

Entangled Geographies

**Empire and
Technopolitics
in the Global
Cold War**

edited by Gabrielle Hecht

MIT Press
2011

Contents

Acknowledgments ix

1 Introduction 1

Gabrielle Hecht

2 Islands: The United States as a Networked Empire 13

Ruth Oldenziel

3 The Uses of Portability: Circulating Experts in the Technopolitics of Cold War and Decolonization 43

Donna Mehos and Suzanne Moon

4 On the Fallacies of Cold War Nostalgia: Capitalism, Colonialism, and South African Nuclear Geographies 75

Gabrielle Hecht

5 Rare Earths: The Cold War in the Annals of Travancore 101

Itty Abraham

6 Nuclear Colonization?: Soviet Technopolitics in the Second World 125

Sonja D. Schmid

7 The Technopolitical Lineage of State Planning in Hungary, 1930–1956 155

Martha Lampland

8 Fifty Years' Progress in Five: Brasilia—Modernization, Globalism, and the Geopolitics of Flight 185

Lars Denicke

9 Crude Ecology: Technology and the Politics of Dissent in Saudi Arabia 209

Toby C. Jones

10 A Plundering Tiger with Its Deadly Cubs? The USSR and China as Weapons in the Engineering of a "Zimbabwean Nation," 1945–2009 231

Clapperton Chakanetsa Mavhunga

11 Cleaning Up the Cold War: Global Humanitarianism and the Infrastructure of Crisis Response 267

Peter Redfield

Bibliography 293

About the Authors 329

Index 331



10 A Plundering Tiger with Its Deadly Cubs? The USSR and China as Weapons in the Engineering of a "Zimbabwean Nation," 1945–2009

Clapperton Chakanetsa Mavhunga

Does it make sense to talk about the "Cold War," let alone "The Global Cold War," in the Global South? What happens to local time when "watershed moments" in the Global North are extended uncritically to mark global time? Are we sure that the materiality and meaning of these "local" events are shared beyond their borders? How do other locals measure their own times?

Like "the First World War" and "the Second World War," "the Cold War" falls within a continuing way of defining what counts as worldly (what is globally significant) from Europe and North America, using war as if it is the only marker of time. The rivalry between two countries—the United States and the Soviet Union—and the trickery they deploy to outwit one another, and using other countries as unobvious weaponry, is transformed into a universal moment in which everybody is living.¹ On occasion Cuba is mentioned, if only as a Soviet surrogate and base-plate position for Moscow's nuclear warheads.² China enters the fray as a Soviet ally—until it gets fed up with Moscow's duplicity when striking nocturnal deals with Washington.³ In the end, whenever scholars insist on "the Cold War" in the Global South, their defense is no more than following the North's footsteps and pathways in the Global South. Of late, even scholars of such oft-omitted "Cold Warriors" as Cuba, China, and the Nordic countries have followed suit.⁴ Any apportionment of agency to African players becomes no more than a work of charity in which the Africans can do no more than respond as opposed to initiating events and synchronizing the North to their own time and circumstances.

So what are the modalities of inverting the commonplace synchronization of Southern time to Northern time into a synchronization of Northern time to Southern time? As this essay will proceed to show, it would force us to spin the narrative of American and Soviet users of Southern puppets into one of Southerners as designers (or political engineers) of post-colonial

futures using the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and influential Southerners Cuba and China as unobvious weaponries (armories as well as strategic assets) to achieve their objectives.

Thanks to emerging memoirs of Soviet operatives in Africa during the 1960s, the 1970s, and the 1980s, we now know that the Soviets did not even use the term "Cold War," whether prefixed with "the" or "a." The Soviets considered such vocabulary "the creation of 'war mongers' and 'imperialist propaganda.'" From Moscow, the battle was not between "two 'superpowers' assisted by their 'satellites' and 'proxies'" as depicted from Washington but "a united fight of the world's progressive forces against imperialism."⁵ Official America had borrowed the term from the English novelist-journalist George Orwell, who in 1945 had deployed it to deride how atomic power had equipped the US and the USSR with a bully-boy mentality of dividing and ruling the world between themselves.⁶ Of course, Orwell's anger toward hegemonic forces and their powers of permeation blinded him to the very same permeation as an avenue for local resistance against or even manipulation of the hegemonic, or, as James Ferguson recently showed, the likelihood of such seemingly universalizing forces to anchor in some while completely steering clear of other places.⁷ It could very well be that the North viewed the period as one of a nuclear arms race while the South viewed it as an anti-colonial and postcolonial era.⁸

The question at stake in this chapter is this: Does the Cold War conceptually and analytically belong in the South, and if so, on whose terms? The Norwegian scholar Odd Arne Westad rejects the position that it does not, on two grounds. First, "without the Cold War, Africa, Asia, and possibly also Latin America would have been very different regions today." Second, "Third World elites often framed their own political agendas in conscious *response* to the models of development presented by the two main contenders of the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union" [emphasis added].⁹ In making his powerful argument, Westad is writing against traditional diplomatic historians for whom the Cold War is only about superpowers and their shenanigans.

Whereas Westad makes a case for the inclusion of the South in the Cold War, I do not see the necessity. The Cold War cannot suffice as an analytic to explain developments in the South, particularly because it misses so much about motivations and agencies. Calling this anti-colonial resistance period a 'Cold War' era would be tantamount to a notion of time I have already rejected: using Northern temporal benchmarks that are very situated and specific to certain countries' foreign relations to envelope benchmarks (e.g., colonialism, anti-colonial struggles, and independence) that are specific to

the South. The further effect is to see Southerners as "using the opportunities offered by Cold War logics" for their own purposes, such that the Cold War sneaks right back to belong in the South analytically, even if it is not a dominant explanatory mode. That too is not what this chapter means: rather, it seeks to show that opportunities were not "offered" by anybody but were a result of local initiatives.

The moment one uses the term "response" to describe what the actors discussed in this chapter are doing, their status as initiators is lost. They become "surrogates," "satellites," or "puppets"—exactly what Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda meant in 1976 when, referring to the worrying increase in Soviet presence in Southern Africa (especially Angola), he spoke of "a plundering tiger with its deadly cubs coming through the back door."¹⁰ Yet at the level of practice, those who use others as puppets are unaware that the so-called puppets are using them (in Shona, *kushandiswa*). They are what one might call puppets of the puppets. Those who see themselves as engineers or designers of artifacts are in fact artifacts of the artifact: the user of the user is, in fact, the used.¹¹

The term "using" extends beyond the traditional STS sense of designers as engineers making artifacts for users (consumers).¹² Rather, it is a process of designing through inversion. The Soviets and the Chinese were entitled to think these black politicians were their puppets. Upon closer scrutiny, these politicians were 'playing puppet' as a camouflage to use these communist countries as weaponry for designing themselves into nationalists, create guerrilla movements, and assemble ideological repertoires to engineer colonies into independent nations through warfare and diplomatic trickery. This, I suggest, is how the North became a weapon of the South (not just the Sino-Soviet blocs but also the US and Mobutu Sese Seko and Jonas Savimbi, France and Félix Houphouët-Boigny, and so on). There were moments in such encounters when countries of the North projected themselves as "superpowers" fighting a Cold War. Meanwhile, in the eyes of Africans, they were merely sources of guns, military training, and communist ideology—tools with which to liberate power for themselves. At moments, in local contexts, the "superpowers" were virtually "superpowerless" in the face of the agencies of local actors, for whom the logics and exigencies of "liberation wars" and seizing power were paramount.

They became weapons of local actors. When used as a noun, "weapon" means anything used against an opponent, an adversary, or a victim. In its verb sense, "to weapon" refers to two things. First, it refers to how local politicians in white-minority-ruled Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) used the Soviets and the Chinese first as chisels to carve their raw civilian men into

guerrillas, then as quartermasters to supply or equip them with guns. Second, it refers to how the Soviets and Chinese, on one hand, and the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) and the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), on the other, transformed one another into weapons. These senses of weaponry are very destabilizing: the weaponizer is, without being aware of it, being transformed into a weapon. Thinking they are using others, the users are, by using, being used to perform a function by those they are using.

For Mamadou Diouf, such "trickery" or "appropriation" (hence my sense of "appropriate technology") raises two critical questions about the location of locals (Africans) in the narrative of globalization: "Is it a matter of appropriating this process by 'annexing' it? Or, rather, of exploiting this process to lend new strength to local idioms, so as to impose on the global scene the original version in place of its translation and adaptation?"¹³ Contrary to Stuart Hall, Diouf is reluctant to accept that localism is "the only point of intervention against the hegemonic, universalizing thrust of globalization." According to him, Africans have constantly remodeled their traditions to create a new memory that differs from that of Western "modernity" in order to "anticipate a future saturated with projects of an indisputable modernity."¹⁴

The story told in this essay is precisely one of intersections between these globalizing, hegemonic thrusts, on the one hand, and the local imperatives that create a buy-in or rejection of the same, on the other, with guerrillas, guns, ideology, and history as specific weapons serving mutual purposes. They occupy that intermediate space between the North and the South, between communist countries and anti-colonial movements, as boundary objects.¹⁵ Once the topographies are mapped, the essay then discusses the war in Rhodesia as a process of engineering a postcolonial state through violence. The conclusion narrows the discussion to the rise and reign of President Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe, suggesting an examination of him as an engineer of political survival in power through the weaponization of forces that would ordinarily render him the hegemon's weapon or victim.

