Problem with V4 keys in krb5-1.2.5

Mike Friedman mikef at ack.Berkeley.EDU
Mon Jun 24 11:28:55 EDT 2002


I've been testing krb5-1.2.5 in preparation for an upgrade of my KDC from
1.2.1 and I noticed something interesting.

It seems that I get a preauth failure when I try to get credentials for a
principal whose key was created on our old V4 KDC (several years ago).

(All my principals are set with REQUIRES_PREAUTH).

The key looks like this:

   Key: vno xx, DES cbc mode with CRC-32, Version 4

If I change the password (to the same value), thereby generating a set of keys
that looks like this:

   Key: vno xx, DES cbc mode with CRC-32, no salt
   Key: vno xx, DES cbc mode with RSA-MD5, Version 4
   Key: vno xx, DES cbc mode with RSA-MD5, Version 5 - No Realm
   Key: vno xx, DES cbc mode with RSA-MD5, Version 5 - Realm Only
   Key: vno xx, DES cbc mode with RSA-MD5, AFS version 3

the problem goes away.

(I masked out the vno, so as not to confuse the issue.  The second set of 
keys is for a different user than the first;  I had already changed the
password of the first user and don't have its old key versions available).

My kdc.conf, which I copied from my V1.2.1 KDC (where this problem didn't
occur), contains the following 'supported_enctypes':

des-cbc-crc:normal des:normal des:v4 des:norealm des:onlyrealm des:afs3 des-cbc-crc:v4

I was under the impression that 'des-cbc-crc:normal' and 'des-cbc-crc:v4'
were all that are necessary to support the old keys.

I don't think I have too many principals with old V4 keys, but I'm wondering
if there's anything I can do to fix this in way that is transparent to users.

Thanks.

Mike

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Mike Friedman                             System and Network Security
mikef at ack.Berkeley.EDU                    2484 Shattuck Avenue
1-510-642-1410                            University of California at Berkeley
http://ack.Berkeley.EDU/~mikef            http://security.berkeley.edu
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