How to prevent very very large ccaches?
Nicolas Williams
Nicolas.Williams at ubsw.com
Tue Jun 18 16:38:20 EDT 2002
Recap: "krsh host date" for 1,000 hosts, 20 at a time; by the time the
ccache grows to half its eventual size the overhead of searching
through the ccache swamps the overhead of the TGS exchange and
KRSH connection. If you have many thousands of hosts this becomes
a big problem. The problem is that each krsh will lock/unlock the
ccache once for each entry in the ccache while searching for a
service ticket for the destination host.
This patch fixes the problem. It unsets the KRB5_TC_OPENCLOSE ccache
flag during cred retrieval, thus causing each krsh/ssh/ftp/whatever
process to run the ccache cred search to completion with one
open/lock/close cycle, rather than one cycle per-ccache entry.
Alternatively lib/krb5/krb/get_cred.c could be patched to bracket the
call to the cred retrieval function with calls to krb5_cc_get_flags() to
unset, then set the KRB5_TC_OPENCLOSE flag. Maybe. I'm not sure that
krb5_cc_start_seq_get() would work correctly if the ccache it's called
with is closed and has the KRB5_TC_OPENCLOSE flag unset.
Comments? Silence -> I'll send a bug report including this patch.
Nico
Index: LOCAL-122.13/lib/krb5/ccache/cc_retr.c
--- LOCAL-122.13/lib/krb5/ccache/cc_retr.c Wed, 14 Mar 2001 14:20:32 -0500
+++ LOCAL-122.13(w)/lib/krb5/ccache/cc_retr.c Tue, 18 Jun 2002 15:57:43 -0400
@@ -193,6 +193,27 @@
if (kret != KRB5_OK)
return kret;
+ /*
+ * krb5_cc_start_seq_get() leaves the ccache open and locked, but
+ * if we don't unset the KRB5_TC_OPENCLOSE ccache flag then
+ * krb5_cc_next_cred() will open/lock/close the ccache for every
+ * entry it iterates over. If several processes are doing a
+ * krb5_cc_retrieve_cred_seq() (or krb5_get_credential()) in
+ * parallel with the same ccache and the ccache is very large, then
+ * the context switch / lock contention overhead in searching the
+ * ccache will grow very large indeed. Think of doing a krsh to
+ * each of 1,000 hosts with, say, 30 krsh client processes running
+ * at any time.
+ *
+ * The KRB5_TC_OPENCLOSE ccache flag has to be set again before we
+ * call krb5_cc_end_seq_get() though. Since there is no
+ * krb5_cc_get_flags() we have to assume that KRB5_TC_OPENCLOSE is
+ * always set except when explicitly unset.
+ *
+ * Nicolas.Williams at ubsw.com
+ */
+ (void) krb5_cc_set_flags(context, id, 0);
+
while ((kret = krb5_cc_next_cred(context, id, &cursor, &fetchcreds)) == KRB5_OK) {
if (((set(KRB5_TC_MATCH_SRV_NAMEONLY) &&
srvname_match(context, mcreds, &fetchcreds)) ||
@@ -236,6 +257,7 @@
continue;
}
} else {
+ (void) krb5_cc_set_flags(context, id, KRB5_TC_OPENCLOSE);
krb5_cc_end_seq_get(context, id, &cursor);
*creds = fetchcreds;
return KRB5_OK;
@@ -247,6 +269,7 @@
}
/* If we get here, a match wasn't found */
+ (void) krb5_cc_set_flags(context, id, KRB5_TC_OPENCLOSE);
krb5_cc_end_seq_get(context, id, &cursor);
if (have_creds) {
*creds = best.creds;
--
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