Is "SPN advertisement" or well-known SPNs a security hole?

Jeffrey Altman jaltman at secure-endpoints.com
Mon Jan 14 17:58:11 EST 2008


Srinivas Kakde wrote:
>
> This message says: From a security standpoint, allowing the server to specify its  
> service principal is a "bad idea".
>
> Why it a bad idea?  
It is a bad idea because it permits an untrusted party, the server you 
want to communicate with, to decide who it is that the client is trying 
to authenticate to.  It would be like walking down the street looking 
for an undercover police officer and instead finding a drug dealer.  You 
decide to authenticate the undercover officer by calling the police 
precinct but instead of using a phone number for the precinct that you 
obtained from the Verizon phone book you ask the drug dealer for the 
phone number of the precinct.  When you call the provided number, his 
accomplice answers and confirms that he is in fact a police officer.

The security of the authentication is based upon the name.  By asking 
you to authenticate to a name selected by the attacker, you can be 
tricked into using a KDC that is in fact under the control of the 
attacker. 

Jeffrey Altman

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