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<title>1701: What the UN Security Council's Ceasefire Resolution Actually Says</title>
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<p align=right style='text-align:right'><b><font size=4 color="#990000"
face="Times New Roman"><span style='font-size:13.0pt;color:#990000;font-weight:
bold'>Weekend Edition<br>
</span></font></b><font size=4 face=Arial><span style='font-size:13.0pt;
font-family:Arial'>August 19 / 20, 2006 </span></font><o:p></o:p></p>
<p style='margin-bottom:12.0pt'><b><i><font size=3 face="Times New Roman"><span
style='font-size:12.0pt;font-weight:bold;font-style:italic'>As Full of
Pro-Israeli Holes as Swiss Cheese<br>
</span></font></i><font color="#990000"><span style='color:#990000'>Inside
1701: What the UN Security Council's Ceasefire Resolution Actually Says<br>
</span></font></b>By <font face=Arial><span style='font-family:Arial'>VIRGINIA
TILLEY<br>
</span></font><font size=2 face=Arial><span style='font-size:10.5pt;font-family:
Arial'><br>
</span></font><font size=6 color="#990000" face=Verdana><span style='font-size:
24.0pt;font-family:Verdana;color:#990000'>W</span></font><font size=2
face=Verdana><span style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Verdana'>hat is really
portended by UN Security Council Resolution 1701, which set the terms for the
present ceasefire in <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Lebanon</st1:place></st1:country-region>?
The very fact that it was signed at all might be encouraging, but no one is sure
what its actual impact will be and most are sceptical. For <st1:country-region
w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Israel</st1:place></st1:country-region>, will it
secure the outcome its leaders are (rather desperately) claiming they have
gained by this dreadful war - i.e., ultimate disarmament of Hizbullah? For <st1:country-region
w:st="on">Lebanon</st1:country-region> and Hizbullah, will it secure <st1:country-region
w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Israel</st1:place></st1:country-region>'s
withdrawal? Either way, will it last?<br>
</span></font><font size=2 face=Arial><span style='font-size:10.5pt;font-family:
Arial'><br>
</span></font><font size=2 face=Verdana><span style='font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Verdana'>More important than its precise provisions are facts on
the ground. On one side, Hizbullah is "victorious" in defeating <st1:country-region
w:st="on">Israel</st1:country-region>'s military ambitions, but much of <st1:country-region
w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Lebanon</st1:place></st1:country-region> itself
is in ruins; peace for a traumatized population is a matter of urgency. On the
other side, the Israeli military is chastened and Jewish Israel is shocked;
more fruitless loss of soldiers' lives has become political anathema. These
factors may cause the guns to stay silent where the resolution itself could
not.<br>
</span></font><font size=2 face=Arial><span style='font-size:10.5pt;font-family:
Arial'><br>
</span></font><font size=2 face=Verdana><span style='font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Verdana'>But a close look at Resolution 1701 is still important
because it says a great deal about the politics of the moment. In practice, any
Security Council (SC) resolution is only as effective in attaining its goals as
the collective political will and capacity of its veto-wielding members allow
it to be. Some resolutions reflect more consensus than others. Many confront
limitations of the SC to enforce them. Brooding divisions and chicanery within
the SC can instill loopholes or debilitating contradictions.<br>
</span></font><font size=2 face=Arial><span style='font-size:10.5pt;font-family:
Arial'><br>
</span></font><font size=2 face=Verdana><span style='font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Verdana'>Even short-and-sweet SC resolutions (a fraction the length
of 1701) can be manipulated to create a crucial loophole. One notorious example
is SC Resolution 242, passed just after the 1967 war when <st1:country-region
w:st="on">Israel</st1:country-region> had occupied the Gaza Strip, the West
Bank, the Golan Heights, and the entire <st1:place w:st="on">Sinai Peninsula</st1:place>.
Hard Israeli lobbying famously managed to extract the crucial "the"
from the English translation of the otherwise blunt provision, "Withdrawal
of Israeli armed forces from [the] territories occupied in the recent
conflict." "Territories" in English is a general term, and could
mean "some territories". "The territories" would mean
"all territories". Israel's maneuver on the definite article was
therefore not sophistic: it has allowed Israel to claim, to this day, that it
satisfied its obligations to comply with 242 by withdrawing from the Sinai (in
198 1), while retaining control of the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and Golan
Heights. (In all the other official UN languages, Resolution 242 still says
"the territories", but apparently <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place
w:st="on">Israel</st1:place></st1:country-region> is accountable to
international law only in English.)<br>
</span></font><font size=2 face=Arial><span style='font-size:10.5pt;font-family:
Arial'><br>
</span></font><font size=2 face=Verdana><span style='font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Verdana'>Brought under the microscope, what exactly does Resolution
1701 say? A line-by-line analysis reveals that it is as full of pro-Israeli
holes as a Swiss cheese. It also has two significant pro-Lebanese holes. But
the over-all weight of the resolution indicates that <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place
w:st="on">Israel</st1:place></st1:country-region> holds the crucial card:
whether and when to withdraw its forces from Lebanese territory. Close study of
the resolution also explains why <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place
w:st="on">Israel</st1:place></st1:country-region> rushed troops across the
border in the days immediately preceding its passage. Knowing the text, having
consulted with the Americans about its details, the Israeli government needed
its troops in place to make it work. The loopholes also suggest that the
present ceasefire, presently welcomed by two exhausted sides, may hold only a
few weeks.<br>
</span></font><font size=2 face=Arial><span style='font-size:10.5pt;font-family:
Arial'><br>
</span></font><font size=2 face=Verdana><span style='font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Verdana'>"The Security Council,<br>
</span></font><font size=2 face=Arial><span style='font-size:10.5pt;font-family:
Arial'><br>
</span></font><font size=2 face=Verdana><span style='font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Verdana'>Recalling all its previous resolutions on Lebanon, in particular
resolutions 425 (1978), 426 (1978), 520 (1982), 1559 (2004), 1655 (2006), 1680
(2006) and 1697 (2006), as well as the statements of its president on the
situation in Lebanon, in particular the statements of 18 June, 2000, of 19
October, 2004, of 4 May 2005, of 23 January 2006 and of 30 July 2006;"<br>
</span></font><font size=2 face=Arial><span style='font-size:10.5pt;font-family:
Arial'><br>
</span></font><font size=2 face=Verdana><span style='font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Verdana'>Security Council resolutions always open with reference to
relevant prior resolutions, to establish their juridical context. This one
establishes Resolution 1701 within the legal history of prior resolutions on <st1:country-region
w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Lebanon</st1:place></st1:country-region>. It
does not place the conflict in larger regional context, however, which includes
<st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Israel</st1:place></st1:country-region>'s
occupation of the Palestinian territories. Israeli violence in enforcing that
occupation is certainly intertwined with Hizbullah's ideology, popular
legitimacy, and its ongoing militancy, as well as Lebanese government weakness.
