Crypto Modularity proj proposal
Nicolas.Williams at sun.com
Sun Jun 28 21:34:09 EDT 2009
On Sun, Jun 28, 2009 at 12:02:30PM -0400, Jeffrey Hutzelman wrote:
> >... therefore: cache derived keys in those handles and leave
> >krb5_keyblock and all existing references to it alone.
> That seems a reasonable approach.
I wish we'd thought of it years ago :(
> >This may mean _adding_ new APIs that take derived keys (for implementing
> >the GSS-API mechanism's per-token message functions, and for the
> >krb5_mk/rd_priv/safe/cred() functions.
> ... and for external users that might benefit from such caching.
Sure, adding a replacement for krb5_keyblock and full complement of APIs
(including types) that deal in it would be fine, but it'd be a plus, not
> >I don't think anyone will want session keys in tokens.
> Application session keys, no. TGT session keys, maybe. Or at least,
> in something that presents the same interface as a token: you tell it
> the key once, and never get it back, but it does crypto operations for
True. This would have zero impact on the scheme I proposed (but really,
it's Love's proposal).
> > As for deriving
> >keys from non-extractable key material stored in tokens, that is
> That depends on the derivation in use. The key derivations used in RFC3961
> and RFC3962 all depend on either using the source key as an encryption key
> or (for single-DES) are the identity mapping. Both forms can be
> implemented with a non-extractable source key stored in a token, provided
> the token is willing to do encryption operations with that key.
D'oh, yeah, you're right.
More information about the krbdev