svn rev #21826: trunk/src/lib/krb5/krb/

raeburn@MIT.EDU raeburn at MIT.EDU
Wed Jan 28 20:19:02 EST 2009


http://src.mit.edu/fisheye/changelog/krb5/?cs=21826
Commit By: raeburn
Log Message:
whitespace


Changed Files:
U   trunk/src/lib/krb5/krb/sendauth.c
Modified: trunk/src/lib/krb5/krb/sendauth.c
===================================================================
--- trunk/src/lib/krb5/krb/sendauth.c	2009-01-29 01:12:17 UTC (rev 21825)
+++ trunk/src/lib/krb5/krb/sendauth.c	2009-01-29 01:19:01 UTC (rev 21826)
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+/* -*- mode: c; indent-tabs-mode: nil -*- */
 /*
  * lib/krb5/krb/sendauth.c
  *
@@ -8,7 +9,7 @@
  *   require a specific license from the United States Government.
  *   It is the responsibility of any person or organization contemplating
  *   export to obtain such a license before exporting.
- * 
+ *
  * WITHIN THAT CONSTRAINT, permission to use, copy, modify, and
  * distribute this software and its documentation for any purpose and
  * without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above copyright
@@ -22,8 +23,8 @@
  * M.I.T. makes no representations about the suitability of
  * this software for any purpose.  It is provided "as is" without express
  * or implied warranty.
- * 
  *
+ *
  * convenience sendauth/recvauth functions
  */
 
@@ -39,199 +40,197 @@
 
 krb5_error_code KRB5_CALLCONV
 krb5_sendauth(krb5_context context, krb5_auth_context *auth_context,
-	      krb5_pointer fd, char *appl_version, krb5_principal client,
-	      krb5_principal server, krb5_flags ap_req_options,
-	      krb5_data *in_data, krb5_creds *in_creds, krb5_ccache ccache,
-	      krb5_error **error, krb5_ap_rep_enc_part **rep_result,
-	      krb5_creds **out_creds)
+              krb5_pointer fd, char *appl_version, krb5_principal client,
+              krb5_principal server, krb5_flags ap_req_options,
+              krb5_data *in_data, krb5_creds *in_creds, krb5_ccache ccache,
+              krb5_error **error, krb5_ap_rep_enc_part **rep_result,
+              krb5_creds **out_creds)
 {
-	krb5_octet		result;
-	krb5_creds 		creds;
-	krb5_creds		 * credsp = NULL;
-	krb5_creds		 * credspout = NULL;
-	krb5_error_code		retval = 0;
-	krb5_data		inbuf, outbuf[2];
-	int			len;
-	krb5_ccache		use_ccache = 0;
+    krb5_octet          result;
+    krb5_creds          creds;
+    krb5_creds           * credsp = NULL;
+    krb5_creds           * credspout = NULL;
+    krb5_error_code     retval = 0;
+    krb5_data           inbuf, outbuf[2];
+    int                 len;
+    krb5_ccache         use_ccache = 0;
 
-	if (error)
-	    *error = 0;
+    if (error)
+        *error = 0;
 
