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<DIV><FONT face="Comic Sans MS" size=1><A
href="http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?l=1&id=4282">http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?l=1&id=4282</A></FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT face="Comic Sans MS" size=1></FONT><BR><SPAN
class=report_title>Israel/Palestine/Lebanon: Climbing Out of the Abyss</SPAN>
<BR>Middle East Report N°57 - International Crisis Group<BR>25 July 2006 </DIV>
<DIV>
<DIV align=justify>
<P class=Section1 align=center><STRONG>EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND
RECOMMENDATIONS</STRONG></P>
<P align=justify>The Middle East is immersed in its worst crisis in years
following the capture of three Israeli soldiers by the Palestinian Islamic
Resistance Movement (Hamas) and Lebanese Party of God (Hizbollah) in late June
2006 and early July, Israel’s comprehensive offensive throughout the Gaza Strip
and Lebanon, and the daily firing of rockets deep into Israel. And horrific as
it is, the current toll of death and destruction could reach entirely different
proportions should a new threshold be crossed – a Hizbollah rocket that strikes
a chemical plant or a heavily populated area in Tel Aviv or Haifa, an Israeli
bombing raid resulting in massive casualties, a major ground offensive, or the
expansion of the war to Syria or Iran. A political solution to the twin crises
of Lebanon and Palestine must be the international community’s urgent priority.
Waiting and hoping for military action to achieve its purported goals will have
not only devastating humanitarian consequences: it will make it much harder to
pick up the political pieces when the guns fall silent.</P>
<P align=justify>This report pieces together the strands of this multi-headed
crisis in Israel, the occupied Palestinian territories, Lebanon and elsewhere,
based on talks with officials and others, including Hamas and Hizbollah
representatives. There are many dimensions to the explanation of why the capture
of three soldiers has, so suddenly and so intensely, escalated at an
extraordinary pace into a deep and widespread conflict: local ones like Hamas’s
struggle to govern and Hizbollah’s desire to maintain its special status in
Lebanon; regional ones, notably the ongoing Arab-Israeli conflict, Syria’s
interests in Lebanon, and the growing Sunni-Shiite divide; and wider
international ones, especially the confrontation between Washington and
Tehran.</P>
<P align=justify>As the international community wrestles with this crisis,
analysis from the ground suggests several key principles that ought to be
followed.</P>
<P align=justify><STRONG>First, the Gaza and Lebanon crises need to be dealt
with separately.</STRONG> Though related both chronologically and in terms of
the sparks that triggered them, the reasons behind Hamas’s action have little to
do with those motivating Hizbollah’s. Bundling them together only complicates
efforts at resolution. </P>
<P align=justify><STRONG>Secondly, resolution of the Palestinian crisis should
rest on a simple equation: governance in exchange for a cessation of
hostilities.</STRONG> Of the two crises, the Palestinian one is relatively
simpler to address: its origins are bilateral in nature (Hamas versus Israel),
and so too can be its resolution. Hamas’s message is straightforward: let us
govern, or watch us fight. Governing, as Crisis Group recently reported, is what
the Islamists have not been permitted to do. The strategy of Fatah, the wider
Arab world, Israel and the West alike since the 25 January parliamentary
elections has been to isolate and squeeze the Palestinian government in order to
precipitate its collapse. The approach was always short-sighted and dangerous
and it urgently needs to be revised. A deal appears attainable and should be
pursued. It involves a prisoner exchange; a restored truce and – if any
resulting tranquillity is not to be fleeting – an end to the international
boycott of the Palestinian Authority (PA) government.</P>
<P align=justify>That boycott never made much sense in terms of Europe’s and
America’s stated objective of inducing change in Hamas’s positions and policies.
It makes even less sense now if the goal is to prevent all-out deterioration.
