[mitreid-connect] Client credentials security issue?

[Justin Richer]

I just tried this on the mitreid.org <http://mitreid.org/> test server and I couldn’t replicate it. Then I checked the code and what you’re describing is prevented by this line in ConnectTokenEnhancer:

		if (originalAuthRequest.getScope().contains(SystemScopeService.OPENID_SCOPE)
				&& !authentication.isClientOnly()) {

If you do get an ID token at all through some fluke, it should refer to the client that authenticated, as that’s the authenticated “user” in that scenario. Same deal with token introspection of access tokens. 

 — Justin

> On Jul 7, 2017, at 4:26 PM, Luiz Omori <luiz.omori at duke.edu> wrote:
> 
> Hi,
>  
> I’ve just run by chance into a suspicious behaviour while exercising the Client Credentials flow. Along with the request I’ve sent scope=openid offline_access. Interesting enough, I got an id_token back. That id-token was referring to a user that I used for an Authorization Code request done immediately before the Client Credentials call. My usage of scope for the Client Credentials may or may not be legal, but in any case I don’t think the server should be sending an ID Token back for Client Credentials. I’m using server version 1.3.1.
>  
> Regards,
> Luiz
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