Mutual Weaponization

There are two types of genealogies that intersect here that make it difficult to accept a notion of "the global Cold War." The first is one of US-Soviet rivalry, both countries trying to turn the Global South into "topographic weaponry" to outsmart each other from 1955 on. The process involved recruiting Africans from leftist organizations for civilian training on

scholarships, and engineering them into hybrid vehicles of communism and anti-colonialism through political indoctrination. By 1965, the Soviets and the Chinese were "sculpting" African guerrillas out of civilians recruited under false pretenses (they were told they were going for civilian courses, only to arrive and be shepherded into barracks).¹⁶

The second genealogy, which occupies most of my attention, is with regards to Africans' trickery and appropriation of the external to fill spaces in their own crossword puzzles. A proper archeology of this innovative tradition is better located in the colonial (and pre-colonial) moments of African history to head off any misconception that it came either with Europeans or Sino-Soviet "advisers" in the 1960s, the 1970s, and the 1980s. This chapter does not deal with pre-colonial appropriations, preferring instead to focus on developments immediately leading up to how black politicians helped themselves to and used the Soviets and Chinese as weaponry. In the first fifty years of white settler rule in Rhodesia, those blacks that got into the school system subverted missionary education that was supposed to make them meek colonial subjects into master keys opening doors to further studies in the diaspora since Rhodesia had no university until 1957.¹⁷ The idea of "Zimbabwean nationalism" owed much to this intellectual exposure to black thought in Africa, America, France, and Britain. In 1959, Pan-Africanism—particularly negritude—became a glue for binding multiple workers' organizations into Zimbabwe's first black mass party, the National Democratic Party (NDP). By 1961, a second transformation had occurred: the battlefield had shifted from negotiating tables to streets. By 1963, the battlefield shifted to the bush, the weapons no longer books and eruditions, stones, and petrol bombs but guns.

This turn to guns is the stage where the US-Soviet rivalry and the Zimbabwean trajectories meet. The turn to guns after 1961 is located within a long local tradition of spiritual and secular weapons for taking and sparing life for purposes of human security. Its predecessors are poison, witchcraft spells, bows and arrows, spears, axes, and snares.¹⁸ Before European colonization, southern Africa's inhabitants had for centuries innovated upon their metallurgical, pharmacological, ecological, and biotechnological traditions to produce goods exchangeable for overseas products, including guns.¹⁹ The resistance of the Shona and Ndebele people (Africans) to the British colonization led by Cecil Rhodes in 1893 and in 1896–97 can be attributed to their initiative to acquire muskets and Martini Henry rifles and subvert them to the practice of African kingship. They were defeated not because they had failed to adapt their customary fighting technique to guns,²⁰ but because the equipment was outmoded in comparison with their European

enemies' Maxim guns. After all, the foundries were in Liverpool, and what reached the South was mostly decommissioned or trade stock, considered unsuitable for military purposes and therefore fit only for export.²¹

It was not until after 1961 that Africans contemplated using guns to challenge the rule of (descendants of) colonial settlers. Since the 1930s, the emerging African elite educated in universities in South Africa and America had used the "civilized" language of diplomacy without success. When in 1961 the British bowed to Rhodesian pressure and refused to grant independence to Africans, the die had been cast. Power would not be given; it had to be taken—by force if necessary.²²

In 1961, ZAPU—under the leadership of Joshua Nkomo, a trade unionist and intellectual educated in South Africa—became the latest African political formation to challenge the state. Banned a year later, it continued "underground" as the People's Caretaker Council (PCC). In August 1963, tired of the politics of entreaty, a few—mostly Shona-speaking radicals led by a US-educated Wesleyan minister, Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole—broke away from the PCC to form the Zimbabwe African National Union. A year later, Rhodesia banned the PCC and ZANU and detained most of the leaders, including Nkomo, Sithole, and Mugabe.

Before ZAPU's banning, however, African politicians had already taken the first practical steps toward acquiring guns. This is the point at which the local genealogy intersected with the national interests of China, the Soviet Union, and Cuba. Until 1955, Africa had remained at the edge of Chinese and Soviet foreign policies.²³ China's revolution had ended only recently (1949). Cuba was still four years from the end of the Batista regime. The Soviets had just buried Joseph Stalin two years earlier and installed Nikita Khrushchev.

China found its feet first: with Indonesia it convened the first Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization (AAPSO) conference at Bandung in 1955. This bold move established what Richard Wright called "the Color Curtain" contesting the validity of an "Iron Curtain" in the ordering of the world at the time.²⁴ From Moscow, the world division of "haves" and "have-nots" was not necessarily a color problem but ideology. In the Soviet imagination, the world had to be cleansed of capitalism, the monster that had given rise to imperialism and the colonization of the South. Subsequently, Khrushchev provided arms and training to equip African leftists with the technical means to weaken Western imperialism from within.²⁵

African politicians saw Moscow as strategic political and military capital to stiffen resistance against Rhodesia. The foundations of ZAPU-Soviet networks were built at three successive AAPSO meetings—one in Conakry (April 1960), one in Beirut (November that year), and one in Moscow

(January 1961). The National Democratic Party (NDP) started the construction work before it was banned and ZAPU was formed to replace it. The affable Tarcissius George "TG" Silundika was the builder. The weapons ZAPU sought in 1961 were not guns but a printing press and scholarships; the motive was clearly to use Marxism as "subversive weaponry" to replace Rhodesia's oppressive capitalism with a more equitable political order.²⁶

Moscow did not just open its armories to ZAPU. In fact, in September 1962, after the banning of ZAPU, the PCC dispatched Joshua Nkomo to Egypt to buy guns from a contact named Mohammed Faiek and smuggle them in by commercial airline via Tanzania and Zambia.²⁷ Inevitably, the party's armory began as a motley collection of small arms that the market could supply and the little money available could buy.²⁸ Later the collection grew to include AK-47 rifles.²⁹

From 1967 to 1970, ZAPU had good guns but used the tactics and strategy the Soviets had drilled into its trainees without critical thought and without practical adaptation. After its disastrous joint conventional campaign with the South African National Congress (ANC) military wing, the Umkonto weSizwe (abbreviated MK), in 1967, the Rhodesian Security Forces (RSF) captured AK and SKS rifles, RPG-7 shoulder-operated rocket launchers, RPD machine guns, PPSH submachine guns, and explosive devices.³⁰

Until 1975, ZAPU's faith in guns had been restricted to small arms, as heavy weapons were thought to give away troop positions while slowing down the mobility that typifies guerrilla warfare.³¹ Beginning in 1976, however, it made the transition to conventional weapons by attaching relatively heavy pieces to its guerrilla units and rear bases. From July 1978 on, convoy after convoy of armored cars rolled out of southern Angola into Zambia.³² By May 1979, giant Russian Antonov-12 transport planes were landing "tanks, artillery and heavy machine guns" into the capital Lusaka daily to equip mobile battalions.³³ Previously, all ZAPU's weaponry was portable; from 1978 it "grew legs" and "gained weight." T-34 tanks, MTU-55 bridging equipment, BTR-152 armored personnel carriers, BM-14 and BM-21 multiple-rocket launchers, and Soviet-made command cars were brought in to equip the regular force trained in Angola.³⁴ Some ZAPU operatives say the Soviet Union delivered an unknown number of MiG-21 fighter jets to provide air cover.³⁵ Soviet operatives disagree only in details.³⁶ It is clear that the USSR had become a rather generous quartermaster to ZAPU.

ZANU struggled with shortages of guns throughout the war. After a militant beginning involving acts of arson and public violence directed at both the state and at ZAPU, ZANU scaled up its operations to a military strategy in 1966. The main technopolitical structure for this was the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA), which was composed of

trained and armed politicians. Its commander Josiah Tongogara said of its first battle near Sinoia in north-central Rhodesia: "We bought guns, bought dug-out canoes and crossed the Zambezi, landing on Zimbabwean soil as a people's army for the first time. . . . We had only a hundred guns and 50 soldiers, but it was the best army one could dream of. That is what we felt about it."³⁷ These early operations were miserable failures, prompting reorganization for the next four years.

When it re-launched operations in 1972, ZANLA had negotiated a pact to fight alongside the Mozambican guerrilla movement FRELIMO (Frente de Libertação de Moçambique) and was receiving arms shipped from China to Dar-es-Salaam and, after Mozambican independence, to the port cities of Beira and Maputo. Most of them were AK-47 rifles in crates.³⁸ This materiel was stored in depots for distribution to the operational headquarters of Tembwe, Chimoio, and Xai Xai. Each guerrilla detachment going into the operational area (Rhodesia) on foot then carried its own supply of guns and ammunition, which was usually "enough . . . to fight for months a hundred kilometers in every direction."³⁹ Once inside Rhodesia, they cached these supplies within a certain radius of their mobile operations.

Assembling Human Weapons

Guns were useless without the acquisition of the necessary skills to kill or spare life. This section attempts to locate some of the spaces where ZAPU




Figure 10.1

The engineering of a Zimbabwean nation through the weaponization of countries. Source: Clapperton Mavhunga. Copyright 2007.

and ZANU sent raw human material to be engineered into mobile weaponry with which to physically carve Rhodesia into Zimbabwe. One might see the guerrilla as a boundary object, a kind of weaponized body at the intersection of two designers (his own organization and the communist countries training him), a vehicle through which these two designers used each other.⁴⁰ I have omitted training in North Korea, eastern European countries, Egypt, Ethiopia, Libya, Uganda, and other countries because I am currently examining the OAU Liberation Committee archives in Dar-es-Salaam.

