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<p class=MsoNormal><b><font size=3 face="Times New Roman"><span
style='font-size:12.0pt;font-weight:bold'>The Day After / How we suffered a
knockout<o:p></o:p></span></font></b></p>
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<p class=MsoNormal><font size=3 face="Times New Roman"><span
style='font-size:12.0pt'>By <a href="mailto:rpedatzur@haaretz.co.il">Reuven
Pedatzur</a><o:p></o:p></span></font></p>
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<p class=MsoNormal><font size=3 face="Times New Roman"><span
style='font-size:12.0pt'><img border=0 width=10 height=5 id="_x0000_i1047"
src="cid:image001.gif@01C6C170.FF946110"><o:p></o:p></span></font></p>
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<p class=MsoNormal><font size=3 face="Times New Roman"><span
style='font-size:12.0pt'><o:p> </o:p></span></font></p>
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<p><span class=t13><font size=3 face="Times New Roman"><span lang=EN
style='font-size:12.0pt'>The <st1:country-region w:st="on">United States</st1:country-region>'
defeat in the Vietnam war started becoming evident when Gen. William
Westmoreland, commander of the <st1:country-region w:st="on">U.S.</st1:country-region>
forces in <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Vietnam</st1:place></st1:country-region>,
started using body counts as an alternative to military victories. When he
could not point to achievements on the battlefield, Westmoreland would send a
daily report to <st1:State w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Washington</st1:place></st1:State>
of the number of Vietcong soldiers his forces had killed. </span></font></span><span
lang=EN><br>
<br>
<span class=t13>In the past few weeks, the Israel Defense Forces has also
adopted the body count approach. When the largest and strongest army in the <st1:place
w:st="on">Middle East</st1:place> clashes for more than two weeks with 50
Hezbollah fighters in Bint Jbail and does not bring them to their knees, the
commanders are left with no choice but to point to the number of dead
fighters the enemy has left behind. It can be assumed that Bint Jbail will
turn into a symbol of the second <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:country-region
w:st="on">Lebanon</st1:country-region></st1:place> war. For the Hezbollah
fighters it will be remembered as their <st1:place w:st="on">Stalingrad</st1:place>,
and for us it will be a painful reminder of the IDF's defeat. </span><o:p></o:p></span></p>
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<p><span class=t13><font size=3 face="Times New Roman"><span lang=EN
style='font-size:12.0pt'>Ze'ev Schiff wrote in Haaretz on August 11 that we
had "gotten a slap." It seems that "knockout" would be a
more appropriate description. This is not a mere military defeat. This is a
strategic failure whose far-reaching implications are still not clear. And
like the boxer who took the blow, we are still lying dazed on the ground,
trying to understand what happened to us. Just like the Six-Day War led to a
strategic change in the Middle East and established <st1:country-region
w:st="on">Israel</st1:country-region>'s status as the regional power, the
second <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:country-region w:st="on">Lebanon</st1:country-region></st1:place>
war may bring about the opposite. The IDF's failure is eroding our national
security's most important asset - the belligerent image of this country, led
by a vast, strong and advanced army capable of dealing our enemies a decisive
blow if they even try to bother us. This war, it soon transpired, was about
"awareness" and "deterrence." We lost the fight for both.
</span></font></span><span lang=EN><br>
<br>
<span class=t13><b><span style='font-weight:bold'>The concept failed again</span></b></span><br>
<br>
<span class=t13>It does not matter one bit what the IDF's true capability is.
There is also no importance to the assertions that the IDF used merely a
small part of its force and that its arsenal still contains advanced weapons
that did not come into play. What really matters is the image of the IDF -
and in fact of <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Israel</st1:place></st1:country-region>
- in the eyes of our adversaries in the region. </span><br>
<br>
<span class=t13>And herein lies the most serious failure of this war. In
Damascus, Gaza, Tehran and Cairo, too, people are looking with amazement at
the IDF that could not bring a tiny guerrilla organization (1,500 fighters
according to the military intelligence chief, and a few thousand according to
other sources) to its knees for more than a month, the IDF that was defeated
and paid a heavy price in most of its battles in southern Lebanon. And most
serious of all: an IDF that has not neutralized Hezbollah's ability to fire
rockets and keep more than 1 million Israeli citizens sitting in shelters for
more than four weeks. What happened to this mighty army, which after a month
was not able to advance more than a few kilometers into <st1:country-region
w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Lebanon</st1:place></st1:country-region>?
wonder many of those who are planning their next wars against <st1:place
w:st="on"><st1:country-region w:st="on">Israel</st1:country-region></st1:place>.
