[LCM Articles] Has Lebanon been shut out from the corridors of power in Washington?

[Loai Naamani]

Has Lebanon been shut out from the corridors of power in Washington?
Think tanks play vital role in giving voice to emigrants in the formulation
of foreign policy
http://www.dailystar.com.lb/article.asp?edition_id=1
<http://www.dailystar.com.lb/article.asp?edition_id=1&categ_id=2&article_id=
76924> &categ_id=2&article_id=76924

First Person Nadeem G. Maasry
The Daily Star
Thursday, November 16, 2006

No sooner do the drums of war start reverberating in the Middle East than
analysts of every background in the West begin their own "war" of
prognostications and proposed solutions. Most of these analysts appear to be
motivated by emotions and ideas that draw on their own narrow experiences,
or theories derived from models utilized only because they address each
analyst's own narrow view of the problem. The sad reality is that many of
these ideas do not correspond to the facts on the ground. 

Meanwhile, the decision-making process in the United States, a country whose
population has just passed the 300 million mark, continues to become more
complicated and problem-ridden. Having less than 5 percent of the total
population of the world and yet contributing close to 30 percent of the
planet's gross domestic production, America has not been able to resist
becoming involved in the affairs of every single country. As a result, a
system, a machine-like web structure had to be developed to enable America's
policy managers to confront changing world circumstances on a daily basis. 

I will limit myself to the perceived impact of this "policy-making
structure" on Lebanon's current situation. 

Considering that Lebanon is endowed with a fairly high level of
Western-educated intelligentsia and a relatively significant reservoir of
sympathy in America, the question is whether Lebanon has been
well-represented in the inner halls of Washington. In other words, have the
Lebanese been involved to an important degree in formulating any of the
options being considered by US foreign policy decision-makers relative to
the Middle East, and more recently to Lebanon itself? Judging from the
events of this past summer, the short answer is no. 

A good number of Lebanese who are unaware of how badly missing their input
has been from the centers of power in Washington have often wondered why the
United States, so steeped in technology and so successful in the management
of government and business, could come up with a foreign policy that could
produce an Iraq-style failure. Perhaps a knowledgeable and analytical visit
to Washington, which has become even more directly involved than ever in the
Middle East after September 11, 2001, would help explain the seeming
anomaly. 

Three aspects of Washington's foreign policy decision-making process detract
from an independent, consistent and sustainable foreign policy in the Middle
East, where the particular and organic relationship that binds the US and
Israel acts as a shunt to an even-handed American stance in the region. 

If we are to consider the White House as the ultimate decision-making
center, or more accurately, the inner sanctum where the choice is made among
a number of foreign policy options, then we are looking at a leadership
under President George W. Bush that has been weakened on several political
and economic fronts and which opted to compensate for this deficiency by
enhancing its presidential powers through an ongoing war on "terrorism" in
the guise of added security for the American people. 

This leadership found itself in need of an increasingly complex system for
the management of political, economic, military and security affairs in a
globalized world. As a result, a system of overworked staff and advisers has
developed over the years that works like a mega-computer, requiring, by
definition, a number of functionaries, highly specialized in their
respective fields, performing mechanically like cogs in an Orwellian
machine. Yet, the leadership's overall vision, reconciled with an American
concept of a melting pot, seems unable to grasp the composite structure of
the different nations of the world, with differing cultures and
anthropological traits. 

It becomes less puzzling, then, why the minions who keep the decision-making
process going, no matter how smart and sincere, find themselves oscillating
between theories of grand design for a "world order" of democracies and the
day-to-day requirements of putting out fires in an unpredictable and
changing world - a situation better known in the White House as crisis
management. 

Ironically, America, rich with well-to-do expatriates from every corner of
the world who have successfully found the "land of opportunity," has proven
unable to reap maximum benefits from the local knowledge of citizens of
foreign extraction. Many of these emigres left behind birthplaces in which
they found discord, while others became too mainstream American to be able
to discern the old realities of their countries of origin. 

Lebanon is not so different: Given that a good number of the commercially
minded successful immigrants come from humble backgrounds in which they were
excluded from an active role in a basically feudal political system, their
climb up the American ladder distances them even further from Lebanon's
age-old political intricacies. Inadvertently, they have contributed at times
to US policies that stood at variance with Lebanon's current national
interests. 

