pam-krb5 3.13 released

Russ Allbery rra at stanford.edu
Wed Feb 11 15:08:33 EST 2009


I'm pleased to announce release 3.13 of pam-krb5.  This is an urgent
security update.  Everyone using this module should upgrade to either 3.13
or to a fixed package available from a package provider.

See:

    http://www.eyrie.org/~eagle/software/pam-krb5/security/2009-02-11.html

for more details.

pam-krb5 is a Kerberos v5 PAM module for either MIT Kerberos or Heimdal.
It supports ticket refreshing by screen savers, configurable authorization
handling, authentication of non-local accounts for network services,
password changing, and password expiration, as well as all the standard
expected PAM features.  It works correctly with OpenSSH, even with
ChallengeResponseAuthentication and PrivilegeSeparation enabled, and
supports configuration either by PAM options or in krb5.conf or both.

Changes from previous release:

    SECURITY: When built against MIT Kerberos, if pam_krb5 is called in a
    setuid context (effective UID or GID doesn't match the real UID or
    GID), use krb5_init_secure_context instead of krb5_init_context.  This
    ignores environment variable settings for the local Kerberos
    configuration and keytab.  Previous versions could allow a local
    attacker to point a setuid program that used PAM authentication at a
    different Kerberos configuration under the attacker's control,
    possibly resulting in privilege escalation.  Heimdal handles this
    logic within the Kerberos libraries and therefore was not affected.

    SECURITY: Disable pam_setcred(PAM_REINITIALIZE_CREDS) for setuid
    applications.  If pam_krb5 detects this call in a setuid context, it
    now logs an error and returns success without doing anything.  Solaris
    su calls pam_setcred with that option rather than PAM_ESTABLISH_CREDS
    after authentication and without wiping the environment, leading
    previous versions of pam_krb5 to trust the KRB5CCNAME environment
    variable for the ticket cache location.  This permitted an attacker to
    use previous versions of pam_krb5 to overwrite arbitrary files with
    Kerberos credential caches that were left owned by the attacker.
    Setuid screen lock programs may also be affected.  Discovered by Derek
    Chan and reported by Steven Luo.  Thanks to Sam Hartman and Jeffrey
    Hutzelman for additional analysis.

    If a prefix of /usr is requested at configure time, install the PAM
    module into /lib/security or /lib64/security on Linux, matching the
    standard Linux-PAM module location.  Use lib64 instead of lib on
    64-bit SPARC, PowerPC, and S390 Linux as well as x86_64.  Patch from
    Peter Breitenlohner.

    Fix a build problem when builddir != srcdir introduced in 3.11.  Patch
    from Peter Breitenlohner.

    Add support for the old Heimdal krb5_get_error_string interface.
    Thanks, Chaskiel Grundman.

    Add --with-krb5-include and --with-krb5-lib configure options to allow
    more specific setting of paths if necessary.

    If krb5-config isn't available, attempt to determine if the library
    directory for the Kerberos libraries is lib32 or lib64 instead of lib
    and set LDFLAGS accordingly.  Based on an idea from the CMU Autoconf
    macros.

You can download it from:

    <http://www.eyrie.org/~eagle/software/pam-krb5/>

This package is maintained using Git; see the instructions on the above
page to access the Git repository.

Debian packages have been uploaded to Debian experimental.  The security
vulnerabilities will be separately fixed shortly in Debian stable (etch),
Debian testing (lenny), and Debian unstable (sid).

Please let me know of any problems or feature requests not already listed
in the TODO file.

-- 
Russ Allbery (rra at stanford.edu)             <http://www.eyrie.org/~eagle/>
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