need project review

[Ken Raeburn]

On Apr 7, 2008, at 15:42, Nicolas Williams wrote:
> Of course, ideally you could have the KDC implemented so no long term
> key material ever leaves a hardware token.  I used to be a fan of that
> until I realized that that would mean putting so much of the KDC
> implementation in the token that it may not be worthwhile.  Instead
> folks should minimize the network footprint of their KDCs and provide
> extra physical security for them.

This idea has been explored before; see, for example, the USENIX  
Security Symposium paper from 2000 by Naomaru Itoi (then at CITI,  
UMich), on moving much of the KDC functionality into the IBM 4758  
secure coprocessor.  Implementing it efficiently would take a bit more  
work; whether it's worthwhile depends, I suppose, on the threat model  
and desired deployment model.  But it seems like an interesting idea  
to me.

Ken