Solaris 9 latest OEM SSH + pam_krb5.so.1
Jeffrey Hutzelman
jhutz at cmu.edu
Tue Jan 30 10:42:03 EST 2007
On Friday, January 19, 2007 04:05:40 PM -0500 Jeff Blaine
<jblaine at kickflop.net> wrote:
> Setting this value to false leaves
> the system vulnerable to DNS spoofing attacks.
This somewhat understates the problem, and IMHO doesn't do a very good job
of describing what is going on here. Basically, the idea is that if you
are going to let a user log in by typing his Kerberos password, you want to
be sure the resulting TGT was issued by a real TGT. The way you do this is
by getting a service ticket for some service whose key you know, and
checking that the ticket is valid.
Setting this option to false disables that check, which means that a user
can log in by putting a fake KDC on the network typing a username and
password, and arranging for his fake KDC's response to reach you before the
real one. This often isn't very hard, especially if the user has physical
access to the machine's network connection.
The "DNS spoofing attacks" referred to in the documentation are on the
lookup of the KDC's address - one way to insert a fake KDC is to convince
your machine to send its KDC requests to the wrong IP address. But there
are plenty of other attacks which do not involve DNS and are often
available to an attacker trying to log in on the console of a machine.
> 3. My /etc/krb5/krb5.keytab *does* have (and has always had)
> entries for both host/test.foo.com at JBTEST and
> host/192.168.168.100 at JBTEST
Is JBTEST configured as the default realm in krb5.conf?
Do you have a domain_realm section mapping test.foo.com to JBTEST?
Is the krb5.conf file in the right place?
-- Jeff
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