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Thu Sep 29 14:36:13 EDT 2005

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LONELY LEADER AMID SWIRLING RUMOURS
Sep 29th 2005  

Bashar Assad is in a pickle, and has no easy way out

THE capital looks stubbornly normal. Shoppers crowd its markets in the
run-up to the fasting month of Ramadan, which starts on October 4th.
The biggest downtown building to go up in years, a posh hotel, is set
to open soon. Opera-goers rave over a new musical, called "The Last
Tale", about a sad misanthrope who kidnaps a singer in the hope that
her song will cheer him out of his gloom. But Syrians, who often
complain that they are hostages to the ruling regime, know they need to
do more than sing to solve the troubles of their president, Bashar
Assad. 

For Mr Assad, and his clan and Baath party, face a crisis as grave as
any since his father, Hafez Assad, consolidated Syria's dictatorship 35
years ago. The regime has survived big dangers before, from losing wars
with Israel (which still occupies Syria's Golan Heights), to a bloody
insurgency by the Muslim Brotherhood that was crushed in the 1980s. 

Soviet backing and pan-Arab sentiment helped then. But Syria now has no
friends at all, except distant, non-Arab Iran. America, the sole
superpower, has grown overtly hostile, and sits right next door in
Iraq; the Bush administration accuses Syria of abetting jihadist
infiltration of the Iraqi maelstrom, backing groups that America deems
terrorists, meddling in Lebanon and oppressing its own people.
America's ambassador in Iraq recently declared that "all options are
open" regarding how Syria might be punished. Influential Arab countries
such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia, which used to condemn such aggressive
talk, have tired of Syria's countering bluster and now shrug
indifferently.

If it were just American chest-thumping, Mr Assad might feel secure.
But a new threat has rapidly emerged in Lebanon, the small neighbour
that Syria is more used to seeing as a playground, strategic buffer
and, some would say, colony. Last spring, the groundswell of anger
after the assassination of a long-serving Lebanese prime minister,
Rafik Hariri, made Syria end its decades-long troop presence, then
obliged it to stand by as the Lebanese voted in a staunchly anti-Syrian
government. 

The humiliation did not end there. The UN sent a special prosecutor,
Detlev Mehlis, to investigate the Hariri killing. The tight-lipped
German recently had four Lebanese security chiefs known for their
closeness to the Syrian regime arrested. Now, after much delay, Syria
has submitted to his demand to question their Syrian counterparts. That
means not just those responsible for intelligence in Lebanon, but also
their bosses in Damascus, including, some say, Mr Assad's brother,
Maher, who commands the Republican Guard, and their brother-in-law,
Asef Shawkat, Syria's overall intelligence chief. 

Mr Mehlis is not due to issue his findings until October 25th, and has
said that he has no Syrian suspects. Yet his presence at a heavily
secured resort near Damascus has caused much trepidation. Many Syrians
assume he will finger top regime figures; the main question is how high
in the hierarchy, and how close to the Assad family, the accusations
will reach. Whatever it does turn up, Mr Mehlis's investigation, backed
by the clout of the UN Security Council, will deeply embarrass Syria's
government. Should there be proof of complicity or worse, and should
Syria fail to hand over suspects for trial, Mr Assad's government is
sure to be punished by further isolation, and an internationalisation
of sanctions that are now unilaterally imposed by America. 

Strains, not surprisingly, are showing at home. Internal opposition
groups are small, fractious and closely watched. But general resentment
runs high, against such ills as corruption, unemployment, sky-high
house prices and the privileged place of Mr Assad's Alawite sect, which
makes up 15% of Syria's mostly Sunni Muslim population. Sporadic unrest
in the provinces has pitted restless Kurds, Ismailis and Druze against
police or against other sects. 

Sunni extremists, who once refrained from attacks in Syria in
recognition of its support for Iraq's "resistance", may have changed
tactics. Gun battles between such groups and police now break out
regularly. Businessmen, many of them Sunnis, complain they are tired of
uncertainty. Cash is said to be flowing rapidly abroad. At least one
senior ousted member of the regime, a Sunni, is said to be living in a
plush hotel in Paris owned by the Hariris: that cannot bring much
comfort to former colleagues. 

When Syria withdrew from Lebanon, Mr Assad tempered his embarrassment
by promising to speed reforms. Little has changed. The Baath party said
it would revise laws that hinder the emergence of rival political
parties, but has taken no measures to do so. The appointment of
Abdullah Dardari, a respected non-Baathist, as deputy prime minister
with a mandate to open up Syria's stymied socialist economy, was
heralded as a breakthrough. But Mr Dardari's good intentions have
mostly been thwarted. Despite considerable public sympathy for Mr
Assad, more and more Syrians now reckon that his regime may not be
capable of reform.

Intellectuals in Damascus contemplate three scenarios. One would see
the regime reaching a deal with America and the UN investigators,
whereby some figureheads, such as Syria's main intelligence chiefs in
Lebanon, including their commander, General Rostom Ghazale, would be
sacrificed for trial, and Syria would comply fully with America's other
demands. 

There are some signs of this. One observer detects the start of a
"dance of the seven veils", with Syria grudgingly relinquishing
positions long declared sacrosanct. It has tightened controls along the
Iraqi frontier, and told Damascus-based armed Palestinian groups to lie
low and back Mahmoud Abbas's peace-inclined Palestinian leadership. In
this scenario, Hizbullah, Lebanon's Iran-backed Shia militia, may be
the next offering. Syria's support has so far insulated it from
pressure to disarm, as required by the UN Security Council. Should Mr
Assad decide to appease the Americans, his regime might, in the words
of another Damascus observer, "lose some limbs but still be ambulatory."

SCRATCHES AND BITES, BOTH LETHAL
But the other two scenarios offer Mr Assad a less rosy outlook. One is
what a dissident describes as "the cornered cat": the regime chooses to
lash out at its tormentors. This could well lead to its rapid demise.
Who might the inheritors be? It is hard to tell whether various
Islamist groups, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, which was persecuted
by Assad senior, are growing in strength. Some close watchers think its
potential exaggerated; others reckon it more likely that military types
may already be gaining ground inside Syria's institutions and may make
a lunge for power.

The last scenario, perhaps more likely, is "the cornered scorpion".
Surrounded by fire, it stings itself. In other words, the regime would
fall to an internal coup. Who might the beneficiaries be? Infighting
among the Assad family and in-laws has been rumoured. The president
might have another go at chucking out the powerful remainder of his
father's old guard. Or the regime could turn against the Assad family.
Or, perhaps most bloodily, young Sunni officers could turn against the
minority Alawites who have held commanding posts in the army and
regime. If Mr Mehlis's report does, in effect, mean that Mr Assad is
told to sack some of his closest and most powerful advisers, or even
put them on trial, this last scenario would become more plausible. For
the time being, the only certainty is more uncertainty. 

See this article with graphics and related items at http://www.economist.com/world/africa/displaystory.cfm?story_id=4462659

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