In the penultimate paragraph, the Resolution does cite the need for a
comprehensive <st1:place w:st="on">Middle East</st1:place> peace process based
on Security Council resolutions 242 and 338.<br>
</span></font><font size=2 face=Arial><span style='font-size:10.5pt;font-family:
Arial'><br>
</span></font><font size=2 face=Verdana><span style='font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Verdana'>"Expressing its utmost concern at the continuing
escalation of hostilities in Lebanon and in Israel since Hezbollah's attack on
Israel on 12 July 2006, which has already caused hundreds of deaths and
injuries on both sides, extensive damage to civilian infrastructure and
hundreds of thousands of internally displaced persons;"<br>
</span></font><font size=2 face=Arial><span style='font-size:10.5pt;font-family:
Arial'><br>
</span></font><font size=2 face=Verdana><span style='font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Verdana'>This paragraph offers the first of the Resolution's two
empirical falsehoods. The conflict has not "caused hundreds of deaths and
injuries on both sides." It caused hundreds of deaths and thousands of
injuries on one side and dozens on the other. Inscribing this false equation
into the text might seem a casual twist of language, but it is an ominous
footprint indicating the resolution's direction: endorsing <st1:country-region
w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Israel</st1:place></st1:country-region>'s
fictional narrative of symmetrical suffering bodes ill for the agenda of later
clauses. (It also does no service to historians of UN interventions, who
doubtless will unthinkingly reproduce this falsehood for decades to come).<br>
</span></font><font size=2 face=Arial><span style='font-size:10.5pt;font-family:
Arial'><br>
</span></font><font size=2 face=Verdana><span style='font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Verdana'>In similar vein, the paragraph traces the
"cause" of the conflict to a Hizbullah action, described as an
"attack on <st1:country-region w:st="on">Israel</st1:country-region>",
instead of <st1:country-region w:st="on">Israel</st1:country-region>'s decision
to respond to a minor border skirmish with a pre-planned and massive assault on
<st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Lebanon</st1:place></st1:country-region>'s
entire population and infrastructure.[1] This interpretation openly reproduces
the Israel-Washington-London axis of revisionist myths about how the conflict
started. It also suggests that the Lebanese government and Hizbullah were
willing to compromise on this language, probably on grounds that capitulating
to <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Israel</st1:place></st1:country-region>'s
version of events would be compensated by later substantive clauses that
counterbalance it. But, again, allowing the Security Council to inscribe
empirical falsehoods and <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Israel</st1:place></st1:country-region>'s
version of events into international law is poor law and poor planning. (The
second instance of error, in Paragraph 8, is even more worrisome .)<br>
</span></font><font size=2 face=Arial><span style='font-size:10.5pt;font-family:
Arial'><br>
</span></font><font size=2 face=Verdana><span style='font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Verdana'>"Emphasizing the need for an end of violence, but at
the same time emphasising the need to address urgently the causes that have
given rise to the current crisis, including by the unconditional release of the
abducted Israeli soldiers;<br>
</span></font><font size=2 face=Arial><span style='font-size:10.5pt;font-family:
Arial'><br>
</span></font><font size=2 face=Verdana><span style='font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Verdana'>Mindful of the sensitivity of the issue of prisoners and
encouraging the efforts aimed at urgently settling the issue of the Lebanese
prisoners detained in <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Israel</st1:place></st1:country-region>;"<br>
</span></font><font size=2 face=Arial><span style='font-size:10.5pt;font-family:
Arial'><br>
</span></font><font size=2 face=Verdana><span style='font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Verdana'>A prisoner exchange was the reason for Hizbullah's capture
of two Israeli soldiers, the event cited by <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place
w:st="on">Israel</st1:place></st1:country-region> as the casus belli. The
question of prisoners is therefore hardly peripheral to this conflict. Yet the
Resolution here inscribes a starkly asymmetrical standing to Israeli and
Lebanese prisoners. Hizbullah's capture of Israeli prisoners is inscribed as
one of "the causes that have given rise to the current crisis". The
Security Council itself will therefore "address urgently" the plight
of the two "abducted" (captured) Israeli soldiers, by securing their
"unconditional release". By contrast, Lebanese prisoners held in <st1:country-region
w:st="on">Israel</st1:country-region>, from previous incursions into <st1:country-region
w:st="on">Lebanon</st1:country-region> by <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place
w:st="on">Israel</st1:place></st1:country-region>, are not admitted to be a
causal factor. Their plight is only a matter of "sensitivity", whose
urgent settlement by other actors (unnamed) will be "encouraged.&q
uot; This formula makes the Security Council itself responsible for the Israeli
soldiers' release, while leaving the release of Lebanese prisoners to present
players - i.e., Israel.<br>
</span></font><font size=2 face=Arial><span style='font-size:10.5pt;font-family:
Arial'><br>
</span></font><font size=2 face=Verdana><span style='font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Verdana'>"Welcoming the efforts of the Lebanese prime minister
and the commitment of the government of Lebanon, in its seven-point plan, to
extend its authority over its territory, through its own legitimate armed
forces, such that there will be no weapons without the consent of the
government of Lebanon and no authority other than that of the government of
Lebanon, welcoming also its commitment to a UN force that is supplemented and
enhanced in numbers, equipment, mandate and scope of operation, and bearing in
mind its request in this plan for an immediate withdrawal of the Israeli forces
from southern Lebanon;"<br>
</span></font><font size=2 face=Arial><span style='font-size:10.5pt;font-family:
Arial'><br>
</span></font><font size=2 face=Verdana><span style='font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Verdana'>As <st1:country-region w:st="on">Israel</st1:country-region>
has insisted that the Lebanese government assume sole authority over Lebanese
territory, this passage may seem friendly to <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place
w:st="on">Israel</st1:place></st1:country-region>, eliminating Hizbullah's
military role and autonomy. Nevertheless, it provides the first loophole
favoring <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Lebanon</st1:place></st1:country-region>,
as the Lebanese government now includes Hizbullah. "No authority other
than that of the government of <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Lebanon</st1:place></st1:country-region>"
will not be a problem for Hizbullah if it is part of that government. (Indeed,
the government could not have signed this resolution without consulting with
Hizbullah and getting a general go-ahead.) The phrase, "no weapons without
the consent of the government of <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place
w:st="on">Lebanon</st1:place></st1:country-region>", will not be a
problem for Hizbullah, either, because the government is likely to give that
consent. Moreover, as Hizbullah members are already well diffused into the
Lebanese army, friendly cooperation between Hizbullah and the army is already e
vident and can be coordinated under the authority of the central Lebanese
government - which, again, includes Hizbullah.<br>
</span></font><font size=2 face=Arial><span style='font-size:10.5pt;font-family:
Arial'><br>
</span></font><font size=2 face=Verdana><span style='font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Verdana'>Knowing all this, the central government itself does not
face the unworkable challenge of confronting Hizbullah's greater military and
political force. The logistics of integration, however, are clearly difficult.
