RFC 4121 & acceptor subkey use in MIC token generation

[Ken Hornstein]

>Until then you don't know because GSS doesn't know if some MIC/Wrap
>token it's consuming was made in response to an earlier MIC/Wrap/AP-REP
>token sent by the acceptor application to the initiator.  Also, in
>practice no app that makes use of PROT_READY before GSS_S_COMPLETE on
>the initiator side will do so for more than one or maybe two per-message
>tokens (one for the app itself, and one for SPNEGO), so maybe we could
>have a hard cap[*] on the number of per-message tokens using the
>initiator sub-session key when the initiator requested mutual auth.

I think we've lost the thread here; I do not think that any krb5
mechanism today ever asserts PROT_READY before GSS_S_COMPLETE, but I
would love to be proven wrong.

>While I'm on the subject of JWT, there are two reasons JWT is killing
>Kerberos:

Are you sure one of the most important reasons ISN'T that the GSSAPI is
insanely complicted and people who look at it get confused and move to
something else that is much simpler?

--Ken