rpcsec_gss and Kerberos 5

Nicolas.Williams@ubsw.com Nicolas.Williams at ubsw.com
Mon Jun 3 15:57:00 EDT 2002

I think the RPCSEC_GSS and AUTH_GSSAPI interfaces are somewhat
similar, varying mostly in form (e.g., setting GSS names is
different; in one API you must make a function call for each
GSS name and in the other you must make one function call with
all the GSS names as arguments or so, IIRC).

RPCSEC_GSS and AUTH_GSSAPI are really rather similar in
function and purpose... But the API differences will require
some re-jiggering of libkadm5* code, perhaps in a significant



> -----Original Message-----
> From: Ken Raeburn [mailto:raeburn at mit.edu]
> Sent: Monday, June 03, 2002 3:49 PM
> To: Rainer Orth
> Cc: Kevin Coffman; Sam Hartman; krbdev at mit.edu; Andy Adamson
> Subject: Re: rpcsec_gss and Kerberos 5
> Rainer Orth <ro at TechFak.Uni-Bielefeld.DE> writes:
> > > Maybe.  I'm not sure if the way our gssrpc authentication 
> works would
> > > fit properly into the rpcsec model.  It's something to look into.
> > 
> > It doesn't need to fit: this function allows you to 
> register a completely
> > different authentication flavor (parallel to AUTH_SYS, 
> AUTH_DH, etc.), not
> > just a different GSSAPI mechanism.
> What I meant was, I'm not sure how well the way we did authentication
> fits the RPC authentication framework.  I hope it would be
> straightforward, but in general I've come to expect that anything
> dealing with our GSSAPI and RPC code is not likely to be
> straightforward. :-)
> Ken
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