</span><br>
<br>
<st1:country-region w:st="on"><span class=t13>Israel</span></st1:country-region><span
class=t13>'s deterrent power was based on the recognition by the enemy that
it would pay an extremely heavy price if it attacked <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:country-region
w:st="on">Israel</st1:country-region></st1:place>. For example, <st1:country-region
w:st="on">Syria</st1:country-region> has not fired hundreds of missiles at
the Israeli homefront - even during times of war - because it fears a harsh
Israeli attack on <st1:City w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Damascus</st1:place></st1:City>
and other important Syrian towns. But when more than 3,000 rockets are fired
at the Galilee, <st1:City w:st="on">Haifa</st1:City> and Hadera without <st1:country-region
w:st="on">Israel</st1:country-region> demanding that someone pay, <st1:place
w:st="on"><st1:country-region w:st="on">Israel</st1:country-region></st1:place>'s
deterrence is damaged. At the next opportunity, someone in Damascus may
decide to fire rockets at Tel Aviv to push forward a diplomatic process,
since Israel did not only fail to react severely to the rockets fired from
Lebanon but also was forced to agree to a UN arrangement that leaves the rocket
stockpile in Hezbollah's hands. </span><br>
<br>
<span class=t13>The Agranat Commission gave a negative connotation to the
term "concept" in the context of military intelligence. The
commission of inquiry that now hopefully will be set up will quickly conclude
that on the eve of the second <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:country-region w:st="on">Lebanon</st1:country-region></st1:place>
war, the IDF - and consequently policy makers - were working with two
mistaken concepts. First, over the past six years, Israelis came to believe a
large-scale fight against Hezbollah would not be necessary: Any military
actions in southern <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Lebanon</st1:place></st1:country-region>
would be limited and short. Second, if a war arose against Hezbollah, the IDF
would dismantle the organization within a few days, break its command
backbone and end the fighting under conditions favorable to <st1:country-region
w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Israel</st1:place></st1:country-region>. </span><br>
<br>
<span class=t13>And this is how we entered the war. The army led the prime
minister and his cabinet to believe that the air force would annihilate
Hezbollah's fighting capability within several days and that thereafter a new
situation would prevail in <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Lebanon</st1:place></st1:country-region>.
On the basis of these promises, Ehud Olmert set ambitious objectives for the
war, which of course were unattainable. </span><br>
<br>
<span class=t13>Just as before the Yom Kippur war, there was a destructive
combination of arrogance, boastfulness, euphoria and contempt for the enemy.
The generals were so certain of the air force's success that they did not
prepare an alternative. And when it became clear after about one week that
Hezbollah was not disintegrating and that its ability to fire rockets had not
been significantly thwarted, the IDF found itself in a state of acute distress
and embarrassment. This is the reason for the hesitancy in using force and
the lack of determination in the use of the ground forces. </span><br>
<br>
<span class=t13>The commission of inquiry will have to examine how the army
entered the war without formulating alternative operations or plans to end
the war. The failure of the government lies in its adoption of the army's
proposal without examining its logic, chances of success or alternatives. The
decision-making process that led to the war once again revealed the most
serious defect in the formation of national security policy. Since the
establishment of the state, no government has had the good sense to set up
professional advisory bodies that could assist it in dealing with IDF
proposals, or at least to examine them seriously. As in all the other
conflicts, the army and not the government decided what <st1:country-region
w:st="on">Israel</st1:country-region> should do in <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place
w:st="on">Lebanon</st1:place></st1:country-region>. The National Security
Council - whose job this is precisely - was not asked to look over the IDF's
plans and their implications, nor was it asked to provide alternatives. </span><br>
<br>
<span class=t13><b><span style='font-weight:bold'>The missing command</span></b></span><br>
<br>
<span class=t13>The arrogance and the overconfidence that characterized the
top brass left the home front unprotected. If it was clear that the air force
would destroy the rocket launch pads within a few days, why call on the residents
of the north to prepare the air raid shelters and stockpile food? We know the
outcome: More than one million people sat for more than one month in stinking
shelters, some of them without food or minimal conditions. </span><br>
<br>
<span class=t13>In this context, the inquiry commission should look into the
home front command. Millions of shekels were invested in this command. A
major general, brigadiers general, colonels and many other officers and
soldiers man this command. And what was its contribution to the war? Warning
notices broadcast over the radio and televisions about alarms and sirens.
