svn rev #24349: branches/nss/src/ lib/crypto/crypto_tests/ lib/crypto/krb/
ghudson@MIT.EDU
ghudson at MIT.EDU
Sat Sep 25 16:21:57 EDT 2010
http://src.mit.edu/fisheye/changelog/krb5/?cs=24349
Commit By: ghudson
Log Message:
When NSS is the crypto implementation, use the NSS PRNG. Avoids the
issue that Yarrow's entropy pools would be invalidated by a fork.
Changed Files:
U branches/nss/src/configure.in
U branches/nss/src/lib/crypto/crypto_tests/Makefile.in
U branches/nss/src/lib/crypto/krb/Makefile.in
U branches/nss/src/lib/crypto/krb/prng.c
Modified: branches/nss/src/configure.in
===================================================================
--- branches/nss/src/configure.in 2010-09-25 15:09:08 UTC (rev 24348)
+++ branches/nss/src/configure.in 2010-09-25 20:21:57 UTC (rev 24349)
@@ -134,6 +134,7 @@
nss)
CRYPTO_IMPL_CFLAGS=`pkg-config --cflags nss`
CRYPTO_IMPL_LIBS="-lnss3 $(pkg-config --libs nss-util)"
+ AC_DEFINE(CRYPTO_IMPL_NSS,1,[Define if crypto implementation is NSS])
;;
*)
AC_MSG_ERROR([Unknown crypto implementation $withval])
Modified: branches/nss/src/lib/crypto/crypto_tests/Makefile.in
===================================================================
--- branches/nss/src/lib/crypto/crypto_tests/Makefile.in 2010-09-25 15:09:08 UTC (rev 24348)
+++ branches/nss/src/lib/crypto/crypto_tests/Makefile.in 2010-09-25 20:21:57 UTC (rev 24349)
@@ -41,6 +41,9 @@
# NOTE: The t_cksum known checksum values are primarily for regression
# testing. They are not derived a priori, but are known to produce
# checksums that interoperate.
+#
+# We use the NSS PRNG when NSS is the crypto back end, so don't test
+# against the expected output for Yarrow.
check-unix:: t_nfold t_encrypt t_prf t_prng t_hmac \
t_cksum4 t_cksum5 \
aes-test \
@@ -48,8 +51,9 @@
t_crc t_cts t_short
$(RUN_SETUP) $(VALGRIND) ./t_nfold
$(RUN_SETUP) $(VALGRIND) ./t_encrypt
- $(RUN_SETUP) $(VALGRIND) ./t_prng <$(srcdir)/t_prng.seed >t_prng.output && \
- diff t_prng.output $(srcdir)/t_prng.expected
+ if [ @CRYPTO_IMPL@ != nss ]; then \
+ $(RUN_SETUP) $(VALGRIND) ./t_prng <$(srcdir)/t_prng.seed >t_prng.output && \
+ diff t_prng.output $(srcdir)/t_prng.expected; fi
$(RUN_SETUP) $(VALGRIND) ./t_hmac
$(RUN_SETUP) $(VALGRIND) ./t_prf <$(srcdir)/t_prf.in >t_prf.output
diff t_prf.output $(srcdir)/t_prf.expected
Modified: branches/nss/src/lib/crypto/krb/Makefile.in
===================================================================
--- branches/nss/src/lib/crypto/krb/Makefile.in 2010-09-25 15:09:08 UTC (rev 24348)
+++ branches/nss/src/lib/crypto/krb/Makefile.in 2010-09-25 20:21:57 UTC (rev 24349)
@@ -8,7 +8,8 @@
-I$(srcdir)/old -I$(srcdir)/raw -I$(srcdir)/yarrow \
-I$(srcdir)/../@CRYPTO_IMPL@/ -I$(srcdir)/../@CRYPTO_IMPL@/des \
-I$(srcdir)/../@CRYPTO_IMPL@/aes -I$(srcdir)/arcfour \
- -I$(srcdir)/../@CRYPTO_IMPL@/sha1 -I$(srcdir)/../@CRYPTO_IMPL@
+ -I$(srcdir)/../@CRYPTO_IMPL@/sha1 -I$(srcdir)/../@CRYPTO_IMPL@ \
+ @CRYPTO_IMPL_CFLAGS@
PROG_LIBPATH=-L$(TOPLIBD)
PROG_RPATH=$(KRB5_LIBDIR)
DEFS=
Modified: branches/nss/src/lib/crypto/krb/prng.c
===================================================================
--- branches/nss/src/lib/crypto/krb/prng.c 2010-09-25 15:09:08 UTC (rev 24348)
+++ branches/nss/src/lib/crypto/krb/prng.c 2010-09-25 20:21:57 UTC (rev 24349)
@@ -29,11 +29,74 @@
#include <assert.h>
#include "k5-thread.h"
-#include "yarrow.h"
-static Yarrow_CTX y_ctx;
#define yarrow_lock krb5int_yarrow_lock
k5_mutex_t yarrow_lock = K5_MUTEX_PARTIAL_INITIALIZER;
+#ifdef CRYPTO_IMPL_NSS
+
+/*
+ * Using Yarrow with NSS is a bit problematic because the MD5 contexts it holds
+ * open for the entropy pools would be invalidated by a fork(), causing us to
+ * lose the entropy contained therein.