Fusing Hizbullah's military wing into the Lebanese army is especially delicate,
as Hizbullah has jealously guarded its military secrets even from the
communities adjacent to its installations. Fusion might therefore have to be
managed by reconstituting Hizbullah's military wing as a branch or special
force of the army, to preserve its intelligence firewalls.<br>
</span></font><font size=2 face=Arial><span style='font-size:10.5pt;font-family:
Arial'><br>
</span></font><font size=2 face=Verdana><span style='font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Verdana'>Simply "disarming" Hizbullah, however, is out of
the question: no Lebanese authority has the power to do that. Reflecting this
reality, the government of <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Lebanon</st1:place></st1:country-region>
has already redefined Hizbullah as a "resistance" group, not a
"militia", and therefore exempt from the provisions of Security
Council Resolution 1559 (which requires all "militias" to disarm).
This maneuver allows <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Lebanon</st1:place></st1:country-region>'s
unity government to comply with Resolution 1559 by "consenting" to
Hizbullah's continuing to bear weapons - or at least, so the government argues.<br>
</span></font><font size=2 face=Arial><span style='font-size:10.5pt;font-family:
Arial'><br>
</span></font><font size=2 face=Verdana><span style='font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Verdana'>But a twist, embedded in the last phrase, undercuts <st1:country-region
w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Lebanon</st1:place></st1:country-region>'s
achievement in this paragraph. "Immediate withdrawal of the Israeli
forces" is phrasing friendly to <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place
w:st="on">Lebanon</st1:place></st1:country-region>'s urgent desires. It is
prefaced, however, with the debilitating word "request". Given <st1:country-region
w:st="on">Israel</st1:country-region>'s violation of international law and the
UN Charter in invading a neighboring state, the Security Council should
"demand" or "instruct" <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place
w:st="on">Israel</st1:place></st1:country-region> to withdraw immediately, not
"request" it to do so. In this phrasing, <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place
w:st="on">Israel</st1:place></st1:country-region> is not required to withdraw
and the Security Council is not charged with enforcing its withdrawal. This
formula therefore leaves <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Israel</st1:place></st1:country-region>
in charge of its own withdrawal. If Hizbullah retains its arms, <st1:country-region
w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Israel</st1:place></st1:country-region> would
not consider itself obligated to withdraw.<br>
</span></font><font size=2 face=Arial><span style='font-size:10.5pt;font-family:
Arial'><br>
</span></font><font size=2 face=Verdana><span style='font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Verdana'>"Determined to act for this withdrawal to happen at
the earliest;"<br>
</span></font><font size=2 face=Arial><span style='font-size:10.5pt;font-family:
Arial'><br>
</span></font><font size=2 face=Verdana><span style='font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Verdana'>This short phrase is both vague and strange, not even
grammatically complete in English. "Act for" is foggy in English,
connoting a general effort. The French version also offers unspecified and
passive constructions: "Determined to act in such a way that this
withdrawal happen as soon as possible" ("Déterminé à agir de telle
sorte que ce retrait intervienne le plus tôt possible"). Even for a
preface, where general formulas are normal, this clause lacks both specificity
and especially agency: the withdrawal will simply happen. The lack of agency
regarding any monitoring or enforcement of <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place
w:st="on">Israel</st1:place></st1:country-region>'s withdrawal shapes the rest
of the Resolution.<br>
</span></font><font size=2 face=Arial><span style='font-size:10.5pt;font-family:
Arial'><br>
</span></font><font size=2 face=Verdana><span style='font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Verdana'>"Taking due note of the proposals made in the
seven-point plan regarding the Shebaa farms area;"<br>
</span></font><font size=2 face=Arial><span style='font-size:10.5pt;font-family:
Arial'><br>
</span></font><font size=2 face=Verdana><span style='font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Verdana'>"Taking due note" offers formal recognition that
this plan exists. But it does not indicate that the Security Council endorses
the seven-point plan, nor does it clarify that the plan will comprise the basis
for any further discussions. (The Resolution's operative reference to the
Shebaa farms, in Paragraph 10, makes no mention of this plan.)<br>
</span></font><font size=2 face=Arial><span style='font-size:10.5pt;font-family:
Arial'><br>
</span></font><font size=2 face=Verdana><span style='font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Verdana'>"Welcoming the unanimous decision by the government
of Lebanon on 7 August 2006 to deploy a Lebanese armed force of 15,000 troops
in south Lebanon as the Israeli army withdraws behind the Blue Line and to
request the assistance of additional forces from Unifil as needed, to
facilitate the entry of the Lebanese armed forces into the region and to
restate its intention to strengthen the Lebanese armed forces with material as
needed to enable it to perform its duties;"<br>
</span></font><font size=2 face=Arial><span style='font-size:10.5pt;font-family:
Arial'><br>
</span></font><font size=2 face=Verdana><span style='font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Verdana'>"As the Israeli army withdraws" implies a confused
process whereby the Israeli army will withdraw while the Lebanese army arrives.
