Reason for removing sname check?
Will Fiveash
will.fiveash at oracle.com
Wed Oct 10 14:31:34 EDT 2012
On Wed, Oct 10, 2012 at 12:40:12PM -0400, Greg Hudson wrote:
> On 10/10/2012 11:27 AM, Tomas Kuthan wrote:
> > in MIT krb there used to be a check making sure, that the principal name
> > of a keytab entry used to decode enc-part of a ticket equals sname from
> > that ticket. But this check went away [...]
>
> We removed this check in 1.7 and changed the way rd_req_dec works in
> order to support server principal aliases. You can read a bit about
> this at:
>
> http://k5wiki.kerberos.org/wiki/Projects/Aliases#Server_principals
In that project description I see:
"Server principals need to be handled differently. The problem is that
the KDC cannot generally change the name of the server principal. So,
instead, we must return the principal name exactly as the client asked
for it. However we need to come up with a solution so that the server
doesn't need to know the comparison function the KDC is using.
We do this by ignoring the server name in the ticket (except in the KDB
keytab) and finding a key in the keytab that can decrypt the ticket. If
the application passes in constraints about what principal names are
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
used, we use these constraints. If not, we accept any key in the keytab.
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
We update the context claiming that the client authenticated to whatever
principal is we found in the keytab. "
How does the server application pass in the service principal
constraints? Does this mean that if a server calls gss_acquire_cred()
like so:
maj = gss_acquire_cred(&min, GSS_C_NO_NAME, 0, indicated,
^^^^^^^^^^^^^ desired name
GSS_C_ACCEPT, &creds, &acquired, NULL);
the krb code will use any service princ keys found in the keytab, as
long as the hostname component matches, for accepting the AP_REQ?
--
Will Fiveash
Oracle Solaris Software Engineer
http://opensolaris.org/os/project/kerberos/
Sent using mutt, a sweet, text based e-mail app <http://www.mutt.org/>
More information about the Kerberos
mailing list