[Crib-list] [Fwd: TALK:Thursday 5-19-05 Universal Mechanism Design] (fwd)

[Shirley Entzminger]

Theory Seminar: Universal Mechanism Design
Speaker: Silvio Micali
Speaker Affiliation: MIT
Host: Shafi Goldwasser
Host Affiliation: MIT

Date: 5-19-2005
Time: 4:15 PM - 5:15 PM
Refreshments: 4:00 PM
Location: 32-G449 (Patil/Kiva)

Mechanism Design applies to many a context, including allocations of private 
goods, provisions of public goods, design of markets, voting procedures, social 
planning, etc. Mechanism design problems, however, are typically solved 
individually, each time with much ingenuity.

We exhibit an automatic, polynomial-time procedure that, given ANY mechanism 
design problem, finds a solution, if one exists.

Key to our result is proving that the ballot-box, the device used all over the 
world for privately and correctly computing the tally function, can actually be 
used to compute ANY function with unusually strong security properties.

Joint work with Sergei Izmalkov and Matt Lepinski

Relevant URL(S): http://theory.csail.mit.edu/toc-seminars/2005/
For more information please contact: Shafi Goldwasser, , 
shafi at theory.csail.mit.edu

_______________________________________________
Seminars mailing list
Seminars at lists.csail.mit.edu
http://lists.csail.mit.edu/mailman/listinfo/seminars