But the sequencing is muddy. Is the Lebanese army to arrive while Israeli
troops are still in place, so that no vacuum of power occurs? Is the Lebanese
army to take over positions only as <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place
w:st="on">Israel</st1:place></st1:country-region> withdraws from them? Is the
Lebanese army's arrival a sufficient condition for <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place
w:st="on">Israel</st1:place></st1:country-region>'s withdrawal, or is
Hizbullah's disappearance (impossible) also necessary? Again, it is left to <st1:country-region
w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Israel</st1:place></st1:country-region> to judge
when to withdraw. It is easy to imagine that any Hizbullah attack on Israeli
troops, or even unspecified trouble for Israeli forces, would give <st1:country-region
w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Israel</st1:place></st1:country-region> a
pretext to delay withdrawal.<br>
</span></font><font size=2 face=Arial><span style='font-size:10.5pt;font-family:
Arial'><br>
</span></font><font size=2 face=Verdana><span style='font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Verdana'>"Aware of its responsibilities to help secure a
permanent ceasefire and a long-term solution to the conflict;<br>
</span></font><font size=2 face=Arial><span style='font-size:10.5pt;font-family:
Arial'><br>
</span></font><font size=2 face=Verdana><span style='font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Verdana'>"Determining that the situation in <st1:country-region
w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Lebanon</st1:place></st1:country-region>
constitutes a threat to international peace and security;<br>
</span></font><font size=2 face=Arial><span style='font-size:10.5pt;font-family:
Arial'><br>
</span></font><font size=2 face=Verdana><span style='font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Verdana'>1. Calls for a full cessation of hostilities based upon,
in particular, the immediate cessation by Hezbollah of all attacks and the
immediate cessation by <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Israel</st1:place></st1:country-region>
of all offensive military operations;"<br>
</span></font><font size=2 face=Arial><span style='font-size:10.5pt;font-family:
Arial'><br>
</span></font><font size=2 face=Verdana><span style='font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Verdana'>In the key word "offensive," Paragraph 1 offers
the lethal phrasing that explains Israel's rush to gain ground in the days
immediately preceding passage of this resolution. Once holding substantial
Lebanese territory, <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Israel</st1:place></st1:country-region>
can define its military actions not as "offensive" but as defensive,
pending its withdrawal. But the conditions for its withdrawal must be
satisfactory to <st1:country-region w:st="on">Israel</st1:country-region>; the
Resolution establishes no external authority to compel <st1:country-region
w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Israel</st1:place></st1:country-region>'s
withdrawal or any sanctions if it does not.<br>
</span></font><font size=2 face=Arial><span style='font-size:10.5pt;font-family:
Arial'><br>
</span></font><font size=2 face=Verdana><span style='font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Verdana'>Obviously, by international criteria regarding territorial
aggression and belligerent occupation, it is nonsense for <st1:country-region
w:st="on">Israel</st1:country-region> to be occupying <st1:country-region
w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Lebanon</st1:place></st1:country-region> while
claiming not to be in an offensive military posture. But it has been equal
nonsense for nuclear-power <st1:country-region w:st="on">Israel</st1:country-region>
to describe its attack on <st1:country-region w:st="on">Lebanon</st1:country-region>,
in the name of crushing a local guerrilla group, as a war for <st1:country-region
w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Israel</st1:place></st1:country-region>'s own
survival. In most diplomacy, <st1:country-region w:st="on">Israel</st1:country-region>
has also consistently denied that it is in a condition of "belligerent
occupation" of the <st1:place w:st="on">West Bank</st1:place> and Gaza
Strip. <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Israel</st1:place></st1:country-region>'s
capacity to claim any action as "defense" is well-established in the
diplomatic record.<br>
</span></font><font size=2 face=Arial><span style='font-size:10.5pt;font-family:
Arial'><br>
</span></font><font size=2 face=Verdana><span style='font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Verdana'>"2. Upon full cessation of hostilities, calls upon
the government of Lebanon and Unifil as authorised by paragraph 11 to deploy
their forces together throughout the South and calls upon the government of
Israel, as that deployment begins, to withdraw all of its forces from southern
Lebanon in parallel;"<br>
</span></font><font size=2 face=Arial><span style='font-size:10.5pt;font-family:
Arial'><br>
</span></font><font size=2 face=Verdana><span style='font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Verdana'>"[A]s that deployment begins" could suggest that
<st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Israel</st1:place></st1:country-region>
is supposed to withdraw its forces immediately upon the entry of Lebanese and
Unifil forces into the region. But, again, "in parallel" is
confusing: in parallel with what? The mere arrival of Lebanese army forces? Or
the effective replacement (i.e., removal) Hizbullah forces from southern <st1:country-region
w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Lebanon</st1:place></st1:country-region>? Since
Hizbullah will not imaginably be removed from southern <st1:country-region
w:st="on">Lebanon</st1:country-region>, "in parallel" could leave <st1:country-region
w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Israel</st1:place></st1:country-region>'s forces
in place, according to its own assessment of "parallel" conditions,
for weeks or months. (As noted, overwhelming domestic Israeli pressure to
withdraw from <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Lebanon</st1:place></st1:country-region>
may trump the plan suggested here.)<br>
</span></font><font size=2 face=Arial><span style='font-size:10.5pt;font-family:
Arial'><br>
</span></font><font size=2 face=Verdana><span style='font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Verdana'>"3. Emphasises the importance of the extension of the
control of the government of Lebanon over all Lebanese territory in accordance
with the provisions of resolution 1559 (2004) and resolution 1680 (2006), and
of the relevant provisions of the Taif Accords, for it to exercise its full
sovereignty, so that there will be no weapons without the consent of the
government of Lebanon and no authority other than that of the government of
Lebanon;"<br>
</span></font><font size=2 face=Arial><span style='font-size:10.5pt;font-family:
Arial'><br>
</span></font><st1:country-region w:st="on"><font size=2 face=Verdana><span
style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Verdana'>Israel</span></font></st1:country-region><font
size=2 face=Verdana><span style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Verdana'> clearly
wants Hizbullah to lose all capacity to launch attacks against <st1:country-region
w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Israel</st1:place></st1:country-region>. But
since the Lebanese government can "consent" to Hizbullah's remaining
armed, as part of a newly centralized military authority, this phrasing could
serve both the government and Hizbullah. The paragraph suggests that Hizbullah
has agreed that any attack on <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Israel</st1:place></st1:country-region>
will be made only with agreement by the Lebanese government and not on its own
sole authority as a party or resistance group. (However, Hizbullah has already
declared an exception: it reserves the right to attack Israeli troops as long
as they remain in <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Lebanon</st1:place></st1:country-region>.
Doubtless Hizbullah accurately perceives the risks of the Resolution and its
faith is likely to be low.)<br>
</span></font><font size=2 face=Arial><span style='font-size:10.5pt;font-family:
Arial'><br>
</span></font><font size=2 face=Verdana><span style='font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Verdana'>Unifying the Lebanese government authority over foreign
policy is not only necessary to holding <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place
w:st="on">Lebanon</st1:place></st1:country-region> together but is also an
important evolution in the state's integration. Historically, the Lebanese
government has lacked both the capacity and the interest necessary to disarm
Hizbullah, a force much more powerful than the state's own armed forces and
