RFC 4121 & acceptor subkey use in MIC token generation

[Ken Hornstein]

>> As a side note, my impression is that gss-keyex has fallen out of favor,
>> and at least for us part of the problem is the unfortunate decision
>> to use MD5 in that protocol.  You and I both know that the use of MD5
>> in there isn't security related, but if you live in a FIPS world
>> then any use of MD5 is a "challenge".
>
>What MD5?  It's used for generating a mechanism name, which has no
>security implications.  You can hardcode the OID->name mappings so you
>don't invoke MD5.

Ever hear the political adage, "If you're explaining yourself, you're
losing"?.  The same adage applies when talking to security people,
especially the non-technical ones.  The common gss-keyex code out there
calls the OpenSSL MD5 function at runtime, and some of the distributions
that do ship the gss-keyex code (RedHat) decided to simply disable
gss-keyex code when FIPS is turned on.  So yes, you CAN hardcode the
OID->name mappings, but it seems that nobody actually does that.

--Ken