The Soviet Union

We must remember that while ZAPU and ZANU had designed a strategy to get into power, they did not have total control over the means; nor were they self-sufficient.⁴¹ Soviet training assistance to ZAPU began with students on scholarship attending political training at the Institute of Social Science. They were not meek sponges for communism; in fact, on numerous occasions they embarrassed ZAPU by making withering critiques of Soviet communism. If Moscow detained or expelled them, it risked defeating its purpose of engineering mobile vessels for its ideology. On the other hand, ZAPU forced its cadres to apologize lest they jeopardize Soviet support.⁴²

Especially for civilian trainees, racism was a major problem. The testimonies of African students in Georgia in 1962 suggest that local students subjected their black counterparts to "enmity and antagonism." The problem was so serious that the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) terminated the admission of blacks and transferred those already in Tbilisi to Moscow.⁴³ In mid 1962, race riots torched the Bulgarian capital, Sofia. The police intervened "violently" to protect Bulgarian students angered by "a Ghanaian's dancing with a Bulgarian girl." In 1963, violent anti-African riots hit Prague, sparked by "the preferential treatment the government offer[ed] to Africans."⁴⁴

One year after the Prague and Sofia riots, ZAPU formally requested military training in the Soviet Union. On December 24, 1963, the party's vice-president, James Chikerema, delivered a letter to AAPSO representative Latyp Maksudov in Cairo requesting the CPSU to provide four months of training for 30 people "for subversive work [and] for military sabotage." He also requested six months of training for three recruits to manufacture "simple small arms," since bringing arms into Rhodesia was "impossible." In mid 1964, two ZAPU groups were admitted to Northern Training Centre to undergo "a ten-month comprehensive course, which . . . included general military subjects and specialization in guerrilla and conventional warfare

and even field medicine." The first group included Akim Ndlovu, the second Pelekezela Mpoko. Both would become senior ZAPU commanders.⁴⁵

Subsequent groups underwent 12–18 months of phased instruction involving first some heavy communist indoctrination at the Central Kom-somol (Communist Union of Youth) School in Moscow.⁴⁶ The idea was to subordinate the anti-colonial projects of these recruits to Moscow's universalistic communist "war" against Western capitalism. Once the crust of parochialism was peeled off, the trainees were then sent to Odessa Military Academy in the Ukraine for officer cadet training under the mentorship of General Alexei Chevchenko.⁴⁷ From there they were taken to a training center in Tashkent (Uzbekistan) or to one in Perevalnoye (Crimea),⁴⁸ where conventional warfare and command-and-control skills were drilled into them. The training emphasized loyalty to the Communist Party's objectives and structures, the role of decisive force as "the midwife of revolution," mobile warfare with heavy armor, artillery, and airpower, an orderly war theater delineated into "tactical areas of responsibility," speed, and surprise.⁴⁹ The final phase involved espionage training at the Higher Intelligence School near Moscow.⁵⁰



Figure 10.2

Ambassador of the Republic of Zimbabwe Pelekezela Mpoko presents his letter of credentials to President Vladimir Putin of Russia, February 3, 2006. Source: <http://www.kremlin.ru>.

Cuba

In his book *Conflicting Missions*, Piero Gleijeses argues that, whereas the history of "the Cold War" has been written from the perspective of the Global North, there is no reason why it cannot be viewed "from Third World country to Third World country." Cuba was just a small island, yet shaped "the Third World" profoundly. Gleijeses shows that Cuba was no mere puppet or satellite of Moscow. In fact, it was the Cubans that sought a Soviet alliance in 1959, while Moscow found Cuba's location on America's doorstep strategic.⁵¹ Through its direct combat involvement in Africa and Latin America, Cuba solidified South-South solidarity networks that had begun to manifest since Bandung.

Looking at the Cuban Revolution of 1959, African nationalists saw a successful homegrown revolution they could use to inspire their own revolution.⁵² Three years later, ZAPU's first recruits arrived at the Minas del Frio training base in Cuba's Sierra Maestra Mountains to commence training. This coincided with the Cuban missile crisis. The subject of the training was not communism but the homegrown ideals of the Cuban Revolution and the tactics that had delivered its success: infiltration, operating in small groups, sabotage, and the training and command of a guerrilla army. Nkomo admitted that "the training [the Cubans] gave our soldiers was better and more realistic than that offered by almost any other country."⁵³ Including the Soviet Union.

China

For all the thunder about the Soviet Union as a plundering tiger, China was the first nation to train guerrillas to fight the Rhodesian government. In 1955, after nearly five centuries of isolation, China confirmed its return to the international scene when it jointly organized the Bandung Conference with Indonesia. The next year, the government in Beijing recognized Egypt's independence, hoping for Cairo to rally pan-African, pan-Arab, pan-Islamic, and pan-"Third World" support to help it gain recognition as the sole government of China at the expense of Taiwan. As a non-member, Beijing used Africa—and, by extension, solidarity within the Non-Aligned Movement—as its voice in the United Nations. And, by sponsoring students (including military trainees), China created advocates in Africa. In 1971, the UN General Assembly voted to recognize Beijing as the sole government of China and expelled Taiwan. With that goal accomplished, China cooled its relationship with Africa.⁵⁴

After China's pact with Egypt in 1956, the stream of African students seeking academic, military, and scientific knowledge in China gathered

momentum. In 1961 some 118 of them came to Beijing.⁵⁵ The purpose of seeking education in China was not merely to acquire tools to dislodge colonial governments but also to govern after they were gone. This training took two forms: civilian and military education. All new arrivals were taken to the Institute of Foreign Languages to learn Chinese as a medium of common instruction.

China's major apparatus for engineering these trainees into ideological weapons was political education, which started at ages 2–3 with kindergarteners being taught how to sing revolutionary songs in praise of Mao and songs deploring American imperialists as "the worst enemies of the Chinese people." Afterwards the children entered the Youth Pioneers and completed their ideological construction in the Communist Youth League. No matter how well one did in one's core academic studies, a continuous streak of poor grades in political education could result in expulsion. "Politics" in Chinese education meant one thing only: "Marxism as expounded, commented on and interpreted by Marx, Engels, Lenin and Mao." Books routinely started with, expanded on, and concluded with praise for the Chinese Communist Party.⁵⁶

Though the "national liberation war" narrative of Zimbabwean history lauds China as a "friend" of ZANU, it is silent about the purely civilian training, which engendered some rather bad feelings from the Chinese public. At least one student from Rhodesia lived through this period of deep Chinese public hostility arising from being "left half-starving on evil-smelling cabbage while the foreigners can eat good food in almost unqualified quantities." Deans received the same pay as their foreign students. African students were instructed to "jump [bus] queues" as one of many gestures designed to make them see how good communism was and report back home to their political parties accordingly. Instead the students ridiculed it and "stole Chinese women."⁵⁷ There was also a racist streak: Chinese often gave way to Africans to avoid skin contact or breathing contact, or to avoid being seen in the proximity of a black person.⁵⁸

It is not clear if such prejudices governed the more hierarchical and disciplinarian military camps such as Nanjing Military Academy, where ZANLA's commander Josiah Tongogara was trained.⁵⁹ The syllabus made sure that every recruit understood the historical symbolism of the place to be inspired by it. For it was through this very place that in 1949, Mao's Red Army had crossed the Yangtze into southern China to seize power. Tongogara arrived with ten others in 1966, four years after the pioneering group.⁶⁰ The training started with two months of ideological indoctrination in the "Chinese Revolution" and its communist ideals. A three-month

phase devoted to mass mobilization, military intelligence, political science, mass media, and guerilla strategies and tactics followed. In the last phase, the trainees were taken to another school of military engineering for two months of training in land-mine warfare. The critical difference between Soviet and Chinese training was the emphasis on mass mobilization, guerilla-oriented tactics, land-mine warfare, and Mao's stature as father of revolutionary warfare.⁶¹

Engineering Zimbabwe from Africa

The Organization of Africa Unity (OAU) was founded on May 25, 1963, on the precept that no part of Africa was free as long as any particle of its soil was still under colonial (white) rule. Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, Julius Nyerere of Tanzania, Ahmed Ben Bella of Algeria, and Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt) were convinced that military means—not just fiery rhetoric—were necessary to achieve this objective. To these men, Africa was no mere "idea" but a reality choking for air under the heavy weight of colonial rule: it needed liberation. The discourse of Pan-Africanism explained a reality that already existed through the shared experience of living under colonial rule.⁶² What was required was a liberational structure to confront what Valentin Mudimbe called a "colonializing structure."⁶³ Nkrumah initially proposed an African Liberation Army. Idi Amin Dada of Uganda and Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria pledged brigades. But only the establishment of the OAU Liberation Committee to coordinate international assistance to anti-colonial movements materialized. Though many African countries chipped in with training facilities from 1962 to 1979, the available data permits only a discussion of Tanzania, Mozambique, and Angola. The intention here is to show how Zimbabwe was engineered from outside, by African elites in partnership with the Soviets, the Cubans, and the Chinese, through various forms of support.

Tanzania: The Headquarters of Southern African Liberation

Nyerere's philosophy of Pan-Africanism revolved around his concept of "African Socialism"—pan-Africanism critically using socialism as an instrument to engineer a postcolonial modernity—as outlined in the four main points of his Arusha Declaration of 1967. First, Nyerere anchored Chinese collectivization within the east African philosophy of ujamaa (familyhood)—the belief that the individual existence is subsumed under the communal good—in the hope of achieving an "agriculture-based modernity."⁶⁴ Second, he declared a one-party state to steer this policy, borrowing

as much from pre-colonial Africa's kingly traditions as from the Chinese Communist Party. Third, in the 1970s, Nyerere entered into a Commodity Agreement under which ujamaa would deliver crop produce to China in return for the construction of "turn-key projects" such as the Tanzania-Zambia railway (TAZARA).⁶⁵ ZAPU and ZANU benefited directly from the fourth aspect of the Arusha Declaration: liberating the rest of southern Africa from colonial rule. Tanzania became the headquarters of Southern African liberation not merely by hosting the Liberation Committee (whose head, Brigadier Hashim Mbita, was Tanzanian), but also by acting as the point of arrival and distribution for incoming Sino-Soviet, Western humanitarian, and other support, as well as guerrilla headquarters and bases.