that enjoys significant legitimacy in <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place
w:st="on">Lebanon</st1:place></st1:country-region> as the sole effective
deterrent to Israeli aggression. (Flagging in the post-Hariri era, its
legitimacy has now been enormously pumped up by <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place
w:st="on">Israel</st1:place></st1:country-region>'s ruinous invasion of the
country.) <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Lebanon</st1:place></st1:country-region>
is hardly unique in this weakness. Many weak states lack the capacity to control
armed groups operating from their territories (several African states come to
mind). They may even tacitly support the presence of such groups, if those
groups operate as extra-legal (and plausibly deniable) instruments of the gove
rnment's foreign policy.<br>
</span></font><font size=2 face=Arial><span style='font-size:10.5pt;font-family:
Arial'><br>
</span></font><font size=2 face=Verdana><span style='font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Verdana'>But centralizing authority over foreign policy, especially
to wage war or launch attacks on other states, is a state-building project
incumbent on all nation-states. Hizbullah was brought into the government in
the last election; the next step would normally be fusion of its armed wing
into the state's armed forces. (We might recall that the precursor to the <st1:country-region
w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">United States</st1:place></st1:country-region>
federal system, the Confederation of the thirteen colonies, ran into similar
problems regarding Indian wars in the eighteenth century. <st1:State w:st="on"><st1:place
w:st="on">New York</st1:place></st1:State>'s wars with the Iroquois and
Georgia's wars with the Cherokee, launched on their own authority, drained the
treasuries of the other states. The problem contributed significantly to the
thirteen states' willingness to adopt the Constitution of 1789, which
authorized only the federal government to govern relations with the
"Indian tribes".)<br>
</span></font><font size=2 face=Arial><span style='font-size:10.5pt;font-family:
Arial'><br>
</span></font><font size=2 face=Verdana><span style='font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Verdana'>"4. Reiterates its strong support for full respect
for the Blue Line;<br>
</span></font><font size=2 face=Arial><span style='font-size:10.5pt;font-family:
Arial'><br>
</span></font><font size=2 face=Verdana><span style='font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Verdana'>"5. Also reiterates its strong support, as recalled
in all its previous relevant resolutions, for the territorial integrity,
sovereignty and political independence of <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place
w:st="on">Lebanon</st1:place></st1:country-region> within its internationally
recognized borders, as contemplated by the Israeli-Lebanese General Armistice
Agreement of 23 March 1949;"<br>
</span></font><font size=2 face=Arial><span style='font-size:10.5pt;font-family:
Arial'><br>
</span></font><font size=2 face=Verdana><span style='font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Verdana'>These clauses are nice but worrisomely vague. The term
"full respect for the Blue Line" suggests the mutual termination of
incursions or cross-border actions. But it does not specify how "full
respect" is to be expressed - for example, whether it would require Israel
to terminate its low-altitude flights over Lebanon, which have regularly broken
the sound barrier over southern Lebanese cities. Nor does it address the
question of prisoners.<br>
</span></font><font size=2 face=Arial><span style='font-size:10.5pt;font-family:
Arial'><br>
</span></font><font size=2 face=Verdana><span style='font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Verdana'>"6. Calls on the international community to take
immediate steps to extend its financial and humanitarian assistance to the
Lebanese people, including through facilitating the safe return of displaced
persons and, under the authority of the government of Lebanon, reopening
airports and harbours, consistent with paragraphs 14 and 15, and calls on it also
to consider further assistance in the future to contribute to the
reconstruction and development of Lebanon;"<br>
</span></font><font size=2 face=Arial><span style='font-size:10.5pt;font-family:
Arial'><br>
</span></font><font size=2 face=Verdana><span style='font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Verdana'>This paragraph might seem friendly to <st1:country-region
w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Lebanon</st1:place></st1:country-region>, too,
until we consider it in context. First, it makes the international community
financially responsible for "reopening airports and harbours," rather
than <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Israel</st1:place></st1:country-region>,
which wrecked them. <st1:country-region w:st="on">Israel</st1:country-region>
has no responsibility at all, in this resolution, for providing financial,
logistical or any other help in reconstructing the rest of <st1:country-region
w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Lebanon</st1:place></st1:country-region>.<br>
</span></font><font size=2 face=Arial><span style='font-size:10.5pt;font-family:
Arial'><br>
</span></font><font size=2 face=Verdana><span style='font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Verdana'>Second and more subtly, the paragraph actually confirms <st1:country-region
w:st="on">Israel</st1:country-region>'s authority to stall any such rebuilding,
or selectively to impede it, since loopholes in the rest of the resolution
leave it up to <st1:country-region w:st="on">Israel</st1:country-region> to
determine when "the authority of the government of <st1:country-region
w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Lebanon</st1:place></st1:country-region>"
has been truly imposed. By linking <st1:country-region w:st="on">Lebanon</st1:country-region>'s
reconstruction to paragraphs 14 and 15 (below), Paragraph 6 confirms that
rebuilding <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Lebanon</st1:place></st1:country-region>
must not translate into Hizbullah's resupplying and rebuilding its military
capacity in the south. If Israel deems that rebuilding is serving Hizbullah's
military capacity (which it doubtless will, as Hizbullah and the army will
necessarily collaborate in reconstructing the demolished cities, villages, and
infrastructure in the Shi'a south and Beirut suburbs), then the Israeli military
can declare itself authorized to stop or even bomb those reconstruction
efforts. Since <st1:country-region w:st="on">Israel</st1:country-region> is
occupyi ng southern <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Lebanon</st1:place></st1:country-region>
precisely to monitor this process, it will be in position to halt the
reconstruction at its discretion.<br>
</span></font><font size=2 face=Arial><span style='font-size:10.5pt;font-family:
Arial'><br>
</span></font><font size=2 face=Verdana><span style='font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Verdana'>Aside from Hizbullah's arms, the phrase "under the
authority of the government of <st1:country-region w:st="on">Lebanon</st1:country-region>"
gives <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Israel</st1:place></st1:country-region>
another point of leverage. Even if Hizbullah as a political party is involved
in the rebuilding - which, again, being well-embedded among the southern Shi'a,
it will inevitably be - then <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Israel</st1:place></st1:country-region>
can declare that the "authority of the government" has not been
effectively imposed. The Lebanese government might protest that argument on
grounds that Hamas is a legitimate Lebanese party. But <st1:country-region
w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Israel</st1:place></st1:country-region> has
similarly rejected the presence of Hamas in the Palestinian government, and,
like Hamas, has declared Hizbullah a "terrorist organization". <st1:country-region
w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Israel</st1:place></st1:country-region> would be
consistent in rejecting the Lebanese government's insistence that Hizbullah
must be considered a legitimate player and treating any involvement or presence
by Hizbullah as a failure to impose full Lebanese state auth ority.<br>
</span></font><font size=2 face=Arial><span style='font-size:10.5pt;font-family:
Arial'><br>
</span></font><font size=2 face=Verdana><span style='font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Verdana'>"7. Affirms that all parties are responsible for
ensuring that no action is taken contrary to paragraph 1 that might adversely
affect the search for a long-term solution, humanitarian access to civilian
populations, including safe passage for humanitarian convoys, or the voluntary
and safe return of displaced persons, and calls on all parties to comply with
