Password change protocol rework, round 2
hartmans at MIT.EDU
Tue Mar 9 18:49:18 EST 2004
>>>>> "Ken" == Ken Hornstein <kenh at cmf.nrl.navy.mil> writes:
>>> Well ... I don't think so. "replay" really is more
>>> appropriate here.
>> No, the kpasswd protocol MUST be replay protected, otherwise
>> bad things happen.
Ken> Really? I guess it's not obvious to me what the dangers are
Ken> of a replayed password change attempt (since presumably an
Ken> attacker doesn't know the session key to put a new password
Ken> in the KRB-PRIV). But I just realized one thing ... if you
Ken> have a password history, a retransmitted password change
Ken> request will fail, so clearly the only option is a lookaside
I think the danger is they replay both a krb_priv and a krb_req.
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