This decision-making system found itself inadequate to handle a multitude of
world problems, including situations which may not have reached critical
proportions, and inevitably had to look for "outside help." Many observers
around the world, and particularly in countries like Lebanon, have come to
believe that the outcome of America's foreign policy has been mainly
influenced by lobbyists and pressure groups. In this regard, they fail to
comprehend the significance of the role of outside advisers and think tanks
in the formulation of strategic options presented on a systematic basis to
the decision-makers, and especially those in the White House where time, pay
and man-hours are limited. Once habituated to this independent input, the
decision-makers who solicit outside advice on a continual basis have become
reliant on this advice.

Even the Europeans, who have developed impressive centers for political and
economic research, do not always distinguish between an American think tank
and their own policy research institutes staffed with renowned professors
and esteemed research workers. 

A well-placed Washington think tank, by contrast, would normally have among
its staff former White House employees and others from the different
branches of government, the military and the various intelligence agencies.
A good number of them use the think tank as a convenient quarter where they
"hang their hats," meet one another and bide their time while they wait for
an administration change and hope to get back into a role more directly
involved in policy making. If they leave for jobs on the West Coast, for
example, they risk being forgotten at the center of power in Washington. 

Normally, their being on the "outside" would afford them a platform to
express more openly and freely their points of view. With few exceptions,
however, the think tanks and other private non-lucrative foundations are in
constant need of funds and donations. It follows that these institutions are
hindered by the demands of the donors who give tax-deductible contributions
with specific topics and special interests in mind. It is perhaps in this
area of an ever-mushrooming activity - not to call it a business - that the
Lebanese and Middle Easterners in general, with the noted exception of the
Israelis, find themselves unable to compete. 

At the same time, the American media have found it convenient to publish and
reproduce articles on foreign affairs contributed by self-appointed experts
who use the umbrella of one foundation or another to promote their captive
ideas. The result: a cacophony of voices confusing the American reader, as
well as the decision-makers. 

The US State Department, with its worldwide network of embassies and
employees, has been weakened in recent years due to a number of factors. 

In a "dangerous" world where many US embassies have become virtual
fortresses under siege, qualified young Americans find it more interesting
to work for multinationals with more benefits and a higher salary than serve
their country as diplomats in insecure areas of the world with less
compensation. 

This "attrition" in the number of good American representatives has been
mostly felt in Islamic and several other developing countries. 

Historically, the State Department had been more immune to the influence of
private interests and pressure groups, primarily because its untainted
sources of information derive directly from its own functionaries based
around the world. Once it came under serious challenge by a White House bent
on using foreign issues for local political gain, this role diminished.
Similarly, the various intelligence agencies find themselves less
independent of the whims of an administration that has managed to heap the
blame for recent policy failures on these same agencies. 

As a consequence, a weakened secretary of state now functions in the good
graces of a White House, which in turn has become addicted to the use of
foreign policy experts, even though many of these experts happen to have
particular agendas. 

In a sense, this dependency of the secretary of state, as well as the White
House, on a system that resembles a mega-computer reduces the qualities and
requirements for leadership. Increasing criticisms, therefore, of the
president and his team as being light-weighted, or, for example, completely
one-track minded in the Middle East, do not take into account that they have
become more like drivers conducting a sophisticated machine, and that, when
under pressure, their decisions are but the "resultants of forces," to
borrow a principle from mathematics. 

In the absence of high-level Lebanese input into this complex policy
machine, is it any wonder that Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said last
July that she was unable to see why she would visit Lebanon on her peace
mission to the area, notwithstanding the fact that the purpose of her travel
was to help negotiate a cessation of the war in Lebanon?

Over 35 years in the United States, Nadeem G. Maasry, a Lebanese banker,
served on the Brookings Institution's Business Advisory Council, the Center
for Strategic Studies' Quadrangular Forum and the Washington Quarterly
Economic Roundtable. The author wishes to dedicate this article to the
memory of the late George N. Frem, who, in his unrelenting efforts on
Lebanon's behalf, understood the inner workings of the American foreign
policy system and the significance of Washington's think tanks.

-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: http://mailman.mit.edu/pipermail/lebanon-articles/attachments/20061116/608d75a6/attachment.htm