this responsibility and to cooperate with the Security Council;"<br>
</span></font><font size=2 face=Arial><span style='font-size:10.5pt;font-family:
Arial'><br>
</span></font><font size=2 face=Verdana><span style='font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Verdana'>This paragraph focuses narrowly on urgent humanitarian
concerns, which is welcome and essential. But it does not compel <st1:country-region
w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Israel</st1:place></st1:country-region> or
anyone else to pursue a "long-term solution". It only affirms that
parties are responsible for not acting in any way that would "adversely
affect" the "search" for one. (This phrasing is reminiscent of
"peace process" language that calls on <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place
w:st="on">Israel</st1:place></st1:country-region> not to act in any way that
will "prejudice final status talks" regarding withdrawal from the
Palestinian territories. <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Israel</st1:place></st1:country-region>
has roundly ignored those calls for decades.)<br>
</span></font><font size=2 face=Arial><span style='font-size:10.5pt;font-family:
Arial'><br>
</span></font><font size=2 face=Verdana><span style='font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Verdana'>"8. Calls for <st1:country-region w:st="on">Israel</st1:country-region>
and <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Lebanon</st1:place></st1:country-region>
to support a permanent ceasefire and a long-term solution based on the
following principles and elements:<br>
</span></font><font size=2 face=Arial><span style='font-size:10.5pt;font-family:
Arial'><br>
</span></font><font size=2 face=Verdana><span style='font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Verdana'>· Full respect for the Blue Line by both parties;"<br>
</span></font><font size=2 face=Arial><span style='font-size:10.5pt;font-family:
Arial'><br>
</span></font><font size=2 face=Verdana><span style='font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Verdana'>"Respect" is inoperably vague: see above.<br>
</span></font><font size=2 face=Arial><span style='font-size:10.5pt;font-family:
Arial'><br>
</span></font><font size=2 face=Verdana><span style='font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Verdana'>· "security arrangements to prevent the resumption of
hostilities, including the establishment between the Blue Line and the Litani
river of an area free of any armed personnel, assets and weapons other than
those of the government of Lebanon and of UNIFIL as authorised in paragraph 11,
deployed in this area;"<br>
</span></font><font size=2 face=Arial><span style='font-size:10.5pt;font-family:
Arial'><br>
</span></font><font size=2 face=Verdana><span style='font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Verdana'>This clause makes the Lebanese government and UNIFIL
responsible for ensuring that Hizbullah is not re-armed.<br>
</span></font><font size=2 face=Arial><span style='font-size:10.5pt;font-family:
Arial'><br>
</span></font><font size=2 face=Verdana><span style='font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Verdana'>"Full implementation of the relevant provisions of
the Taif Accords, and of resolutions 1559 (2004) and 1680 (2006), that require
the disarmament of all armed groups in Lebanon, so that, pursuant to the
Lebanese cabinet decision of July 27, 2006, there will be no weapons or
authority in Lebanon other than that of the Lebanese state;"<br>
</span></font><font size=2 face=Arial><span style='font-size:10.5pt;font-family:
Arial'><br>
</span></font><font size=2 face=Verdana><span style='font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Verdana'>This clause provides the second serious distortion of
history. The Taif Agreement (1989, clause 2.1 A) and Resolution 1559 (paragraph
3) did not call for disarming all "armed groups" but rather all
"militias". It is startling that the international community allowed
this alteration of facts (here, the diplomatic record). But its purpose is
plain. Deliberate misquotation of both agreements undercuts the Lebanese
government's maneuver cited earlier: to evade obligations to disarm Hizbullah
by redefining Hizbullah as a "resistance" organization.<br>
</span></font><font size=2 face=Arial><span style='font-size:10.5pt;font-family:
Arial'><br>
</span></font><font size=2 face=Verdana><span style='font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Verdana'>"· No foreign forces in <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place
w:st="on">Lebanon</st1:place></st1:country-region> without the consent of its
government;"<br>
</span></font><font size=2 face=Arial><span style='font-size:10.5pt;font-family:
Arial'><br>
</span></font><font size=2 face=Verdana><span style='font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Verdana'>This subsection is friendly to the Lebanese government,
implying that Israeli forces cannot legally invade again. But the clause does
not actually go beyond the UN Charter and international law prohibiting exactly
such behavior, which <st1:country-region w:st="on">Israel</st1:country-region>
has violated repeatedly in <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Lebanon</st1:place></st1:country-region>
on grounds of self-defense, so it does not really manifest as more robust here.
Also, <st1:country-region w:st="on">Israel</st1:country-region> has in the past
implicitly defined Hizbullah as "foreign forces" in being an
instrument of <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Iran</st1:place></st1:country-region>,
so it could conceivably declare the clause violated and violate it itself.<br>
</span></font><font size=2 face=Arial><span style='font-size:10.5pt;font-family:
Arial'><br>
</span></font><font size=2 face=Verdana><span style='font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Verdana'>"· No sales or supply of arms and related materiel to
<st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Lebanon</st1:place></st1:country-region>
except as authorized by its government;"<br>
</span></font><font size=2 face=Arial><span style='font-size:10.5pt;font-family:
Arial'><br>
</span></font><font size=2 face=Verdana><span style='font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Verdana'>This clause favors <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place
w:st="on">Israel</st1:place></st1:country-region>, but it will also serve to
strengthen the central Lebanese government in the positive sense observed
earlier. The problem is the Lebanese government's capacity to enforce it, which
is dubious. At what degree of failure would <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place
w:st="on">Israel</st1:place></st1:country-region> declare this condition
violated? Major rearmament of Hizbullah's southern positions? Or simply
interception of a single truck carrying Katyushas?<br>
</span></font><font size=2 face=Arial><span style='font-size:10.5pt;font-family:
Arial'><br>
</span></font><font size=2 face=Verdana><span style='font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Verdana'>"· Provision to the United Nations of all remaining
maps of land mines in <st1:country-region w:st="on">Lebanon</st1:country-region>
in <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Israel</st1:place></st1:country-region>'s
possession;"<br>
</span></font><font size=2 face=Arial><span style='font-size:10.5pt;font-family:
Arial'><br>
</span></font><font size=2 face=Verdana><span style='font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Verdana'>The clause seems to favor the Lebanese, who urgently need
these maps. However, it is formulated not as <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place
w:st="on">Israel</st1:place></st1:country-region>'s immediate obligation but
as a "principle or element" associated with a "long-term
solution". Since <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Israel</st1:place></st1:country-region>
understands a "long-term solution" only as the entire evaporation of
Hizbullah, providing the maps of land mines is left conditional on an outcome
not likely to emerge.<br>
</span></font><font size=2 face=Arial><span style='font-size:10.5pt;font-family:
Arial'><br>
</span></font><font size=2 face=Verdana><span style='font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Verdana'>"9. Invites the secretary general to support efforts
to secure as soon as possible agreements in principle from the government of
Lebanon and the government of Israel to the principles and elements for a
long-term solution as set forth in paragraph 8, and expresses its intention to
be actively involved;"<br>
</span></font><font size=2 face=Arial><span style='font-size:10.5pt;font-family:
Arial'><br>
</span></font><font size=2 face=Verdana><span style='font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Verdana'>Translation: The hapless Secretary General is charged with
monitoring and facilitating this mess of an agreement.<br>
