Protocol benchmarking / auditing inquiry

Thu Feb 15 12:49:15 EST 2024

The purpose of non-destructive testing is to validate form/fit/function - across the entire operational mission/ asset lifecycle/ whatever - contrasted with the STIG/CIS benchmark which throws the real problems "over the wall" to Ken H.

Using the outputs, the lifecycle manager constructs their budget for operations + maintenance (OpEx) and replacement (CapEx).
        Physical systems wear out.  (Weibull)
        Cyber systems fail spectacularly.
        CPS systems wear out + fail spectacularly. (Power-law?)

Why is this relevant?

Back in the 1940s, too many planes were falling out of the sky.  (Q.  How many planes are too many?)
You call this philosophy a "surety system", "fly fix fly", "patch Tuesday", " FAA's approach to the Boeing 737 MAX" - whatever.
Regardless, by the 1950s, it was decided that action needed to be taken.  The status quo was unacceptable.  It was too expensive for operators.

The national safety council created something called the "Hierarchy of Controls."  It was immensely successful.  (Planes stopped falling out of the skies.)

You can call this approach "safety by design".  This approach and it's benefits are very well documented and might even be applicable to Navy C4ISR.

To tie a bow on this thread:
        How can we make Kerberos safe?

-----Original Message-----
From: Brent Kimberley
Sent: Thursday, February 15, 2024 12:19 PM
To: kerberos at mit.edu; kenh at cmf.nrl.navy.mil
Subject: RE: Protocol benchmarking / auditing inquiry

At higher levels it falls under "Non Destructive testing".

-----Original Message-----
From: Brent Kimberley
Sent: Thursday, February 15, 2024 12:12 PM
To: 'kerberos at mit.edu' <kerberos at mit.edu>; 'kenh at cmf.nrl.navy.mil' <kenh at cmf.nrl.navy.mil>
Subject: RE: Protocol benchmarking / auditing inquiry

This approach is taught in first year engineering.

-----Original Message-----
From: Brent Kimberley
Sent: Thursday, February 15, 2024 12:10 PM
To: kerberos at mit.edu; kenh at cmf.nrl.navy.mil
Subject: RE: Protocol benchmarking / auditing inquiry

Ken.
The term Frame of Reference is a Cyber Physical system (CPS) term.

For those who work in the cyber subset, the term is "interface".

Regardless of what you call it.

You take the system diagram and evaluate using each major interface or Frame of Reference.

The STIG or CIS benchmark is just one of the interfaces evaluated.

-------------

>Minor comment the CIS Benchmark appears to have been written from the
>system administrator's frame of reference - not the network frame of
>reference (FoR).  Typically, each frame of reference (FoR) needs to be
>audited.  Hence the need for automation.

I can only say this:

- I've been doing Kerberos for a few decades (but I'm certainly not the
  person with the most Kerberos experience on this list).
- I've done a ton of security accreditation work at my $DAYJOB, which
  also involves Kerberos.  As part of the accrediation work we (and
  others) do automated scanning that includes the Kerberos servers
  and this seems to satisfy the powers that be.  Some of the scanning
  seems to detect Kerberos but I am unclear how much it actually checks
  for other than "Kerberos is found".
- I've used the aforementioned CIS Benchmark.
- I really have no clue what you mean by "frame of reference" in this
  context, and this corresponds to no security accreditation or auditing
  requirements I have ever encountered so I cannot provide any
  suggestions; I'm really unclear what you are asking for.

--Ken

-----Original Message-----
From: Brent Kimberley
Sent: Wednesday, February 14, 2024 3:24 PM
To: Christopher D. Clausen <cclausen at acm.org>; kerberos at mit.edu
Subject: RE: Protocol benchmarking / auditing inquiry

Minor comment the CIS Benchmark appears to have been written from the system administrator's frame of reference - not the network frame of reference (FoR).
Typically, each frame of reference (FoR) needs to be audited.  Hence the need for automation.

-----Original Message-----
From: Christopher D. Clausen <cclausen at acm.org>
Sent: Wednesday, February 14, 2024 2:10 PM
To: Brent Kimberley <Brent.Kimberley at Durham.ca>; kerberos at mit.edu
Subject: Re: Protocol benchmarking / auditing inquiry

[You don't often get email from cclausen at acm.org. Learn why this is important at https://aka.ms/LearnAboutSenderIdentification ]

I have used this as a guide, but I think MIT Kerberos version 1.10 is the latest available:
https://www.cisecurity.org/benchmark/mit_kerberos

Not sure if this is what you are looking for or not.

<<CDC

On 2/14/2024 11:46 AM, Brent Kimberley via Kerberos wrote:
> Preferably something smaller and more focused than nmap or OpenSCAP. 😉

> > > > > >
> From: Brent Kimberley
> Sent: Wednesday, February 14, 2024 12:44 PM
> To: kerberos at mit.edu
> Subject: Protocol benchmarking / auditing inquiry
>
> Hi.
> Can anyone point me to some methods to benchmark and/or audit Kerberos v5?
>
> For example, SSH:
>                 Manual
>                                Read the RFCs and specs.
>                Semi-automatic.
>                                jtesta/ssh-audit: SSH server & client security auditing (banner, key exchange, encryption, mac, compression, compatibility, security, etc) (github.com)<https://github.com/jtesta/ssh-audit/>
>                 Automatic
>                                SSH Configuration Auditor
> (ssh-audit.com)<http://ht/
> tps%3A%2F%2Fwww.ssh-audit.com%2F&data=05%7C02%7CBrent.Kimberley%40Durh
> am.ca%7C8eddde16708448e6cdb008dc2d907d49%7C52d7c9c2d54941b69b1f9da198d
> c3f16%7C0%7C0%7C638435345797172606%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4
> wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C0%7C%7C%7C&s
> data=ydwY2y5%2FxuZxJavbNQw877yOmuFuVo3DktJr%2FdFA05A%3D&reserved=0>
>
>
> TLS example upon request.

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