review of Projects/replay_cache_collision_avoidance, ending Jan. 12

[Greg Hudson]

On Mon, 2008-12-29 at 00:13 -0500, Tom Yu wrote:
> I will try to dig up records of those discussions, but a pointer would
> be helpful.

I found:

http://mailman.mit.edu/pipermail/krbdev/2005-May/003444.html
http://mailman.mit.edu/pipermail/krbdev/2005-June/003455.html

These posts from Sam are particularly relevant:

http://mailman.mit.edu/pipermail/krbdev/2005-June/003457.html
http://mailman.mit.edu/pipermail/krbdev/2005-June/003464.html

The conversation picks up again in 2008:

http://mailman.mit.edu/pipermail/krbdev/2008-May/006601.html

I'm not finding any piece of discussion specifically connecting the dots
between "maybe an attacker can perturb the authenticator a little bit
and change its hash without invalidating it" and "we should store the
authenticator".  In fact, Sam seemed to be arguing simply for hashing
the decrypted authenticator rather than its encrypted form.