-	/*
-	 * First, send over the length of the sendauth version string;
-	 * then, we send over the sendauth version.  Next, we send
-	 * over the length of the application version strings followed
-	 * by the string itself.  
-	 */
-	outbuf[0].length = strlen(sendauth_version) + 1;
-	outbuf[0].data = (char *) sendauth_version;
-	outbuf[1].length = strlen(appl_version) + 1;
-	outbuf[1].data = appl_version;
-	if ((retval = krb5int_write_messages(context, fd, outbuf, 2)))
-		return(retval);
-	/*
-	 * Now, read back a byte: 0 means no error, 1 means bad sendauth
-	 * version, 2 means bad application version
-	 */
+    /*
+     * First, send over the length of the sendauth version string;
+     * then, we send over the sendauth version.  Next, we send
+     * over the length of the application version strings followed
+     * by the string itself.
+     */
+    outbuf[0].length = strlen(sendauth_version) + 1;
+    outbuf[0].data = (char *) sendauth_version;
+    outbuf[1].length = strlen(appl_version) + 1;
+    outbuf[1].data = appl_version;
+    if ((retval = krb5int_write_messages(context, fd, outbuf, 2)))
+        return(retval);
+    /*
+     * Now, read back a byte: 0 means no error, 1 means bad sendauth
+     * version, 2 means bad application version
+     */
     if ((len = krb5_net_read(context, *((int *) fd), (char *)&result, 1)) != 1)
-	return((len < 0) ? errno : ECONNABORTED);
+        return((len < 0) ? errno : ECONNABORTED);
     if (result == 1)
-	return(KRB5_SENDAUTH_BADAUTHVERS);
+        return(KRB5_SENDAUTH_BADAUTHVERS);
     else if (result == 2)
-	return(KRB5_SENDAUTH_BADAPPLVERS);
+        return(KRB5_SENDAUTH_BADAPPLVERS);
     else if (result != 0)
-	return(KRB5_SENDAUTH_BADRESPONSE);
-	/*
-	 * We're finished with the initial negotiations; let's get and
-	 * send over the authentication header.  (The AP_REQ message)
-	 */
+        return(KRB5_SENDAUTH_BADRESPONSE);
+    /*
+     * We're finished with the initial negotiations; let's get and
+     * send over the authentication header.  (The AP_REQ message)
+     */
 
-	/*
-	 * If no credentials were provided, try getting it from the
-	 * credentials cache.
-	 */
-	memset((char *)&creds, 0, sizeof(creds));
+    /*
+     * If no credentials were provided, try getting it from the
+     * credentials cache.
+     */
+    memset((char *)&creds, 0, sizeof(creds));
 
-	/*
-	 * See if we need to access the credentials cache
-	 */
-	if (!in_creds || !in_creds->ticket.length) {
-		if (ccache)
-			use_ccache = ccache;
-		else if ((retval = krb5int_cc_default(context, &use_ccache)))
-			goto error_return;
-	}
-	if (!in_creds) {
-		if ((retval = krb5_copy_principal(context, server,
-						  &creds.server)))
-			goto error_return;
-		if (client)
-			retval = krb5_copy_principal(context, client, 
-						     &creds.client);
-		else
-			retval = krb5_cc_get_principal(context, use_ccache,
-						       &creds.client);
-		if (retval) {
-			krb5_free_principal(context, creds.server);
-			goto error_return;
-		}
-		/* creds.times.endtime = 0; -- memset 0 takes care of this
-					zero means "as long as possible" */
-		/* creds.keyblock.enctype = 0; -- as well as this.
-					zero means no session enctype
-					preference */
-		in_creds = &creds;
-	}
-	if (!in_creds->ticket.length) {
-	    if ((retval = krb5_get_credentials(context, 0,
-					       use_ccache, in_creds, &credsp)))
-		    goto error_return;
-	    credspout = credsp;
-	} else {
-	    credsp = in_creds;
-	}
+    /*
+     * See if we need to access the credentials cache
+     */
+    if (!in_creds || !in_creds->ticket.length) {
+        if (ccache)
+            use_ccache = ccache;
+        else if ((retval = krb5int_cc_default(context, &use_ccache)))
+            goto error_return;
+    }
+    if (!in_creds) {
+        if ((retval = krb5_copy_principal(context, server,
+                                          &creds.server)))
+            goto error_return;
+        if (client)
+            retval = krb5_copy_principal(context, client,
+                                         &creds.client);
+        else
+            retval = krb5_cc_get_principal(context, use_ccache,
+                                           &creds.client);
+        if (retval) {
+            krb5_free_principal(context, creds.server);
+            goto error_return;
+        }
+        /* creds.times.endtime = 0; -- memset 0 takes care of this
+           zero means "as long as possible" */
+        /* creds.keyblock.enctype = 0; -- as well as this.
+           zero means no session enctype
+           preference */
+        in_creds = &creds;
+    }
+    if (!in_creds->ticket.length) {
+        if ((retval = krb5_get_credentials(context, 0,
+                                           use_ccache, in_creds, &credsp)))
+            goto error_return;
+        credspout = credsp;
+    } else {
+        credsp = in_creds;
+    }
 
