GSS_C_NO_NAME for desired_name?

Simon Wilkinson simon at
Sat Jan 1 14:15:19 EST 2011

On 1 Jan 2011, at 16:48, Brian Candler wrote:
> That is: if someone broken into httpd, and it was using a shared  
> keytab
> which also contained the sshd key, then they'd be able to go fetch  
> (and
> abuse) the sshd key.

You're not necessarily only concerned with local attackers here.  
Encryption key strength can also come into play. For example, say you  
have deployed Kerberised NFS, and yet many of your clients can only  
use single DES encryption types. But, as corporate policy, you have  
moved to AES based encryption types for login services. If you have  
both keys in the same keytab (and both NFS and ssh are very keen on / 
etc/krb5.keytab), and your sshd accepts any principal in that keytab,  
then an attacker only has to break the NFS DES key to compromise your  
ssh service.

The point here is that it's hard to give hard and fast answers to some  
of these questions. What's fine for one site's security policy may be  
radically different for a different site - it all depends on your  
analysis of your local risks.



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