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<P align=left><B>"A Workable Approach to Engaging Syria"<BR></B>Peter Harling,
<EM>Al Hayat</EM>, 26 November 2006<BR>full article (in Arabic): <A
href="http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=4530&l=1">http://www.crisisgroup.org/ho
me/index.cfm?id=4530&l=1</A><A
href="http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=4534&l=1"></A><A
href="http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=4503&l=1"></A><BR>full
article (in English): <A
href="http://www.crisisgroup.org/ho me/index.cfm?id=4534&l=1">http://www.crisisgroup.org/ho
me/index.cfm?id=4534&l=1</A><BR></P></FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT size=2>In the wake of the Lebanon war, the clamor for Western
engagement with Syria has been growing. Both pundits and policy makers
throughout Europe as well as all-important foreign policy experts in the U.S. -
including, reportedly, the authors of the forthcoming report of the Iraq Study
Group -- have reached the conclusion that Damascus is a key to regional
stability and that reopening long-dormant lines of communication is vital. The
premise makes eminent sense, but if the resulting policy is simply a more polite
way of asking Syria to alter its behavior, it is unlikely to bear fruit.
Instead, what is needed is a serious give-and-take in which such changes are
accompanied by reciprocal steps.</FONT></DIV>
<DIV> </DIV>
<DIV><FONT size=2>So far, that has not been the case. A plethora of European
emissaries have journeyed to Damascus, inquiring whether their interlocutors
would be willing to change their approach to Lebanon, Iraq, Iran and Palestine
in exchange for renewed dialogue. That, in a word, is to seek through
engagement what the Bush administration has been trying to achieve through
isolation. U.S. advocates of a policy change essentially propose the same
equation: offering the reward of renewed talks in exchange for meaningful Syrian
concessions. Unsurprisingly, past European envoys have returned
empty-handed. Future American ones would fare no better.</FONT></DIV>
<DIV> </DIV>
<DIV><FONT size=2>Meanwhile, the Syrian regime is merely waiting for others to
change their stance and adapt to new realities, confidently anticipating no less
than a fundamental shift from the U.S. which, as a consequence of its latest
regional setbacks - the deepening Iraqi quagmire, growing Iranian influence and
assertiveness, continuing Hizbollah and Hamas resilience - will be compelled to
beg for Syria's help. Nor is Syria likely to do anything of note so long as the
investigation into the 2005 murder of Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri - and
the possibility of sanctioning the Baathist regime as a result -- hangs over its
head.</FONT></DIV>
<DIV> </DIV>
<DIV><FONT size=2>But just as the West's logic is misguided, so too is Syria's
assumption that, in the absence of Western acknowledgement of its key role, it
can play its spoiler role. Indeed the situation throughout the Middle East has
deteriorated to the point where it threatens to engulf the Syrian regime as
well. In short, it's not just the West that needs the stability Syria
purportedly can offer. It's the Syrian regime itself.</FONT></DIV>
<DIV> </DIV>
<DIV><FONT size=2>Another haphazard attempt to reopen a dialogue devoid of
substance carries the risk of putting off the Syrian regime and convincing it
that the context is not yet ripe for genuine negotiations. Conversely, Western
advocates of engagement are likely to be discouraged by Syria's response, which
will only validate the view that Damascus is not serious in its calls for
peace. Instead, a coherent approach must be agreed upon so that any
engagement with Syria can yield concrete results.</FONT></DIV>
<DIV> </DIV>
<DIV><FONT size=2>First, some understanding should be reached regarding the UN
probe into the Hariri assassination. If and when compelling evidence implicating
Syrian nationals is produced, Damascus will be pressured to turn them over to
the soon-to-be established international tribunal. In that case, the regime
itself should not be targeted or made the object of sanctions; indeed, it is
hard to imagine that the investigation - regardless of its outcome - will teach
the world much about Syria and its Lebanon policies that the U.S. and France did
not already know at the time when they backed the regime. If Damascus proves
willing to turn a page in its relations with Beirut, the West should immediately
do the same in its relations to Syria.</FONT></DIV>
<DIV> </DIV>
<DIV><FONT size=2>Second, if the West seeks to engage Syria, it needs to adopt a
clear and balanced discourse. Firmness on the issue of Lebanese sovereignty is
absolutely justified, but so too is firmness on the issue of the return of the
Golan. When Prime Minister Ehud Olmert recently claimed that the Golan Heights
would forever remain in Israeli hands, Syrian officials were incensed not so
much by the declaration than by the absence of any Western
condemnation.</FONT></DIV>
<DIV> </DIV>
<DIV><FONT size=2>Third, proponents of engagement must be prepared to offer
tangible quid pro quos. Damascus has no reason to alter its policies if it
simply means acquiescing to a hostile regional order . U.S. officials who reject
the notion of re-engagement argue that the only quid pro quo Syria truly wants
is to be given a free hand in Lebanon. But regaining the Golan Heights and
reviving prospects of an equitable economic agreement with the EU remain
critically important to a regime that, both politically and economically, is in
need of breathing space.</FONT></DIV>
<DIV> </DIV>
<DIV><FONT size=2>Fourth, in seeking Syrian concessions, the West ought to be
realistic. Syria is not about to cut its ties to Hamas, Hizbollah, Iran or
Iraqi insurgent groups - links it believes are its only assets in a delicate
strategic tug of war with Israel and the West. Rather, it should be asked to use
these relations to more constructive effect: to pressure Hamas to implement and
impose a cease-fire; to persuade Hizbollah to maintain calm; to work with Iran
and Sunni insurgent groups to promote a genuine Iraqi internal
reconciliation.</FONT></DIV>
<DIV> </DIV>
<DIV><FONT size=2>Engaging Syria is fast on its way to becoming the new rallying
cry. But fruitless engagement is liable to do more harm than good.
If Europe and the United States are serious about wanting to modify regional
dynamics - as well they should be - they need to be serious about how they go
about it. That begins with being serious about what one does with
Syria.</FONT></DIV>
<DIV> </DIV>
<DIV><FONT size=2>Peter Harling is a Senior Analyst with the International
Crisis Group.</FONT></DIV></BODY></HTML>