krb5-1.22-beta1 is available
Greg Hudson
ghudson at mit.edu
Thu May 8 13:07:32 EDT 2025
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MIT krb5-1.22-beta1 is now available for download from
https://kerberos.org/dist/testing.html
The main MIT Kerberos web page is
https://web.mit.edu/kerberos/
Please send comments to the krbdev list. We plan for the final
release to occur in about two months. The README file contains a more
extensive list of changes.
PAC transitions
- ---------------
Beginning with release 1.20, the KDC will include minimal PACs in
tickets instead of AD-SIGNEDPATH authdata. S4U requests (protocol
transition and constrained delegation) must now contain valid PACs in
the incoming tickets. Beginning with release 1.21, service ticket
PACs will contain a new KDC checksum buffer, to mitigate a hash
collision attack against the old KDC checksum. If only some KDCs in a
realm have been upgraded across versions 1.20 or 1.21, the upgraded
KDCs will reject S4U requests containing tickets from non-upgraded
KDCs and vice versa.
Triple-DES and RC4 transitions
- ------------------------------
Beginning with the krb5-1.21 release, the KDC will not issue tickets
with triple-DES or RC4 session keys unless explicitly configured using
the new allow_des3 and allow_rc4 variables in [libdefaults]. To
facilitate the negotiation of session keys, the KDC will assume that
all services can handle aes256-sha1 session keys unless the service
principal has a session_enctypes string attribute.
Beginning with the krb5-1.19 release, a warning will be issued if
initial credentials are acquired using the des3-cbc-sha1 encryption
type. Beginning with the krb5-1.21 release, a warning will also be
issued for the arcfour-hmac encryption type. In future releases,
these encryption types will be disabled by default and eventually
removed.
Beginning with the krb5-1.18 release, all support for single-DES
encryption types has been removed.
Major changes in 1.22
- ---------------------
User experience:
* The libdefaults configuration variable "request_timeout" can be set
to limit the total timeout for KDC requests. When making a KDC
request, the client will now wait indefinitely (or until the request
timeout has elapsed) on a KDC which accepts a TCP connection,
without contacting any additional KDCs. Clients will make fewer DNS
queries in some configurations.
* The realm configuration variable "sitename" can be set to cause the
client to query site-specific DNS records when making KDC requests.
Administrator experience:
* Principal aliases are supported in the DB2 and LMDB KDB modules and
in the kadmin protocol. (The LDAP KDB module has supported aliases
since release 1.7.)
* UNIX domain sockets are supported for the Kerberos and kpasswd
protocols.
* systemd socket activation is supported for krb5kdc and kadmind.
Developer experience:
* KDB modules can be be implemented in terms of other modules using
the new krb5_db_load_module() function.
* The profile library supports the modification of empty profiles and
the copying of modified profiles, making it possible to construct an
in-memory profile and pass it to krb5_init_context_profile().
* GSS-API applications can pass the GSS_C_CHANNEL_BOUND flag to
gss_init_sec_context() to request strict enforcement of channel
bindings by the acceptor.
Protocol evolution:
* The PKINIT preauth module supports elliptic curve client
certificates, ECDH key exchange, and the Microsoft paChecksum2
field.
* The IAKERB implementation has been changed to comply with the most
recent draft standard and to support realm discovery.
* Message-Authenticator is supported in the RADIUS implementation used
by the OTP kdcpreauth module.
Code quality:
* Removed old-style function declarations, to accomodate compilers
which have removed support for them.
* Added OSS-Fuzz to the project's continuous integration
infrastructure.
* Rewrote the GSS per-message token parsing code for improved safety.
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