ZAPU graduates from Cuba, the USSR, and Algeria and ZANU graduates from China and Ghana returned to Tanzania to establish training camps and guerrilla armies. Albert Nxele, a graduate of the Intelligence School in Moscow, opened ZAPU's first two training camps, one at Kongwa (1966) and one at Morogoro (1967). The latter became the first OAU-sponsored guerrilla training camp in Africa. The courses took from six to eight months and involved basic infantry training.⁶⁶ Meanwhile, Nanjing's graduates established camps at Mgagao and Itumbi with Chinese, Tanzanian, and ZANLA instructors.⁶⁷ Nyerere also hosted FRELIMO training at Nachingwea until the guerrilla movement took power in Mozambique. He then turned the base over to ZANU.⁶⁸ Nachingwea was "the biggest and best-equipped training base in Africa," covering 16 square miles and including an airfield and barracks for 10,000 trainees.⁶⁹ The Chinese, Tanzanian, FRELIMO, and ZANLA instructors blended field experience with Maoist guerrilla warfare.⁷⁰

Mozambique: ZANLA's Eastern Gateway into Rhodesia

FRELIMO and ZANLA had been fellow travelers on the road to freedom since 1970. In 1975, when Mozambique gained political independence, FRELIMO's new president, the Mozambican Samora Machel, granted the "Zimbabweans" freedom to establish training bases, headquarters, refugee camps, and farms from which to feed and fight for their own freedom. Mozambique became ZANLA's gateway into Rhodesia and a new incubator for manufacturing fighters from raw material recruited from the overflowing refugee camps of Chimoio, Nyadzonia, and Doroï. The biggest such training base was Tembwe (established in 1976), which could accommodate 4,000 trainees.⁷¹ Located in the war zone, the camp gave trainees immediate battle experience. As ZANLA turned to its own version of conventional warfare, fighting with small arms (AK-47 rifles), the instructors adjusted their syllabus accordingly. Tembwe's biggest problem was a lack of enough weapons to match the glut of recruits. Trainees made their own

"guns"—dummies carved from wood or plain sticks—and used stones as grenades. They got guns only as they deployed to the field.⁷²

Angola: ZIPRA's Soviet-Run Training Camp at Luena

Portugal's departure from Angola invited the MPLA (Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola) to march on Luanda and take power in 1975. One year later, President Agostinho Neto offered ZAPU's armed wing, the Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA), training bases near Luena (formerly Vila de Boma) for the purpose of building up a conventional force capable of seizing power in Rhodesia. The offer also included an alternative route for "the transportation of arms and other supplies." Until that point, ZAPU had experienced problems with the Liberation Committee—and the Tanzanian government—over diversion and occasional resale of guns and other supplies meant for it to Chinese-backed guerrillas.⁷³

After the failure of talks in Geneva in 1976, ZIPRA increased its combat personnel from about 70 troops inside the country to about 600. And 1,200 were undergoing training, 1,000 were starting training in Luena, and 3,000 recruits were in transit camps in Zambia and Botswana. That year, Nkomo asked the Soviets to send military instructors to Angola, to provide a transport plane for personnel and equipment airlifts from Angolan camps into Zambia, and to accept 200 men for specialized military training in the USSR. Twenty would be trained as pilots and an unspecified number as artillery gunners; others would learn intelligence work. The Kremlin expedited the request.⁷⁴

ZAPU's objective was to seize power by force. To achieve that, the party would need "a big number of fighters, trained in using small arms and able to act efficiently as combat units." This defined the Soviet instructional mission: to train soldiers and give them guerrilla instruction in case conventional operations suffered temporary setbacks. The first twelve Soviet military instructors arrived in July 1977. Lieutenant-Colonel Vladimir Pekin, the chief instructor, had been deputized by a political commissar, Captain Anatoly Burenko. Pekin's group later stood down for Lieutenant-Colonel Zverev's training team. The Cubans shared barracks with the Soviets and the ZIPRA trainees, but it seems their role was mostly confined to logistics and camp security. The combined mission was to receive and graduate 2,000 recruits every two months. In all, more than 10,000 soldiers and commanders were trained.⁷⁵

Zambia: ZIPRA's Northern Gateway into Rhodesia

Between Zambia and Rhodesia was the crocodile-infested Zambezi River. ZAPU's political headquarters were in Lusaka, capital of Zambia. The troops

trained in Angola had to pass through Zambia to get into Rhodesia. ZIPRA ran its own "survival course" at Westlands Farm just outside Lusaka to "grease" the Angola graduates into combat readiness. Reliance on training alone, no matter how good it was, had proved suicidal in the 1967 campaign. One MK guerrilla trained at Westlands described ZIPRA's training as "tough and rough and we were so lean because we went for days without food or food was so little."⁷⁶ The training was designed to adapt the guerrillas to the terrain in the operational zone, where the itineraries I have been tracing all led.

Engineering Zimbabwe through War

Through the application of weaponry and trained soldiers, African politicians shifted the nature and venue of combat from talks and roundtables to gunfire and bushes. From 1961 onwards the means and modes of combat changed. Hitherto, the educated and politically active African elites had anointed themselves nationalists and pleaded for Rhodesian recognition as representatives of "every African oppressed by whites." They engineered their status as "the racially discriminated against" into a "Zimbabwean" identity and nation to which the white man came as an invitee, at the mercy of "the natives."⁷⁷ How did this happen?

How the Political Elites Became "Nationalists"

When the politics of entreaty turned violent, the instruments changed. Now the politicians—or perhaps their followers—hurled stones, petrol bombs, knobkerries, and spears. They had worn jacket and tie—the emblems of learnedness and "civilization"—to claim that they were modern enough to rule their own people (contrary to Rhodesian Prime Minister Ian Smith's insistence that they were not when declaring UDI, or unilateral declaration of independence from Britain, in 1965). They had talked in the language of negritude and Pan-Africanism, their South African and overseas education making them giddy in the registers of Marx, Engels, and Lenin. No one had heard them. So they climbed down from this lofty perch to speak in local idioms, to define their "nationalist" status through a return to the ancestral traditions they had shunned for the clever trickery of Western intellectualism.

These engineers of a Zimbabwean identity discarded the garb of Western "modernity" and, using intellectual skills acquired in "the white man's academy," carefully selected from their ancestral histories moments that best symbolized and inspired their own mission. From architecture they

got the name of the country they wished to create: Great Zimbabwe, the stonewalled center of Shona power before 1500. Refusing to be called "Rhodesians" (which meant "white settler descendents of Cecil John Rhodes"), they began calling themselves "Zimbabweans" and "Africans." Ancestral clothing—hats made out of wild felines (leopards, cheetahs, and genets)—such as only rulers and spirit mediums had worn before colonization now became the official garb of the leaders at public rallies and meetings. These were not mere cosmetics but the transformation of history into weaponry—what Terence Ranger (who as a nationalist wore his own feline skin hat) called "a usable past."⁷⁸

As pioneering Marxist revisionists who dismantled Eurocentric histories that had stripped Africans of agency, members of the black elite anointed themselves new spokesmen of "their" people at the expense of the chiefs who had "sold their souls for sugar."⁷⁹ Understanding the divisive dangers of ethnicity, they turned their Shona and Ndebele ancestors—who had fought each other before colonization—into one unified pillar of anti-colonial struggle. Then they carefully selected the battles their ancestors had won decisively or lost gallantly, and the right heroes and heroines. Then they installed themselves heirs to a rich tradition of resistance.⁸⁰

Adopting the title *vana vevhu* (sons of the soil) in the fight against *vasetasimba* (power-suckers or whites), they inverted the negativities the Rhodesians had inserted into "native as primitive" into "native as rightful rulers of the land." And they went further: their ancestral religion, which missionaries and the state had dismissed as primitive unchanging tradition, now became the head cornerstone in these self-appointed "nationalists'" reinvention of themselves into miracle workers performing *masaramusi* (indecipherable feats).⁸¹ Nkomo not only adopted the title of the powerful eighteenth-century Shona ruler Mambo (King); he also cast himself as a mystic whose voice could be heard but whose form could not be seen. People made pilgrimages to get party cards from him at Gonakudzingwa, where he was restricted (banished to) in 1964. He said these pieces of paper would automatically imbue them with a magical power to resist the weapons of the state, especially guns.⁸²

Through trickery, these "nationalists" changed even the definition of combat. "African nationalism" was cast not as a new struggle but as a continuation of the *chimurenga* (uprising against colonial rule) the ancestors had "valiantly" lost in 1896–97. Ranger was in their midst, putting his historian's skills to work, turning fictions of continuation between spiritually inspired first and second *zvimurenga* (singular: *chimurenga*) into sacred truths. They narrowed the reasons why their ancestors had lost power to

Rhodes down to inferior weaponry. To them, the first chimurenga was the real beginning of "Zimbabwean nationalism."⁸³

