GSSAPI Proxy initiative

Nico Williams nico at cryptonector.com
Fri Nov 4 11:36:11 EDT 2011


Also, the recovery issue can come up with the server's cache of
RPCSEC_GSS contexts is under pressure.

I really think we want an RPCSEC_GSS-level solution for this.  I don't
think we can address this problem entirely in the GSS stack.  Since
RPCSEC_GSSv3 isn't done yet, maybe now is the time to work on a
solution there.

I'd build the solution by borrowing tech from Kerberos.  The server
would mint a ticket for itself using some local secret key for the
ticket's encrypted part and with authorization data storing all of the
relevant server-side authorization context for the client principal,
then the server sends a KRB-CRED with that ticket and session key with
the KRB-CRED wrapped in a GSS wrap token OR with an encryption key for
the KRB-CRED based on GSS_Pseudo_random() OR it sends the ticket and
the client uses GSS_Pseudo_random() to compute the same session key
that the server did.

Nico
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