-	if (ap_req_options & AP_OPTS_USE_SUBKEY) {
-	    /* Provide some more fodder for random number code.
-	       This isn't strong cryptographically; the point here is
-	       not to guarantee randomness, but to make it less likely
-	       that multiple sessions could pick the same subkey.  */
-	    char rnd_data[1024];
-	    GETPEERNAME_ARG3_TYPE len2;
-	    krb5_data d;
-	    d.length = sizeof (rnd_data);
-	    d.data = rnd_data;
-	    len2 = sizeof (rnd_data);
-	    if (getpeername (*(int*)fd, (GETPEERNAME_ARG2_TYPE *) rnd_data, 
-			     &len2) == 0) {
-		d.length = len2;
-		(void) krb5_c_random_add_entropy (context, KRB5_C_RANDSOURCE_EXTERNAL_PROTOCOL, &d);
-	    }
-	    len2 = sizeof (rnd_data);
-	    if (getsockname (*(int*)fd, (GETSOCKNAME_ARG2_TYPE *) rnd_data, 
-			     &len2) == 0) {
-		d.length = len2;
-		(void) krb5_c_random_add_entropy (context, KRB5_C_RANDSOURCE_EXTERNAL_PROTOCOL, &d);
-	    }
-	}
+    if (ap_req_options & AP_OPTS_USE_SUBKEY) {
+        /* Provide some more fodder for random number code.
+           This isn't strong cryptographically; the point here is
+           not to guarantee randomness, but to make it less likely
+           that multiple sessions could pick the same subkey.  */
+        char rnd_data[1024];
+        GETPEERNAME_ARG3_TYPE len2;
+        krb5_data d;
+        d.length = sizeof (rnd_data);
+        d.data = rnd_data;
+        len2 = sizeof (rnd_data);
+        if (getpeername (*(int*)fd, (GETPEERNAME_ARG2_TYPE *) rnd_data,
+                         &len2) == 0) {
+            d.length = len2;
+            (void) krb5_c_random_add_entropy (context, KRB5_C_RANDSOURCE_EXTERNAL_PROTOCOL, &d);
+        }
+        len2 = sizeof (rnd_data);
+        if (getsockname (*(int*)fd, (GETSOCKNAME_ARG2_TYPE *) rnd_data,
+                         &len2) == 0) {
+            d.length = len2;
+            (void) krb5_c_random_add_entropy (context, KRB5_C_RANDSOURCE_EXTERNAL_PROTOCOL, &d);
+        }
+    }
 
-	outbuf[0].data = NULL;	/* Coverity is confused otherwise */
-	if ((retval = krb5_mk_req_extended(context, auth_context,
-					   ap_req_options, in_data, credsp,
-					   &outbuf[0])))
-	    goto error_return;
+    outbuf[0].data = NULL;      /* Coverity is confused otherwise */
+    if ((retval = krb5_mk_req_extended(context, auth_context,
+                                       ap_req_options, in_data, credsp,
+                                       &outbuf[0])))
+        goto error_return;
 
-	/*
-	 * First write the length of the AP_REQ message, then write
-	 * the message itself.
-	 */
-	retval = krb5_write_message(context, fd, &outbuf[0]);
-	free(outbuf[0].data);
-	if (retval)
-	    goto error_return;
+    /*
+     * First write the length of the AP_REQ message, then write
+     * the message itself.
+     */
+    retval = krb5_write_message(context, fd, &outbuf[0]);
+    free(outbuf[0].data);
+    if (retval)
+        goto error_return;
 