Using Appropriate Technology to Carve Zimbabwe out of Rhodesia

The vision of Zimbabwe could only become a reality through the erasure of the reality of Rhodesia. Since talks and street protests had gone as far as they could, there was only one appropriate technology to carve Zimbabwe into a reality: the barrel of the gun. Yet the "nationalists" soon discovered that guns and training did not make guerrillas. Nor did the bestowal of a Zimbabwean sovereignty upon their bodies necessarily free them from their quotidian Rhodesian existence. Soon Nkomo, ZANU president Sithole and his secretary-general Mugabe, and other leaders were imprisoned; the rest fled into the Zambian and Tanzanian diaspora to plot an invasion. The first operatives paid the price of failure to appropriate (subvert) the weaponry acquired from abroad into local realities. The political leaders were not militarily trained, and their political strategy was not translatable to military strategy or tactics. Some of the trained commanders were "bloody cowards" who stayed behind in Lusaka enjoying nightlife and sex while sending their men to "commit suicide" before Rhodesian troops.⁸⁴ The operatives were under the illusion that "immediately the gun was introduced into the country the masses would rise and join the army" since they "felt oppressed."⁸⁵ It didn't happen. The first groups went about armed to the teeth among villagers who had no clue what they were fighting for, and who saw them as a danger. They called the police.⁸⁶

ZAPU did not fare any better. In 1967–1969 it undertook joint operations with the MK, hoping to escort the latter to South Africa's Limpopo border and to return with more recruits.⁸⁷ Once the groups had crossed the Zambezi into national parks country, they lay low, going into the villages now and then to mobilize the masses. They scared the civilians, who ran to the police. The casualties were knee-breaking. In Lusaka the hard questions began. Many troops criticized large-scale "invasions" in favor of infiltration, recruitment, and mass mobilization.⁸⁸ Damaging ethnic clashes wrecked the top hierarchy, then soon spread to the ranks.⁸⁹ Key Shona-speaking commanders defected to ZANLA, carrying with them Soviet-acquired techniques and inside knowledge of ZAPU strategy.⁹⁰

ZAPU now convened a strategy planning conference at which a Revolutionary Council was formed to organize war and political strategy, to source arms and training from communist countries, and to coordinate mass mobilization. The ZAPU "armed wing" was re-branded into a full-fledged army, ZIPRA. Its immediate mission was to infiltrate small and

inconspicuous groups, to "move as fast as possible towards villages," and, once there, to "change into civilian clothes and start attempting to recruit and train that population." They would "carry out sabotage without full engagement [involving] a continuous cycle of retreating, planting landmines and hiding."⁹¹

In ZANLA, the setbacks also triggered a strategic and political review. Tongogara became Director of Operations in charge of all military responsibilities. He operated under a newly established High Command that represented logistics and planning matters to the politicians, while the Dare reChimurenga (Revolutionary Council) concentrated on political affairs.⁹² But this clear separation of powers between soldiers and civilians did not translate into immediate success. Recruits were in acute supply, so ZANLA resorted to kidnapping, targeting refugees in Zambia.⁹³ In addition, the Zambezi was a difficult barrier: guerrilla operations were most effective in summer, but at that time the river was flooded and impassable. The tactics were wrong: the guerrillas "would fight until they exhausted the last bullet and then run."⁹⁴

Any success depended on addressing three factors: the Zambezi, ammunition shortages, and tactics. To solve the first, it was imperative to operate from Mozambique, following, not crossing, all the major rivers. FRELIMO agreed to let ZANLA use its rear bases in 1970. Second, for the next two years, Tongogara sent in small groups (from three to five men) to create subversion cells, cache arms, and read the terrain. They were to avoid military contact, and to go via dependable people who could not readily "sell out." Third, the materiality of the AK-47—their major weapon—was to be adapted to local conditions. That rifle's lightness and portability made it well suited to stealthy infiltration and high mobility. ZANLA's operations in the rainy season (November–April) were specifically designed to take advantage of the AK-47's resistance to dampness, dust, and heat, whereas the Rhodesian FN rifle was susceptible to jamming.⁹⁵ Success transformed the AK-47 into the signature of the struggle for freedom.

Even with these remedies, the most important factor was mass mobilization. Here the guerrillas deployed ancestral religion to give potency to skills acquired from training and guns sourced abroad. In reverse, local custodians of ancestral spirituality deployed their immortal powers to use the guerrilla and his AK-47 as instruments to challenge their local colonial tormentor. Chiefs and headmen could not be trusted; ZANLA deemed most of them "puppets" and "sellouts" working for the state. Besides local party officials, ancestral spirit mediums—adult men and women through whom the spirits communicated with the people—were the most ideal contact

persons because they had a vested interest in the "nationalist" project. It would restore the ancestors' traditional role of guiding the mortals that Christianity and colonization had diminished, one reason why spirit mediums Nehanda and Kaguvi had orchestrated the 1896–97 chimurenga and paid with their lives.⁹⁶

Nehanda reportedly had declared, before the colonial settlers executed her, "My bones will rise again." Right on time, the guerrillas presented themselves as Nehanda's bones arisen from the dead. In the first chimurenga, spirit mediums had performed rituals before warriors set off to battle to render them impregnable to enemy bullets and sharpen their spears and muskets. Now the guerrillas followed suit: their bodies were cleansed and their AK-47 rifles blessed.⁹⁷ And, in Shona spirituality, the forest is the domain of the spirits and masaramusi; it was there that vakomana ("the boys," as the guerrillas were affectionately called) operated, the immortals watching over and guiding them.⁹⁸

By submitting themselves to spirits revered by entire clans and villages, guerrillas secured local mortals to their cause, thereby enabling the AK-47 to be effective as a weapon. What was an AK-47 worth in the hands of a ZANLA person commanding no popular support? The mediums commanded the youths to obey Nehanda's risen bones. ZANLA created in each operational area dependable corps of youth militias called mujibha (male) and chimbwido (female) for gathering intelligence, food, and mobilizing "the masses." Through pungwe (all-night meetings),⁹⁹ the masses told the guerrillas government's molestations—taxation, land dispossession, cattle de-stocking, and cruel, racist local farmers and state laws. They had anxieties: "How can we defeat the whites who are well-armed and well-equipped? *Do you have arms?*"¹⁰⁰ With Maoist analysis earned through training, the guerrillas gave convincing and thoughtful answers; punching the air with the AK-47, they chanted "This is your new voice! Pamberi nehondo! (Forward with the Revolution!)" And yet the same voice also silenced—permanently—those who "sold out" to the state: "Pasi nevatenges! (Down with sellouts!)"¹⁰¹ The pungwe became an alternative public sphere to that defined for Africans by the state; the guerrillas were behaving like a state.

The mujibhas and chimbwidos provided labor for transporting arms and ammunition that the guerrillas then secretly cached in the mountains and forests to sustain operations for long periods. Upon seeing the "guns, the machine guns, the bazookas, the mines," the masses "danced with excitement and joy." Some were ecstatic to just feel the weapons, others actually wanted to keep them so that they could go and 'sort out' their local white nemeses personally.¹⁰²

The Work of Engineering Zimbabwe out of Rhodesia

With arms cached and masses mobilized, ZANLA waited for the rains to green the landscape into good camouflage. Then, on December 21, 1972, it re-launched its war from northeastern Rhodesia. The guerrillas carefully reconnoitered the area, plotted escape routes and targets of strategic value—military posts, police camps, homes of white police and army reservists, and farms used as command posts. Their tactics involved surprise night attacks, ambushes, and the laying of land mines. The attacks were "so quick and swift that we disappeared before the . . . enemy troops got a chance to fire back." The masses were mystified: "Stories spread around the villages that freedom fighters turn into logs or snakes or bush at the approach of settler [Rhodesian] forces."¹⁰³ After all, had their guns and bodies not received ancestral spiritual blessing? The workings of the ancestral spirits and the material capabilities of the AK-47 conflated into the mysterious ways of the guerrilla.¹⁰⁴

ZANLA's success forced Smith to use peace talks as a weapon to buy time for rebuilding his army, deliberately stretching negotiations to a point where his army was ready to fight again before scuttling them.¹⁰⁵ The strategy worked so well that in 1974 ZAPU and ZANU ordered a complete cease-fire. The chimurenga died. It was left to Machel to organize and make available facilities for a unified ZANLA-ZIPRA army called the Zimbabwe People's Army (ZIPA) in late 1975. ZIPA was doomed from the start. In particular, ZIPRA command elements looked down upon their Chinese-trained ZANLA colleagues as half-baked, their strategy weak.¹⁰⁶ The cleavages between ZAPU and ZANU, between Ndebele and Shona, and between Soviet- and Chinese-trained and armed were too strong. When the political leaders were released from prison in 1974 and joined the guerrillas in exile, ZIPA disintegrated.

