champion of Lebanese interests and nationalism. Hizbollah will not be
disarmed or marginalised; the only way to deal with it is to push for a new
Lebanese polity in which it plays a central role, as a Lebanese party.

If the west wishes to counter the synergy between Arab nationalism, Sunni
militancy and the Shia crescent, which will link battlefields from
Afghanistan to Lebanon, it must draw Islamist movements such as Hamas and
Hizbollah further into the mainstream. This means encouraging a proper
settlement in Lebanon involving all Lebanese actors without interference
from Syria or Iran; supporting democratisation of Syria and negotiating with
Hamas. It also means Israel must renounce its policy of "bunkerisation",
withdrawing behind a fortified border and hammering at any perceived threat.

The writer, a professor at Ecoles des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales, is
author of Globalised Islam (Hurst 2004)

Copyright <http://www.ft.com/servicestools/help/copyright> The Financial
Times Limited 2006
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