After RFC 8429: Deprecate Triple-DES (3DES) and RC4 in Kerberos
derek at ihtfp.com
Mon Nov 5 10:57:50 EST 2018
Greg Hudson <ghudson at mit.edu> writes:
> On 11/01/2018 10:30 AM, Weijun Wang wrote:
>> Now that RFC 8429 is published and 3DES and RC4 are deprecated, is
>> there any plan to remove them from etype list of KDC-REQ?
> For RC4, I would like Microsoft to take the lead. 3DES is our
> responsibility, and is probably not in nearly as much use (although I'd
> have to at least check if we're still using it internally at MIT), so it
> is probably not as painful to deprecate.
> There is some ambiguity in how weak an enctype needs to be to qualify
> for being affected by allow_weak_crypto. The primary concerns about
> des3-cbc-sha1 are its 64-bit block size and the fast speed of its
> string-to-key operation; both of these are far less problematic than the
> practical ability to recover a random single-DES key. It would also be
> a shame if administrators wound up enabling DES in order to make DES3
> work (or RC4).
Maybe we need an "allow_very_weak_crypto" in addition to the
> krbdev mailing list krbdev at mit.edu
Derek Atkins 617-623-3745
derek at ihtfp.com www.ihtfp.com
Computer and Internet Security Consultant
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