In 1976, ZAPU drafted a working document titled *Our Path to Liberation*, laying out a broad strategy "to conquer state power" through conventional warfare. It recommended the political unification of ZAPU and ZANU into a Patriotic Front (PF) while the armies fought the same enemy separately using conventional means.¹⁰⁷ The exhaustive discussion resulted in the Turning Point Strategy (TPS), which outlined steps toward mobile warfare. First, ZIPRA would create rear bases inside Rhodesia by capacitating guerrilla units to hold ground and to merge into infantry platoons and companies for larger-scale operations. Once field commanders had secured "liberated zones," half the High Command would move into Zimbabwe (meaning areas wrested from Rhodesian control) to direct the war and set up civil administration. ZIPRA veterans deny that there was any Soviet

pressure or role in TPS, insisting that it was a logical outcome of the Our Path to Liberation debate. Only when it came to application did ZIPRA request assistance.¹⁰⁸

TPS was supposed to culminate in a final military push to seize power called Zero Hour—a five-battalion multi-front attack on Rhodesia. The piercing force would consist of three infantry companies, with two more logistics and artillery support companies in reserve. Their mission was to seize bridgeheads—fortifications at bridges within firing range of the strategic garrison towns of Kanyemba, Chirundu, and Kariba—to facilitate re-supply, deployment of the main body of armor (tanks and armored cars), and the maneuvering of artillery batteries into base-plate (firing) positions. The armor and artillery would macerate the Kariba, Victoria Falls, and Wankie airfields and any Rhodesian military aircraft in their hangars. Once these airfields were secure, ZIPRA would land MiG-21 jets from Angola to achieve aerial superiority. Using air power, artillery, armor, and infantry, the conventional brigade would then advance toward the Rhodesian capital, Salisbury. ZIPRA now remodeled the earlier strategy of civil disobedience to Zero Hour: its Training Department moved in and cached 50,000 AK-47 and SKS rifles in strategic bush hideouts to hastily arm citizens.¹⁰⁹

ZIPRA's plans hinged on securing pilots to fly the assault aircraft. The twenty recruits mentioned earlier were already training at the Air Force Centre in Frunze, capital of Kirgizia. Meanwhile, Nkomo resolved to use pilots from "friendly countries" other than the USSR as a stopgap measure. Moscow and Havana were skeptical. The former Soviet operative Vladimir Shubin refutes assertions that the MiGs "arrived in Zambia" but were not "uncrated," that the Soviets withheld the ZIPRA pilots, and that Nkomo refused to replace them with foreign ones.¹¹⁰ The fact is that ZIPRA pilots completed their training after Zimbabwe was already independent. In December 1979, Smith had agreed to settle with ZANU and ZAPU. Zero Hour was never executed.

Meanwhile, ZANLA was taking its own path to conventional war. The mother parties—ZAPU and ZANU—had agreed on a tentative Patriotic Front, but the two armies pursued a "separate armies, one enemy" policy as a military strategy to encircle the cities from the rural areas, Vietcong-style. ZANLA would storm the eastern garrison city of Umtali. Once it was secured, the political leaders would be moved in to declare an independent republic of Zimbabwe, which would be extendable to the rest of the country through conventional warfare.¹¹¹ A boisterous Mugabe declared 1978 Gore reGukurahundi (The Year of the People's Storm). The term is deeply

anchored in Shona traditions related to the first torrential rains in October or November, which come after a long, dry winter in which deciduous trees shed leaves, riverbeds dry up, and pools become still and filled with algae. The torrents cleanse the land, washing away the dirt into the floodwaters, leaving the lands clean, green, and full of better life.¹¹²

Gukurahundi represents ZANLA's final sweep of the dirt (Smith) through the thunder of gunfire and the heavy droplets of bullets. Like TPS, the storm derived its power from merging small guerrilla units into companies and battalions (50–500 each, depending on the strength of the target) capable of washing away the enemy with firepower. Unlike ZIPRA, however, ZANLA did not have aircraft, armor, and heavy artillery, so the storm would come from large "cumulonimbus clouds" of guerrillas armed primarily with AK-47 rifles raining bullets onto their enemy.¹¹³

This twin strategy was the final nail in Rhodesia's coffin. By 1979, Smith was facing an untenable situation. ZANLA and ZIPRA were picking strategic targets—national fuel depots, railroads, city centers, farms, mines—at will, and were choking life out of the economy. A mass exodus of whites was in motion despite stiff conscription laws barring white men from leaving. The BBC journalist Richard Lindley summed it well on April 20, 1978:

The whites have now allowed Africans to discover that power can, indeed, grow out of the barrel of a gun. . . . The lesson to the leaders and the men of the Patriotic Front is plain: if you want to keep up the pressure for more radical political change, for a real transfer of power to the black majority, then keep hold of your guns.¹¹⁴

There is no better summary of the notion of appropriate technology. Yet whereas the guerrillas amplified the demand for black rule through the barrel of the gun, in 1976 ZANLA found the perfect weapon to amplify the gunfire itself into demands for independence. That rhetorical weapon was Robert Mugabe.

Mugabe: The Itinerary of a Political Engineer

Engineering Power: Rhetoric Amplifier of the Gun Barrel

In a bold declaration in July 1977, ZANU leader Robert Mugabe rejected without ambiguity any illusions the Soviets and the Chinese might have harbored about turning them into mere cubs as Kaunda had feared. Mugabe emphasized that "Zimbabweans" would fight their own war if the communist countries played their part as quartermasters:

True the socialist countries have shown a greater preparedness to assist the process towards decolonization of Southern Africa. They have given help through the OAU

Liberation Committee and we are grateful for that. They have done so because we have asked for this help, but we reject completely that those who give us help should turn themselves into our masters. . . . We believe that the war must be fought by us. It is our war, the struggle is our struggle.¹¹⁵

Robert Mugabe epitomizes the spirit of this essay: a story not of Sino-Soviet “puppets” but of political engineers whose senses of initiative had not suddenly awakened when “the Cold War” began, but whose trajectory had predated and then outlived such North-North rivalries.

At first sight, his birth at Kutama Mission to an aspiring Catholic nun named Bona Shonhiwa on February 21, 1924 and a life of poverty fits snugly into the narrative of victimhood—until one discovers that the young Robert inverted this same poverty into energy that inspired him to become perhaps Africa’s most educated politician,¹¹⁶ a man who used the colonial education system to acquire a learned vocabulary that would, one day, become rhetorical weaponry (word-turned-weaponry). The education system had been designed to make blacks tea-boys, clerks, and nannies; instead, Mugabe used it as a passport to the University of Fort Hare (in South Africa), a lectureship at Chalimbana Teacher Training College (in Zambia), and a teaching post in Tekoradi (in Ghana), where he imbibed




Figure 10.3
Robert Mugabe, a political engineer. Source: Wikipedia.

lectures from Kwame Nkrumah. When Mugabe returned to Rhodesia, in May 1960, his rise within the nationalist movement was rapid.

At an NDP rally at Stoddart Hall, Mugabe was suddenly catapulted onto the podium to share his Ghanaian experience of independence. The party appointed him secretary for information and publicity the following year. When the NDP was banned, the black politicians simply changed its name to ZAPU. In 1962, ZAPU was banned and its leaders restricted to their rural homes. Mugabe was banished to Kutama. State repression forced the leaders to relocate to Tanganyika in April 1963 to fight from exile. Host president Julius Nyerere told them to leave and fight from within. Shona-speaking elements blamed this bad decision on Nkomo’s “inept” Ndebele leadership and formed ZANU in August. Mugabe was not there when ZANU was formed but was elected secretary-general in absentia as he attended the birth of his son, Nhamodzenyika, in Dar-es-Salaam.¹¹⁷

Upon his return from Tanganyika, Mugabe was promptly arrested and sent to prison for the next 11 years for plotting terrorism. Books now became weapons for negotiating prison life.¹¹⁸ Designed by the state to break his spirit, prison became for Mugabe a school, the cell a classroom where he studied for three undergraduate degrees with British universities. He became headmaster over fellow political inmates. Recognizing his intellect, fellow prisoners Edgar Tekere, Enos Nkala, Moton Malianga, and Maurice Nyagumbo would oust Sithole and nominate Mugabe to lead ZANU.¹¹⁹

From 1975 on, Mugabe deployed “the book” to amplify the message of the gun barrel. After being released for talks in Zambia in late 1974, he fled with Tekere to Mozambique to avoid re-arrest. He focused on amplifying the lethality of gunfire through the gunfire of words; he was now the voice of the AK-47 and the bazooka. By 1976, the military men in ZANLA badly needed a civilian orator to articulate what they were fighting for at the British-organized Geneva Peace Conference. Mugabe rose to the occasion. On August 31, 1977, he was proclaimed party president. Mugabe’s tough rhetoric on liberation through the barrel of the gun outgunned the promise of a negotiated “Internal Settlement,” involving Smith and the moderate clerics Ndabaningi Sithole and Abel Muzorewa, that was signed on March 3, 1978. To amplify Mugabe’s rhetoric, ZANLA blew up Salisbury’s fuel depot into a five-day inferno in December as the guerrillas circled menacingly on the urban areas. Only the intervention of Samora Machel forced Mugabe to negotiate with Smith at Lancaster House in 1979. If he did not sit down and talk, ZANLA would be unwelcome in Mozambique.

Having been dragooned to settle, Mugabe now focused on the impending elections. Nkomo proposed a joint ticket with him as candidate for the

premiership; ZANLA chief Tongogara agreed. Mugabe said "No, it must be me" and ordered Tongogara off to the barracks to address the troops. About 100 miles north of the Mozambican capital, Tongogara was "involved in a fatal car crash." In January 1980, Mugabe returned home from five years of exile. At Highfield Grounds he preached peace and reconciliation to a crowd of 200,000. Yet ZANU (PF) fought the election with the sort of violence befitting guerrilla war. A triumphant Prime Minister Robert Mugabe moved swiftly to assure a jittery white public: "The wrongs of the past must be forgiven and forgotten."¹²⁰

Mugabe deployed racial reconciliation as a curtain he drew to mesmerize the West into believing he was a post-racial statesman, meanwhile going after blacks who opposed his vision of a one-party state. Not only did he let Ian Smith live in Zimbabwe unscathed, he also made sure that Smith kept his farm, as a monument to his generosity and fairness.¹²¹ He let whites keep their land not because the Lancaster House peace agreement legally prevented him from forcefully seizing the land (he could simply have used force and worried about costs afterwards), but because the threat to his personal hold on power from black opponents in a black-majority country was far more urgent. Keeping the land question on ice narrowed the circle of any likely conspirators against him as Mugabe went after ZAPU.