</span></font><font size=2 face=Arial><span style='font-size:10.5pt;font-family:
Arial'><br>
</span></font><font size=2 face=Verdana><span style='font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Verdana'>"10. Requests the secretary general to develop, in
liaison with relevant international actors and the concerned parties, proposals
to implement the relevant provisions of the Taif Accords, and resolutions 1559
(2004) and 1680 (2006), including disarmament, and for delineation of the
international borders of Lebanon, especially in those areas where the border is
disputed or uncertain, including by dealing with the Shebaa farms area, and to
present to the Security Council those proposals within 30 days;"<br>
</span></font><font size=2 face=Arial><span style='font-size:10.5pt;font-family:
Arial'><br>
</span></font><font size=2 face=Verdana><span style='font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Verdana'>Translation: The Secretary General is also charged with
developing further proposals. Disposition of the Shebaa farms area is left to
later negotiations, with no mention of the seven-point plan.<br>
</span></font><font size=2 face=Arial><span style='font-size:10.5pt;font-family:
Arial'><br>
</span></font><font size=2 face=Verdana><span style='font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Verdana'>"11. Decides, in order to supplement and enhance the
force in numbers, equipment, mandate and scope of operations, to authorize an
increase in the force strength of Unifil to a maximum of 15,000 troops, and
that the force shall, in addition to carrying out its mandate under resolutions
425 and 426 (1978):<br>
</span></font><font size=2 face=Arial><span style='font-size:10.5pt;font-family:
Arial'><br>
</span></font><font size=2 face=Verdana><span style='font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Verdana'>a. Monitor the cessation of hostilities;<br>
</span></font><font size=2 face=Arial><span style='font-size:10.5pt;font-family:
Arial'><br>
</span></font><font size=2 face=Verdana><span style='font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Verdana'>b. Accompany and support the Lebanese armed forces as they
deploy throughout the South, including along the Blue Line, as Israel withdraws
its armed forces from Lebanon as provided in paragraph 2;<br>
</span></font><font size=2 face=Arial><span style='font-size:10.5pt;font-family:
Arial'><br>
</span></font><font size=2 face=Verdana><span style='font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Verdana'>c. Coordinate its activities related to paragraph 11 (b)
with the government of <st1:country-region w:st="on">Lebanon</st1:country-region>
and the government of <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Israel</st1:place></st1:country-region>;<br>
</span></font><font size=2 face=Arial><span style='font-size:10.5pt;font-family:
Arial'><br>
</span></font><font size=2 face=Verdana><span style='font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Verdana'>d. Extend its assistance to help ensure humanitarian
access to civilian populations and the voluntary and safe return of displaced
persons;<br>
</span></font><font size=2 face=Arial><span style='font-size:10.5pt;font-family:
Arial'><br>
</span></font><font size=2 face=Verdana><span style='font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Verdana'>e. Assist the Lebanese armed forces in taking steps
towards the establishment of the area as referred to in paragraph 8;<br>
</span></font><font size=2 face=Arial><span style='font-size:10.5pt;font-family:
Arial'><br>
</span></font><font size=2 face=Verdana><span style='font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Verdana'>f. Assist the government of <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place
w:st="on">Lebanon</st1:place></st1:country-region>, at its request, to
implement paragraph 14;"<br>
</span></font><font size=2 face=Arial><span style='font-size:10.5pt;font-family:
Arial'><br>
</span></font><font size=2 face=Verdana><span style='font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Verdana'>According to these provisions, UNIFIL will play an
expanded role in monitoring Hizbullah's disarmament, the Lebanese army's
takeover, and the country's reconstruction. The measure seems to provide <st1:country-region
w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Israel</st1:place></st1:country-region> with a
guarantor of Hizbullah's marginalization, and the Lebanese government with a
friendly international force that can monitor and even oppose any Israeli
intervention. But the confusions and contradictions cited in earlier passages
indicate a crucial weakness for UNIFIL regarding these jobs. Consider the
dilemma: UNIFIL is charged with supporting the Lebanese army's deployment in
the south, although deployment is not clearly contingent on <st1:country-region
w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Israel</st1:place></st1:country-region>'s
withdrawal. UNIFIL must also prevent any rearmament by Hizbullah, southern <st1:country-region
w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Lebanon</st1:place></st1:country-region>'s
primary military power, although it has no military or intelligence capacity to
do. It will assist in securing "humanitarian access to civilian
populations& quot; and the return of refugees, but has no authority to
engage Israeli forces if <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Israel</st1:place></st1:country-region>
impedes those efforts. A more unenviable position is difficult to imagine.<br>
</span></font><font size=2 face=Arial><span style='font-size:10.5pt;font-family:
Arial'><br>
</span></font><font size=2 face=Verdana><span style='font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Verdana'>"12. Acting in support of a request from the
government of Lebanon to deploy an international force to assist it to exercise
its authority throughout the territory, authorizes Unifil to take all necessary
action in areas of deployment of its forces and as it deems within its
capabilities, to ensure that its area of operations is not utilised for hostile
activities of any kind, to resist attempts by forceful means to prevent it from
discharging its duties under the mandate of the Security Council, and to
protect United Nations personnel, facilities, installations and equipment,
ensure the security and freedom of movement of United Nations personnel,
humanitarian workers, and, without prejudice to the responsibility of the
government of Lebanon, to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical
violence;"<br>
</span></font><font size=2 face=Arial><span style='font-size:10.5pt;font-family:
Arial'><br>
</span></font><font size=2 face=Verdana><span style='font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Verdana'>Recognizing UNIFIL's dilemma, the Resolution now seems to
strengthen UNIFIL's role. But read closely, it only loads UNIFIL with more
unmanageable duties. Since UNIFIL is based entirely in southern <st1:country-region
w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Lebanon</st1:place></st1:country-region>, its
primary responsibility-to "ensure that its area of operations is not
utilized for hostile activities of any kind"-pertains solely to containing
Hizbullah. Regarding Israel, its charge "to protect civilians under
imminent threat of physical violence" seems to give it authority to repel
Israeli attacks on Lebanese civilians, but this role is undercut by two
factors: (a) Israel's standard claim that it hits civilians only by accident
during necessary military engagement with Hizbullah, such that it would reject
UNIFIL's role in repelling actions ostensibly aimed at military targets
"using civilians as shelter"; and (b) UNIFIL's obvious logistical
inability to d o anything about Israeli aggression of any kind. Since the rest
of the resolution provides multiple loopholes for Israeli aggression (e.g.,
redefining it as "defense"), this clause sets up UNIFIL for failure
to protect civilians.<br>
</span></font><font size=2 face=Arial><span style='font-size:10.5pt;font-family:
Arial'><br>
</span></font><font size=2 face=Verdana><span style='font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Verdana'>Most strikingly, the resolution makes no mention of <st1:country-region
w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Israel</st1:place></st1:country-region>'s
relationship to UNIFIL or its responsibility to respect UNIFIL's authority in
fulfilling its mission. In other words, UNIFIL is the same feeble instrument it
has been for decades.<br>
</span></font><font size=2 face=Arial><span style='font-size:10.5pt;font-family:
Arial'><br>
</span></font><font size=2 face=Verdana><span style='font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Verdana'>"13. Requests the secretary general urgently to put
in place measures to ensure Unifil is able to carry out the functions envisaged
in this resolution, urges member states to consider making appropriate
contributions to Unifil and to respond positively to requests for assistance
from the Force, and expresses its strong appreciation to those who have