-	/*
-	 * Now, read back a message.  If it was a null message (the
-	 * length was zero) then there was no error.  If not, we the
-	 * authentication was rejected, and we need to return the
-	 * error structure.
-	 */
-	if ((retval = krb5_read_message(context, fd, &inbuf)))
-	    goto error_return;
+    /*
+     * Now, read back a message.  If it was a null message (the
+     * length was zero) then there was no error.  If not, we the
+     * authentication was rejected, and we need to return the
+     * error structure.
+     */
+    if ((retval = krb5_read_message(context, fd, &inbuf)))
+        goto error_return;
 
-	if (inbuf.length) {
-		if (error) {
-		    if ((retval = krb5_rd_error(context, &inbuf, error))) {
-			free(inbuf.data);
-			goto error_return;
-		    }
-		}
-		retval = KRB5_SENDAUTH_REJECTED;
-		free(inbuf.data);
-		goto error_return;
-	}
-	
-	/*
-	 * If we asked for mutual authentication, we should now get a
-	 * length field, followed by a AP_REP message
-	 */
-	if ((ap_req_options & AP_OPTS_MUTUAL_REQUIRED)) {
-	    krb5_ap_rep_enc_part	*repl = 0;
-		
-	    if ((retval = krb5_read_message(context, fd, &inbuf)))
-		goto error_return;
+    if (inbuf.length) {
+        if (error) {
+            if ((retval = krb5_rd_error(context, &inbuf, error))) {
+                free(inbuf.data);
+                goto error_return;
+            }
+        }
+        retval = KRB5_SENDAUTH_REJECTED;
+        free(inbuf.data);
+        goto error_return;
+    }
 
-	    if ((retval = krb5_rd_rep(context, *auth_context, &inbuf,
-				      &repl))) {
-		if (repl)
-		    krb5_free_ap_rep_enc_part(context, repl);
-	        free(inbuf.data);
-		goto error_return;
-	    }
+    /*
+     * If we asked for mutual authentication, we should now get a
+     * length field, followed by a AP_REP message
+     */
+    if ((ap_req_options & AP_OPTS_MUTUAL_REQUIRED)) {
+        krb5_ap_rep_enc_part    *repl = 0;
 
-	    free(inbuf.data);
-	    /*
-	     * If the user wants to look at the AP_REP message,
-	     * copy it for him
-	     */
-	    if (rep_result) 
-		*rep_result = repl;
-	    else
-		krb5_free_ap_rep_enc_part(context, repl);
-	}
-	retval = 0;		/* Normal return */
-	if (out_creds) {
-	    *out_creds = credsp;
-	    credspout = NULL;
-	}
+        if ((retval = krb5_read_message(context, fd, &inbuf)))
+            goto error_return;
 
+        if ((retval = krb5_rd_rep(context, *auth_context, &inbuf,
+                                  &repl))) {
+            if (repl)
+                krb5_free_ap_rep_enc_part(context, repl);
+            free(inbuf.data);
+            goto error_return;
+        }
+
+        free(inbuf.data);
+        /*
+         * If the user wants to look at the AP_REP message,
+         * copy it for him
+         */
+        if (rep_result)
+            *rep_result = repl;
+        else
+            krb5_free_ap_rep_enc_part(context, repl);
+    }
+    retval = 0;         /* Normal return */
+    if (out_creds) {
+        *out_creds = credsp;
+        credspout = NULL;
+    }
+
 error_return:
     krb5_free_cred_contents(context, &creds);
     if (credspout != NULL)
-	krb5_free_creds(context, credspout); 
+        krb5_free_creds(context, credspout);
     if (!ccache && use_ccache)
-	krb5_cc_close(context, use_ccache);
+        krb5_cc_close(context, use_ccache);
     return(retval);
 }
-
-




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