Engineering Survival: The Gun (Bullet) Is Mightier Than the Pen (Ballot)

First, Mugabe neutralized the Soviets to deny ZAPU any source of weaponry. The Soviets had "backed the losing horse," China the winning one. That meant there were many pressure points Mugabe could apply. Pressure Point I: to deny Moscow an embassy until it had severed "all contact with the PF-ZAPU." After further talks, Moscow met its conditions and received an invitation to post an ambassador—in February 1981! Pressure Point II: to neutralize ZIPRA's Soviet-made arsenal. Both ZIPRA and ZANLA, fearing that assembly points were a trap and if they completely disarmed their whole fighting forces might be slaughtered by the Rhodesians, kept some of their battle-hardened elite forces in the "rear." In 1982 Mugabe's intelligence suddenly "discovered" arms caches at ex-ZAPU assembly points.¹²²

While addressing a rally in the eastern city of Marondera in February that year, Mugabe declared: "ZAPU and its leader, Dr. Joshua Nkomo, are like a cobra in a house. The only way to deal effectively with a snake is to strike and destroy its head."¹²³ The Western countries were lauding Mugabe for "reconciliation." Economic aid and honorary awards kept coming. The Soviets had been reduced to spectators glad to finally get an embassy in Harare. The bulk of the Shona (Mugabe is Shona) warmed up to, urged

Mugabe on, or stood by as he and his lieutenants used incendiary rhetoric justifying the crackdown against ZAPU (a Ndebele party). Mugabe could unleash Gukurahundi, the North Korean-trained Fifth Brigade, on the cobra and its neonates in peace. Nkomo became a hunted animal, escaping to Botswana disguised as an old woman and then flying to exile in Britain. An estimated 20,000 overwhelmingly Ndebele people remotely suspected of supporting him were slaughtered. A grieving Nkomo chose to let ZANU swallow ZAPU to serve his followers. This Unity Accord was signed in 1987.¹²⁴

With the liquidation of ZAPU, a pattern emerged in Zimbabwe: small parties mushroomed a few weeks before an election, only to vanish soon afterwards. There was only token opposition to Mugabe until 1997, when Secretary-General Morgan Tsvangirai of the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) led a broad-based coalition that culminated, in 1999, in the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC). In 2000, Mugabe blamed rising dissent (including rejection of his proposed constitution giving him a ten-year term in office) on whites, and sanctioned invasion of their farms. Land had effectively become an incisive political weapon. Mugabe successfully profiled the MDC—which had substantial white membership and sponsors—as a British puppet sent to prevent land redistribution.

We saw earlier how "African political elites" transformed themselves into "nationalists" through the connection of the 1896–97 Shona-Ndebele risings and the 1960s–1970s resistance into First and Second Chimurenga respectively. ZANU (PF) went further: the ancestors of 1896–97 had started the revolution and handed it over to their grandchildren (the "nationalists"), but Lancaster House prevented them from completing it. Hence the necessity for yet a Third Chimurenga, whose mission was crystal-clear: to invade and occupy white farms and secure the land. While Africa celebrated the seizure of land, Mugabe was busy using land as a divide-and-rule weapon, just as he had used reconciliation and ethnicity to hoodwink the West and the Shona as he exterminated ZAPU. The West cried foul when a few white farmers were brutally murdered, even as black opposition activists were being burned alive, tortured, raped, and murdered with little or no whimper of protest from the North. This racial bias played right into the hands of Africa, which stoically supported Mugabe as a pan-Africanist who was a victim of Western neocolonial interference, with the MDC as a front. Africa's Robert Mugabe was a great African liberator giving his people land stolen from them. Zimbabweans' Robert Mugabe was an old despot who had stayed in power for too long and caused their suffering.

Conclusion

Mugabe is an intersection of many narratives of inversion. With his anti-Western rhetoric and his practice of seizing land from whites, he has for a long time mollified and endeared himself to Africa's heads of state and government as a pan-Africanist. Traveling around Africa and overseas, and talking to ordinary Africans, I have discovered how Mugabe's land seizure and acerbic onslaught against the West has become a cause célèbre. To some, he is the best president they never had. The West has become Mugabe's chisel for carving his internal opponents into a front for the British and the American re-colonization of Zimbabwe, specifically during the administrations of Tony Blair and George W. Bush. This has reduced the West's public pronouncements and support for democratic change in Zimbabwe into a massive liability to the struggle for better governance, for example, when these countries have admitted to funding peaceful and contemplating violent "regime change."¹²⁵

Mugabe has also tooled (and fooled) the West in much more audacious, if odious, ways. Consider, for example, what happened after September 11, 2001, when the US Congress passed the USA PATRIOT Act and Bush implored countries throughout the world to join him in "a coalition of the willing" against terrorism. One of the signs of willingness would be to pass a raft of anti-terrorism legislations similar to the PATRIOT Act. Very well, said the Zimbabwean President. Zimbabwe's amendments to the Public Order and Security Act (Chapter 11: 17) on January 22, 2002 used wording similar to that of the PATRIOT Act, but Mugabe's terrorists were not Al-Qaeda but the MDC and other internal enemies.¹²⁶ The irony? These pro-democratic forces were the same people whose plight the US Congress had sought to alleviate through "regime change" when passing the Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act (ZIDERA).¹²⁷ Here is a case where two US foreign policy weapons turned their muzzles upon each other and pulled the trigger.

If this essay dismisses the notion of "the Cold War"—let alone "the global Cold War"—as not belonging to the South, it is because such extensions of Northern time into universal time have continued to pose existential questions in instances like Zimbabwe. Such labels of time, in the hands of people like Mugabe, are important as sources of raw material to design instruments for their own survival. The idea around the Bush doctrine of "axis of evil" and "coalition of the willing" was in every sense a continuing Washington tradition of defining the world as a geography of "them" and "us." Mahmood Mamdani has already made a compelling case when

tracing this long genealogy,¹²⁸ which rests on a belief that the North's priorities define what matters to the rest of the world. When actors in the South agree with and follow propositions of and sometimes impositions from the North, the ready assumption is that they are "responding" or are "puppets." Little space is left for analyzing the calculations, agencies, and priorities of such "puppets."

Take Mugabe's relationship with the Chinese, for example. After the West declared him a pariah, the Zimbabwean president retreated into history to search for verbs and nouns to profile the West as far worse than "fair-weather" friends. Was it not the West that had hemorrhaged Africa through slavery, colonialism, debt, and structural adjustment programs whose workability has not been proved anywhere, including in the West? When Africans asked for guns to fight colonial rule, had the West—Britain and America specifically—not refused and branded them "terrorists"? Here Mugabe massaged and pampered China with praises as a friend of all seasons. Was it not China that had stood side by side with "blacks" as they fought the "racist white regime of Ian Smith"? And then the coup de grace: "We have turned east where the sun rises, and given our backs to the West where the sun sets."¹²⁹

If I question the Cold War as a category, it is because China's footprint in Africa is already being represented from Beijing as a story of "how China lures Africa." The short history of how Mugabe engineered Rhodesia into Zimbabwe in the 1970s suggests a far more nuanced calculus that goes into decisions to give space to outsiders. Knowing he cannot get a penny from the West after taking land from white descendents of Europe, Mugabe has tried to use China as a weapon against criticism from that quarter in exactly the same way as ZAPU and ZANU did in the 1960s and the 1970s when the West rebuffed them in the fight against Smith. Moreover, China's policy is that it does not interfere in the affairs of independent states, especially those it helped free from "Western imperialism." That means it can deal with rulers who oppress their own citizens: the Chinese respect national sovereignty, even selling guns to regimes on which the West has imposed military sanctions.¹³⁰

Few Zimbabweans take the priorities of China in Zimbabwe seriously. What they know is that China is one of the weapons Mugabe uses to stay in power. When Mugabe introduced anti-terrorism legislation, Zimbabweans dreaded what would happen next: summary arrests, torture, rape, and murder of Mugabe's opponents on trumped-up charges of plotting terrorism with the British and Americans against his government. Suddenly China's non-interference and sales of arms to Zimbabwe and America's "war

on terror" found themselves side by side as Mugabe's weapons against the people of Zimbabwe. Similarly, it is these local experiences that defined the priorities and imperatives of the time that might be called "the Cold War" in the North.

Certainly, these hegemonic imperatives can only look "Cold War-ish" from specific Norths, but that is only one way of seeing—and experiencing. It is possible that people can share the same experience, but they may feel it very differently, and represent it according to their own designs, priorities, and expectations. If two people attended a musical show and one was disappointed but the other enjoyed it, neither can claim that his experience of this event was a universal one. It is even worse where one part of the world was fighting against colonization by the North, while the North was locked in rivalry over nukes. It amounts to the trivialization of Southern time and the struggles, initiatives, and triumphs invested in describing the period 1951–1994 as the era of African liberation from colonial rule. The countries that were fighting their "cold" war—of words, artifacts, and troop deployments—became weapons in the hands of the designers of this African independence. If they see themselves as designers of a program of thwarting their Northern rivals and using the South as puppets, that does not mean they were the only ones capable of doing it. Africans were also busy designing them as puppets and weaponry in the liberation of the continent from colonialism. The question for Africa is what to make of this moment when Africa used the North for its own purposes, now that Robert Mugabe and other political engineers are turning such weaponry against the people they said they were liberating in the 1960s and the 1970s.