contributed to Unifil in the past;"<br>
</span></font><font size=2 face=Arial><span style='font-size:10.5pt;font-family:
Arial'><br>
</span></font><font size=2 face=Verdana><span style='font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Verdana'>Translation: The international community will fund and
assist UNIFIL.<br>
</span></font><font size=2 face=Arial><span style='font-size:10.5pt;font-family:
Arial'><br>
</span></font><font size=2 face=Verdana><span style='font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Verdana'>14. Calls upon the government of Lebanon to secure its
borders and other entry points to prevent the entry in Lebanon without its
consent of arms or related materiel and requests Unifil as authorised in
paragraph 11 to assist the government of Lebanon at its request;<br>
</span></font><font size=2 face=Arial><span style='font-size:10.5pt;font-family:
Arial'><br>
</span></font><font size=2 face=Verdana><span style='font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Verdana'>"15. Decides further that all states shall take the
necessary measures to prevent, by their nationals or from their territories or
using their flag vessels or aircraft;<br>
</span></font><font size=2 face=Arial><span style='font-size:10.5pt;font-family:
Arial'><br>
</span></font><font size=2 face=Verdana><span style='font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Verdana'>a. the sale or supply to any entity or individual in Lebanon
of arms and related materiel of all types, including weapons and ammunition,
military vehicles and equipment, paramilitary equipment, and spare parts for
the aforementioned, whether or not originating in their territories, and;<br>
</span></font><font size=2 face=Arial><span style='font-size:10.5pt;font-family:
Arial'><br>
</span></font><font size=2 face=Verdana><span style='font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Verdana'>b. the provision to any entity or individual in Lebanon of
any technical training or assistance related to the provision, manufacture,
maintenance or use of the items listed in subparagraph (a) above, except that
these prohibitions shall not apply to arms, related material, training or
assistance authorised by the government of Lebanon or by Unifil as authorised
in paragraph 11;"<br>
</span></font><font size=2 face=Arial><span style='font-size:10.5pt;font-family:
Arial'><br>
</span></font><font size=2 face=Verdana><span style='font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Verdana'>These paragraphs target <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place
w:st="on">Israel</st1:place></st1:country-region>'s core concerns. They
require full disarmament of Hizbullah as well as termination of related support
to Hizbullah by its allies. Being linked to Paragraph 6, however, these
provisions also make "reopening [<st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place
w:st="on">Lebanon</st1:place></st1:country-region>'s] airports and
harbors" contingent both. Since covert external support to Hizbullah is
virtually certain, and therefore easy for Israel to claim whether Israel has
direct evidence or not, this construction gives Israel a standing legal
mechanism through which to block the reconstruction of Lebanon for whatever
reason it might have.<br>
</span></font><font size=2 face=Arial><span style='font-size:10.5pt;font-family:
Arial'><br>
</span></font><font size=2 face=Verdana><span style='font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Verdana'>"16. Decides to extend the mandate of Unifil until 31
August 2007, and expresses its intention to consider in a later resolution
further enhancements to the mandate and other steps to contribute to the
implementation of a permanent ceasefire and a long-term solution;<br>
</span></font><font size=2 face=Arial><span style='font-size:10.5pt;font-family:
Arial'><br>
</span></font><font size=2 face=Verdana><span style='font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Verdana'>17. Requests the secretary general to report to the
Council within one week on the implementation of this resolution and
subsequently on a regular basis;<br>
</span></font><font size=2 face=Arial><span style='font-size:10.5pt;font-family:
Arial'><br>
</span></font><font size=2 face=Verdana><span style='font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Verdana'>18. Stresses the importance of, and the need to achieve, a
comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East, based on all its
relevant resolutions including its resolutions 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967
and 338 (1973) of 22 October 1973;<br>
</span></font><font size=2 face=Arial><span style='font-size:10.5pt;font-family:
Arial'><br>
</span></font><font size=2 face=Verdana><span style='font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Verdana'>19. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.<br>
</span></font><font size=2 face=Arial><span style='font-size:10.5pt;font-family:
Arial'><br>
</span></font><font size=2 face=Verdana><span style='font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Verdana'>Translation: the Security Council intends to keep this
tattered process running.<br>
</span></font><font size=2 face=Arial><span style='font-size:10.5pt;font-family:
Arial'><br>
</span></font><font size=2 face=Verdana><span style='font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Verdana'>To summarize, Resolution 1701 reflects a legal coup for <st1:country-region
w:st="on">Israel</st1:country-region> and the <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place
w:st="on">United States</st1:place></st1:country-region>. On its face, it
seems even-handed, providing for an Israeli withdrawal, pacification of
Hizbullah, restoration of Lebanese sovereignty, and conditions that allow for <st1:country-region
w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Lebanon</st1:place></st1:country-region>'s
reconstruction. It actually provides <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place
w:st="on">Israel</st1:place></st1:country-region> with ultimate leverage over
its own withdrawal, contingent on disarming Hizbullah.<br>
</span></font><font size=2 face=Arial><span style='font-size:10.5pt;font-family:
Arial'><br>
</span></font><font size=2 face=Verdana><span style='font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Verdana'>Most seriously, regarding the UN itself, the Resolution
fails to condemn <st1:country-region w:st="on">Israel</st1:country-region> for
violating international law in its onslaught on <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place
w:st="on">Lebanon</st1:place></st1:country-region>. It also fails to establish
any basis for a serious peace process. It represents a twisted, tricky
document, representing machinations of the <st1:country-region w:st="on">United
States</st1:country-region> in service to the neocon alliance with <st1:country-region
w:st="on">Israel</st1:country-region> to "remake" the <st1:place
w:st="on">Middle East</st1:place>. Its provisions to disarm Hizbullah are
politically unworkable and beyond the SC's capacity. Its provisions for Israeli
withdrawal are contingent on that disarmament.<br>
</span></font><font size=2 face=Arial><span style='font-size:10.5pt;font-family:
Arial'><br>
</span></font><font size=2 face=Verdana><span style='font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Verdana'>Regarding its relevance to a real peace in <st1:country-region
w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Lebanon</st1:place></st1:country-region>, within
days or weeks of this writing Resolution 1701 may be a discredited artefact of
history. But its design remains significant: inability of the SC to act in a
principled fashion to impose international order. In that light, it tells us
far more about the internal debility of the UN than it does about any future
for the Israeli-Lebanese conflict.<br>
</span></font><font size=2 face=Arial><span style='font-size:10.5pt;font-family:
Arial'><br>
</span></font><b><font size=2 face=Verdana><span style='font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Verdana;font-weight:bold'>Virginia Tilley </span></font></b><font
size=2 face=Verdana><span style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Verdana'>is a
professor of political science, a <st1:country-region w:st="on">US</st1:country-region>
citizen working in <st1:country-region w:st="on">South Africa</st1:country-region>,
and author of The One-State Solution: A Breakthrough for Peace in the
Israeli-Palestinian Deadlock <a
href="http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0472115138/counterpunchmaga"><http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0472115138/counterpunchmaga></a>
(<st1:place w:st="on"><st1:PlaceType w:st="on">University</st1:PlaceType>
of <st1:PlaceName w:st="on">Michigan Press</st1:PlaceName></st1:place> and
Manchester University Press, 2005). She can be reached at <a
href="mailto:tilley@hws.edu">tilley@hws.edu</a> </span></font><o:p></o:p></p>
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