krb5-1.13.3 is released

Tom Yu tlyu at mit.edu
Fri Dec 4 16:49:31 EST 2015


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The MIT Kerberos Team announces the availability of MIT Kerberos 5
Release 1.13.3.  Please see below for a list of some major changes
included, or consult the README file in the source tree for a more
detailed list of significant changes.

RETRIEVING KERBEROS 5 RELEASE 1.13.3
====================================

You may retrieve the Kerberos 5 Release 1.13.3 source from the
following URL:

        http://web.mit.edu/kerberos/dist/

More information about the krb5-1.13.3 release is at:

        http://web.mit.edu/kerberos/krb5-1.13/

Further information about Kerberos 5 may be found at the following
URL:

        http://web.mit.edu/kerberos/

and at the MIT Kerberos Consortium web site:

        http://www.kerberos.org/


DES transition
==============

The Data Encryption Standard (DES) is widely recognized as weak.  The
krb5-1.7 release contains measures to encourage sites to migrate away
- From using single-DES cryptosystems.  Among these is a configuration
variable that enables "weak" enctypes, which defaults to "false"
beginning with krb5-1.8.


Major changes in 1.13.3 (2015-12-04)
====================================

This is a bug fix release.  The krb5-1.13 release series is in
maintenance, and for new deployments, installers should prefer the
krb5-1.14 release series or later.

* Fix memory aliasing issues in SPNEGO and IAKERB mechanisms that
  could cause server crashes. [CVE-2015-2695] [CVE-2015-2696]
  [CVE-2015-2698]

* Fix build_principal memory bug that could cause a KDC
  crash. [CVE-2015-2697]

* Allow an iprop slave to receive full resyncs from KDCs running
  krb5-1.10 or earlier.


Major changes in 1.13.2 (2015-05-08)
====================================

This is a bug fix release.

* Fix a minor vulnerability in krb5_read_message, which is primarily
  used in the BSD-derived kcmd suite of applications.  [CVE-2014-5355]

* Fix a bypass of requires_preauth in KDCs that have PKINIT enabled.
  [CVE-2015-2694]

* Fix some issues with the LDAP KDC database back end.

* Fix an iteration-related memory leak in the DB2 KDC database back
  end.

* Fix issues with some less-used kadm5.acl functionality.

* Improve documentation.


Major changes in 1.13.1 (2015-02-11)
====================================

This is a bug fix release.

* Fix multiple vulnerabilities in the LDAP KDC back end.
  [CVE-2014-5354] [CVE-2014-5353]

* Fix multiple kadmind vulnerabilities, some of which are based in the
  gssrpc library. [CVE-2014-5352 CVE-2014-5352 CVE-2014-9421
  CVE-2014-9422 CVE-2014-9423]


Major changes in 1.13 (2014-10-15)
==================================

Administrator experience:

* Add support for accessing KDCs via an HTTPS proxy server using the
  MS-KKDCP protocol.

* Add support for hierarchical incremental propagation, where slaves
  can act as intermediates between an upstream master and other
  downstream slaves.

* Add support for configuring GSS mechanisms using
  /etc/gss/mech.d/*.conf files in addition to /etc/gss/mech.

* Add support to the LDAP KDB module for binding to the LDAP server
  using SASL.

* The KDC listens for TCP connections by default.

* Fix a minor key disclosure vulnerability where using the "keepold"
  option to the kadmin randkey operation could return the old keys.
  [CVE-2014-5351]

User experience:

* Add client support for the Kerberos Cache Manager protocol. If the
  host is running a Heimdal kcm daemon, caches served by the daemon
  can be accessed with the KCM: cache type.

* When built on OS X 10.7 and higher, use "KCM:" as the default cache
  type, unless overridden by command-line options or krb5-config
  values.

Performance:

* Add support for doing unlocked database dumps for the DB2 KDC back
  end, which would allow the KDC and kadmind to continue accessing the
  database during lengthy database dumps.
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