Notes

1. Gaddis 1999; Walker 1997.
2. For a rebuttal of this tendency and a discussion of Cuba's independent African and Latin American forays, see Gleijeses 2002.
3. Of late, a number of books have emerged that rush to discuss China's current role without a detailed historical role in the decolonization of Africa. Examples: Eisenman, Heginbotham, and Mitchell 2007; Rotberg 2008; Alden, Large, and de Oliveira 2008.
4. Eriksen 2000; Morgenstienne 2003; Sellström 2002.
5. Shubin 2008: 3.
6. Orwell 1945.

7. This framing draws from a recent unsettling of similar universalistic synchronizations of world time by Ferguson (2006).
8. Exactly what it means to live in the postcolony or not is a matter of conjecture. See Mbembe 2001.
9. Westad 2007: 3.
10. "Zambian Paper's Challenge to USSR and Cuba," *Times of Zambia*, February 13, 1976; Moorcraft 1990: 124–131.
11. Although the original idea was inspired by Mamdani's immaculate framing of the agency of the "puppet" to turn against its creator or handler, and for victimization to transform victims into killers, the more I read two of his works on the subject the more I saw also that the victimizing action (using) is simultaneously acting as an ingredient or even conveyor belt for the victim to reclaim their own agency. See Mamdani 2001 and 2004.
12. I am trying to get away from the conventional arguments in Science and Technology Studies (STS) on designers and users, summarized well in Oudshoorn and Pinch 2003.
13. Diouf 2000: 680, citing Appadurai 1996: 4. The notion of "trickery" is inspired by Bayart 2000: 217.
14. Diouf 2000: 682, 684.
15. Star 1989: 37–54.
16. Tungamirai 1995.
17. Ranger 1995.
18. For this view of "indigenous knowledge" as a resource for a native modernity, see Geschiere 1997: 22.
19. Beach 1993; Mudenge 1986; Bhila 1982.
20. Beach 1971: 143–144.
21. On the domestication of guns into hunting cultures, see Mavhunga 2003: 201–231.
22. Sithole 1968. These political elites had gone abroad to get tertiary education because Rhodesia had no university until 1957.
23. Legvold 1970; Mbembe 2000: 259–284; Mbembe and Nuttall 2004.
24. Wright 1956. For the cinematic origins of the notion of "Iron Curtain," see Wright 2007.
25. Bell 1971: 43; Morrison 1964: 102–193.

26. Shubin 2008: 152–153.
27. Nkomo 1984: 102–103.
28. Lessing 1962: 60.
29. *Keesings Contemporary Archives* (June 6–13, 1964): 20110.
30. Shay and Vermaak 1971: 8; *Rhodesian Herald*, August 10, 1968.
31. National Archives of Zimbabwe/MS589, Interview with Joshua Nkomo in the Second Half of 1977 by Australian Film Crew in Lusaka: 7; Nkomo 1984: 165.
32. *Times* (London), July 24, 1978.
33. *Intelligence Digest*, May 16, 1979: 3.
34. Moorcraft 1985: 117.
35. Brickhill 1995: 61; Ellert 1989: 52, 64.
36. Shubin 2008: 177.
37. Tongogara 1978a: 29.
38. *Star* (Johannesburg), February 18, 1978), citing *Tribune de Geneve*, February 10.
39. Interview with Josiah Tungamirai, Zanu PF Headquarters, Harare, May 24, 1999; Tongogara, 1978a: 30; National Archives of Zimbabwe/MS536/11/4 Terrorist Weapons; *Zimbabwe News* 10, 6 (December 1978): 20.
40. For a framing that helped me think toward this critique, see Nash 1979.
41. Some of ZAPU's guerrillas also received military and civilian technical training in—and were trained by instructors from—other Warsaw Pact countries besides the Soviet Union. ZANU sent its recruits to other countries overseas besides China—Romania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, and North Korea.
42. Shubin 2008: 156.
43. Shubin 2008: 154.
44. Hevi 1963: 136–137.
45. Shubin 2008: 155.
46. Greig 1977: 165.
47. Bopela and Luthuli 2005: 38–44.
48. Shubin 2008: 174.
49. Scott and Scott 1979.
50. Barron 1974: 57.

51. Gleijeses 2002: 7, 9, 18.
52. Valenta 1975: 23; Hodges and Shanab 1972: 169–170.
53. Nkomo 1984: 177; Pinto 1973: 74.
54. Johnson 2006: 29–30, 34.
55. Johnson 2006: 40.
56. Hevi 1963: 28–29, 35–39.
57. Hevi 1963: 133.
58. Johnson 2006: 77.
59. A Wikipedia entry on Emmerson Mnangagwa mentions his having undergone training in 1964 at Nanjing alongside Felix Santana, Robert Garachani, Lloyd Gundu, Phebion Shonhiwa, and John Chigaba, but it is not referenced.
60. Mubako 2007.
61. Maxey 1975: 80; Greig 1977: 170; Hutchison 1975: 247; Fiennes 1975: 31–35.
62. For a contrary view, which seeks to explain that whites are also Africans just like blacks and that the reduction of “Africa” to “blackness” is a rhetorical and poetical myth dreamed up by the founding fathers of pan-Africanism, see Mbembe 2002; Appiah 1992. There are high emotions and stakes in this debate.
63. Mudimbe 1988: 4.
64. Ibhawoh and Dibua 2003: 59–83.
65. Robinson and Shambaugh 1994: 287.
66. Government of Zimbabwe 1989: 41.
67. Tungamirai 1995: 40; Shay and Vermaak 1971: 27–30; National Archives of Zimbabwe MS 536/7/5 Press Release, Rhodesian Ministry of Information, August 26, 1968; *Zimbabwe News* 10, 2 (May–June 1978): 16–17.
68. Avirgan 1975.
69. *Keesings Contemporary Archives* (October 20–26, 1975): 27402.
70. Evans 1981: 21–25.
71. Government of Zimbabwe 1999: 2; Government of Zimbabwe 1989: 51–52.
72. “Interview with Tungamirai.”
73. Shubin 2008: 167.
74. Shubin 2008: 171.

75. Shubin 2008: 172–173.
76. Truth and Reconciliation Commission: Human Rights Violations: Submissions—Questions and Answers, Day 4, Olefile Samuel Mnqibisa, Soweto, July 25 1996, available at <http://www.doj.gov.za>.
77. Shay and Vermaak 1971: 10–14.
78. Ranger 1976.
79. Lonsdale 1968: 119–146.
80. Ranger 1967.
81. The term “ancestral religion” refers both to the religion of the forefathers and to the specific belief that when an adult person died and proper rituals were performed, the dead person’s soul did not die but became a spirit that returned to protect the living. See Shoko 2006.
82. Wright 1972: 358–394.
83. Ranger 1967; *Rhodesian Herald*, October 22–November 17 and December [?], 1961).
84. Bopela and Luthuli 2005: 54–55.
85. Tongogara 1978a: 20; Venter 1974: 132–133.
86. Tongogara 1978b.
87. Bopela and Luthuli 2005: 59–87.
88. *Rhodesian Herald*, January and February 1970; Shay and Vermaak 1971: 74; Wall 1975: 34.
89. Dabengwa 1995: 31.
90. Brickhill 1995: 48.
91. Ibid.; Dabengwa 1995: 32; *Keesings Contemporary Archives* (January 8–14, 1973): 25668; National Archives of Zimbabwe IDAF MS 590/3, Rhodesian Liberation Movements July–December 1973: columns 450–560: “ZAPU War Communiqué,” *Zimbabwe Review*, August 28, 1973.
92. Tongogara 1978a: 29.
93. Tungamirai 1995: 40–41.
94. Tongogara 1978a: 29.
95. “Interview with Tungamirai.”
96. Ranger 1967, 1999.

97. Conversations with village elders in Mudzingwa and Machangara village, Chihota Communal Lands, May 23, 2001; Lan 1985; Shoko 2006.
98. For a good discussion of this practice, see Daneel 1970.
99. For a video clip of the Rhodesian Security Forces reconnaissance on a pungwe, see “Rhodesia— Internal Operations,” <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tpHVvYAtJj8&mode=related&search=>.
100. Tongogara 1978a: 29.
101. Nyarota 2006: chapters 1 and 2; Kriger 1992.
102. Tongogara 1978a: 29.
103. Ibid.
104. Daneel 1970.
105. Moore 1995.
106. Dabengwa 1995: 33.
107. Brickhill 1995: 50.
108. Dabengwa 1995: 33.
109. Brickhill 1995: 62, 64–5.
110. Shubin 2008: 176–7.
111. *Times* (London), April 20, 1978.
112. The Gukurahundi of 1978 is not to be confused with the post-independence Zanu government-orchestrated army genocide in which 20,000 Ndebele people were killed. See Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace and Legal Resources Foundation 1999.
113. Martin 1978.
114. “The Boys in the Bush,” *The Listener* (UK) April 20, 1978.
115. “Interview with Robert Mugabe,” *New African Development*, July 1977.
116. Holland 2008: 3, 7.
117. Sithole 2006: 32.
118. Norman 2004: 51; Holland 2008: 27. For an academic study of prisons in Rhodesia, see Munochiveyi 2008.
119. Tekere 2007: 68–69.
120. Norman 2004: 72–75.

121. Norman 2004: 75.
122. Shubin 2008: 185–188.
123. "Mugabe Makes Bitter Attack on Nkomo," *The Guardian* (UK) February 15, 1982.
124. Shubin 2008: 189.
125. Peta 2004.
126. Government of Zimbabwe. 2002. Public Order and Security Act (Chapter 11: 17). *Government Gazette* (January 22).
127. US Congress, Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act of 2001.
128. Mamdani 2004.
129. Karumbidza 2006.
130. Beresford 2008.