GSSAPI Proxy initiative
Nico Williams
nico at cryptonector.com
Fri Nov 4 11:36:11 EDT 2011
Also, the recovery issue can come up with the server's cache of
RPCSEC_GSS contexts is under pressure.
I really think we want an RPCSEC_GSS-level solution for this. I don't
think we can address this problem entirely in the GSS stack. Since
RPCSEC_GSSv3 isn't done yet, maybe now is the time to work on a
solution there.
I'd build the solution by borrowing tech from Kerberos. The server
would mint a ticket for itself using some local secret key for the
ticket's encrypted part and with authorization data storing all of the
relevant server-side authorization context for the client principal,
then the server sends a KRB-CRED with that ticket and session key with
the KRB-CRED wrapped in a GSS wrap token OR with an encryption key for
the KRB-CRED based on GSS_Pseudo_random() OR it sends the ticket and
the client uses GSS_Pseudo_random() to compute the same session key
that the server did.
Nico
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