That's it. For more than a month, the entire command made do with drafting
public notices about seeking shelter and staying in interior rooms. Where was
this command over the past six years? Was it not its task to examine and
check whether the shelters were satisfactory? </span><br>
<br>
<span class=t13>And of course, the intelligence. Once again there were
surprises and failures, some of which were based on the mistaken concept of
Hezbollah's capacities. The militia's success in surprising an IDF patrol and
abducting two soldiers - the catalyst for the war - stems from a military
intelligence failure. IDF intelligence did not assess correctly Hezbollah's
fighting capability, did not know about the tunnels next to the organization's
strongholds, and erred in its assessments of the deployment inside Bint
Jbail, and there were many more other intelligence failures. </span><br>
<br>
<span class=t13>The navy's intelligence failed because it did not know about
the Iranian land-to-sea missiles in Hezbollah's hands, and its assessments
about Hezbollah's ability to fire rockets were mistaken. Hezbollah's
successful handling of anti-tank missiles also revealed an intelligence
failure that resembles to a large extent that of the 1973 war. The Patriot
missile batteries stationed near <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:City w:st="on">Haifa</st1:City></st1:place>
and Safed were announced by the IDF with much fanfare. The wide media
coverage given to these deployments was supposed to quiet residents' fears.
Since then we have not heard a single word about that wonderful defense
system. As far as is known, not even one attempt was made to knock down
missiles fired at <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:City w:st="on">Haifa</st1:City></st1:place>
and Hadera. The commission of inquiry will also have to deal with the army's
decisions about anti-missile defense. Billions of dollars were invested in
the defense systems to combat missiles, but this was unapparent when it came
to the test. In addition, the army's decision to stop developing the Nautilus
- a laser-based anti-Katyusha defense system - must be examined. </span><br>
<br>
<span class=t13>The state allocates some 11 billion dollars annually for the
defense budget. Almost 15 percent of the GNP is devoted to security. (The
official figure is 10 percent, but this does not include all the investments
in security issues). But when the reservists are called up, they discover
that they lack basic equipment: flak jackets, helmets, vehicles and even
stretchers. Entire units were forced to fight more than 24 hours without food
or water. Where did the money go? This will have to be examined by the
commission of inquiry. The height of the chutzpah is the hints by senior
officers that the dearth of equipment is due to the defense budget cuts. This
should be the chance to break the myth about these budget cuts: Not only was
the defense budget not cut in the past decade, it actually grew during the
years 2002 and 2005. <st1:country-region w:st="on">Israel</st1:country-region>
allocates to security more of its total resources than any other democracy in
the world (15 times more than <st1:country-region w:st="on">Japan</st1:country-region>
and three times more than the <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">U.S.</st1:place></st1:country-region>).
It should be checked whether there is justification for this. </span><br>
<br>
<span class=t13>The Yom Kippur war is remembered as a seminal event that
damaged the public's trust in the army. Quite a few years passed before this
trust was restored. It is still too early to assess whether the second <st1:place
w:st="on"><st1:country-region w:st="on">Lebanon</st1:country-region></st1:place>
war will be remembered as the turning point at which the public awakes from
the illusion about the unlimited might of the Israeli military force.</span><o:p></o:p></span></p>
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