+ *
+ * Therefore, use the NSS PRNG if NSS is the crypto implementation. Doing this
+ * via ifdefs here is temporary until we come up with better build logic for
+ * it.
+ */
+
+#include "../nss/nss_gen.h"
+#include <pk11pub.h>
+
+/* Gather 8K of OS entropy per call, enough to fill the additional data buffer
+ * for the built-in PRNG and trigger a reseed. */
+#define OS_ENTROPY_LEN 8192
+
+int krb5int_prng_init(void)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+krb5_error_code KRB5_CALLCONV
+krb5_c_random_add_entropy(krb5_context context, unsigned int randsource,
+ const krb5_data *data)
+{
+ krb5_error_code ret;
+
+ ret = k5_nss_init();
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+ if (PK11_RandomUpdate(data->data, data->length) != SECSuccess)
+ return k5_nss_map_last_error();
+ return 0;
+}
+
+krb5_error_code KRB5_CALLCONV
+krb5_c_random_make_octets(krb5_context context, krb5_data *data)
+{
+ krb5_error_code ret;
+
+ ret = k5_nss_init();
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+ if (PK11_GenerateRandom((unsigned char *)data->data,
+ data->length) != SECSuccess)
+ return k5_nss_map_last_error();
+ return 0;
+}
+
+void
+krb5int_prng_cleanup (void)
+{
+}
+
+#else /* CRYPTO_IMPL_NSS */
+
+#include "yarrow.h"
+static Yarrow_CTX y_ctx;
+
+/* Gather enough OS entropy per call to trigger a Yarrow reseed. */
+#define OS_ENTROPY_LEN (YARROW_SLOW_THRESH/8)
+
/* Helper function to estimate entropy based on sample length
* and where it comes from.
*/
@@ -100,12 +163,6 @@
}
krb5_error_code KRB5_CALLCONV
-krb5_c_random_seed(krb5_context context, krb5_data *data)
-{
- return krb5_c_random_add_entropy(context, KRB5_C_RANDSOURCE_OLDAPI, data);
-}
-
-krb5_error_code KRB5_CALLCONV
krb5_c_random_make_octets(krb5_context context, krb5_data *data)
{
int yerr;
@@ -127,7 +184,14 @@
k5_mutex_destroy(&yarrow_lock);
}
+#endif /* not CRYPTO_IMPL_NSS */
+krb5_error_code KRB5_CALLCONV
+krb5_c_random_seed(krb5_context context, krb5_data *data)
+{
+ return krb5_c_random_add_entropy(context, KRB5_C_RANDSOURCE_OLDAPI, data);
+}
+
/*
* Routines to get entropy from the OS. For UNIX we try /dev/urandom
* and /dev/random. Currently we don't do anything for Windows.
@@ -163,7 +227,7 @@
krb5_data data;
struct stat sb;
int fd;
- unsigned char buf[YARROW_SLOW_THRESH/8], *bp;
+ unsigned char buf[OS_ENTROPY_LEN], *bp;
int left;
fd = open (device, O_RDONLY);
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