Protocol benchmarking / auditing inquiry
Brent Kimberley
Brent.Kimberley at Durham.ca
Thu Feb 15 12:09:34 EST 2024
Ken.
The term Frame of Reference is a Cyber Physical system (CPS) term.
For those who work in the cyber subset, the term is "interface".
Regardless of what you call it.
You take the system diagram and evaluate using each major interface or Frame of Reference.
The STIG or CIS benchmark is just one of the interfaces evaluated.
-------------
>Minor comment the CIS Benchmark appears to have been written from the
>system administrator's frame of reference - not the network frame of
>reference (FoR). Typically, each frame of reference (FoR) needs to be
>audited. Hence the need for automation.
I can only say this:
- I've been doing Kerberos for a few decades (but I'm certainly not the
person with the most Kerberos experience on this list).
- I've done a ton of security accreditation work at my $DAYJOB, which
also involves Kerberos. As part of the accrediation work we (and
others) do automated scanning that includes the Kerberos servers
and this seems to satisfy the powers that be. Some of the scanning
seems to detect Kerberos but I am unclear how much it actually checks
for other than "Kerberos is found".
- I've used the aforementioned CIS Benchmark.
- I really have no clue what you mean by "frame of reference" in this
context, and this corresponds to no security accreditation or auditing
requirements I have ever encountered so I cannot provide any
suggestions; I'm really unclear what you are asking for.
--Ken
-----Original Message-----
From: Brent Kimberley
Sent: Wednesday, February 14, 2024 3:24 PM
To: Christopher D. Clausen <cclausen at acm.org>; kerberos at mit.edu
Subject: RE: Protocol benchmarking / auditing inquiry
Minor comment the CIS Benchmark appears to have been written from the system administrator's frame of reference - not the network frame of reference (FoR).
Typically, each frame of reference (FoR) needs to be audited. Hence the need for automation.
-----Original Message-----
From: Christopher D. Clausen <cclausen at acm.org>
Sent: Wednesday, February 14, 2024 2:10 PM
To: Brent Kimberley <Brent.Kimberley at Durham.ca>; kerberos at mit.edu
Subject: Re: Protocol benchmarking / auditing inquiry
[You don't often get email from cclausen at acm.org. Learn why this is important at https://aka.ms/LearnAboutSenderIdentification ]
I have used this as a guide, but I think MIT Kerberos version 1.10 is the latest available:
https://www.cisecurity.org/benchmark/mit_kerberos
Not sure if this is what you are looking for or not.
<<CDC
On 2/14/2024 11:46 AM, Brent Kimberley via Kerberos wrote:
> Preferably something smaller and more focused than nmap or OpenSCAP. 😉
> > >
> From: Brent Kimberley
> Sent: Wednesday, February 14, 2024 12:44 PM
> To: kerberos at mit.edu
> Subject: Protocol benchmarking / auditing inquiry
>
> Hi.
> Can anyone point me to some methods to benchmark and/or audit Kerberos v5?
>
> For example, SSH:
> Manual
> Read the RFCs and specs.
> Semi-automatic.
> jtesta/ssh-audit: SSH server & client security auditing (banner, key exchange, encryption, mac, compression, compatibility, security, etc) (github.com)<https://github.com/jtesta/ssh-audit/>
> Automatic
> SSH Configuration Auditor
> (ssh-audit.com)<http://ht/
> tps%3A%2F%2Fwww.ssh-audit.com%2F&data=05%7C02%7CBrent.Kimberley%40Durh
> am.ca%7C8eddde16708448e6cdb008dc2d907d49%7C52d7c9c2d54941b69b1f9da198d
> c3f16%7C0%7C0%7C638435345797172606%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4
> wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C0%7C%7C%7C&s
> data=ydwY2y5%2FxuZxJavbNQw877yOmuFuVo3DktJr%2FdFA05A%3D&reserved=0>
>
>
> TLS example upon request.
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