Recreating Master Key
Mike Friedman
mikef at ack.Berkeley.EDU
Mon Feb 3 18:14:12 EST 2003
On Mon Feb 3 14:55:07 2003, Marcus Watts said:
>> What do you do when the angry Kerberos Admin leaves the company? Can
>> you Dump the DB, Recreateit with a new Master Key then Restore?
>
> The master key does 2 things:
> encrypt the database proper
> most likely serves as secret used in random number entropy
> In particular, the master key
> does *NOT* participate in any form of active on-the-wire authentication
> or authorization.
> Hopefully you have a stash file with the master key, and weren't relying
> on your old angry kerberos administrator to restart the database by hand
> each time the machine crashed. If you were, your best resort is probably
> the court system.
Marcus,
But the key still has been compromised, even though you can use it (in this
case, the former admin presumably knows the password). So there's still a
good reason to have the means for changing the master key.
> However, if you wanted to encrypt under a different master key, you could
> certainly dump and restore the database, and use that to change the master
> key. Looks like the "-mkey_convert" option to dump can do just this. At
> one point, there was some issue that dump/restore didn't actually save
> *everything* - hopefully that's fixed now.
There was a patch for 1.2.5 that was supposed to fix it. I just installed
1.2.7 on my test KDC and was pleased to see that the patch has, indeed, been
incorporated. But I haven't had a chance to try it. For me, on 1.2.5 without
the patch, the (undocumented) "-mkey_convert" option of kdb5_util actually
core dumped (if I remember correctly). I was going to test the patch and
never got around to it. Now I'm hoping to test the feature with 1.2.7 to
see if it really works.
Thanks.
Mike
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Mike Friedman System and Network Security
mikef at ack.Berkeley.EDU 2484 Shattuck Avenue
1-510-642-1410 University of California at Berkeley
http://ack.Berkeley.EDU/~mikef http://security.berkeley.edu
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