The 25 June 2006 signing of a National Conciliation Document by Fatah, Hamas and
other Palestinian organisations on the basis of the Prisoners’ Initiative, the
decision to form a national unity government and the designation of President
Abbas as the person in charge of negotiations with Israel do not quite add up to
the conditions put forward by the Quartet for normalising its relations with the
PA government. But incomplete as they may be, they should be enough – together
with a reciprocal and monitored ceasefire – to trigger a different approach by
the international community or, if the U.S. is not yet prepared to go along, at
least by the EU and other Quartet members.</P>
<P align=justify><STRONG>Thirdly, an immediate Israeli-Lebanese ceasefire is
necessary: pursuing a military knockout is unrealistic and
counterproductive.</STRONG> The Lebanese case is far more complex. What
potentially might have been yet another chapter in the ongoing tit-for-tat
between Israel and Hizbollah has become something very different. The brazen
nature of the initial Hizbollah operation, coupled with the fact that it closely
followed Hamas’s capture of one of its soldiers, lent it, in Israeli eyes, an
entirely new meaning. Fearing a dangerous erosion of its military deterrence on
two fronts simultaneously, the new government quickly escalated in an effort to
achieve decisive outcomes against its adversaries. Hizbollah followed suit, for
the first time launching rockets deep into Israel. Step by rapid step, the
stakes and nature of the conflict have shifted: Israel increasingly sees it as a
battle for its and the region’s future; Hizbollah – torn between its identity as
a Lebanese/Shiite movement and a messianic Arab-Islamist one – has increasingly
slipped into the latter. On both sides, a tactical fight is metamorphosing into
an existential war.</P>
<P align=justify>The key to managing this conflict, therefore, is to ensure it
reverts to more manageable size by producing a ceasefire that puts an immediate,
reciprocal end to attacks. To achieve that goal will require agreement on two
steps that would rapidly follow: a prisoner swap and an understanding between
all parties (Hizbollah included) that the current UN presence in South Lebanon
will be strengthened with a multinational force. Injection of such a force
carries considerable risk, as Lebanon’s history suggests: given the depth of
confessional divisions in Lebanon, it could trigger a deadly civil conflict. But
in the absence of a strong Lebanese army, and given legitimate Israeli concerns,
it has become a regrettable necessity. Bearing all this in mind, and mindful too
of sobering lessons from Iraq, any such force should have a limited mandate
(principally verifying adherence to the ceasefire), be authorised by the UN
Security Council, work closely with the Lebanese army, and ensure it does not
become an unwitting party to Lebanon’s sectarian battles.</P>
<P align=justify>Anything more ambitious at this time – including Israel’s
desire to prolong military efforts until Hizbollah is crippled, and dispatch of
a force charged with disarming the movement or full implementation of UN
Security Council Resolution 1559 – could bring Lebanon to breaking point,
risking more loss of life and serious escalation. Israeli and U.S. hopes that
Hizbollah can rapidly be cut down to size, that the Lebanese government will
confront it and its civilians rise against it, fly in the face of history.
Hizbollah has not been significantly weakened nor, despite broad anger at its
action, has its position on the Lebanese scene markedly eroded. In the past,
Israeli military operations have only bolstered militant elements and, over
time, rallied domestic opinion around them. The central government is not now,
nor will it be soon, in a position to act against a movement that represents a
critical domestic constituency and is present at all national levels – the
government included. Should Hizbollah and its allies be pushed in a corner, they
are liable to react, even at the cost of destabilising the country as a whole,
disrupting its precarious inter-confessional balance and plunging it into a new
round of sectarian strife.</P>
<P align=justify>Achieving the desired outcome while minimising risks to
Lebanon’s stability will require the EU and UN to continue talking to Hizbollah
despite pressures to cease. It also will require engagement with Syria,
preferably by the U.S. Damascus repeatedly has demonstrated its nuisance
capacity in Lebanon; it needs to be given incentives to cooperate, along with
clear warnings if it does not.</P>
<P align=justify><STRONG>Fourthly, to be sustainable, the ceasefire needs to be
urgently followed by intensive diplomatic efforts to tackle root causes – all of
them.</STRONG> A ceasefire by definition will be fragile and at best temporary,
for it does not meet core concerns. Israel would be left with a hostile, armed
force to its north; Lebanon with the reality of an autonomous militia and a
southern neighbour eager to eradicate Hizbollah; and both the latter and its
Syrian ally with unaddressed political issues. The U.S. is correct in asserting
that “root causes” need to be addressed, but this cannot be done selectively nor
should the international community stop half-way by focusing exclusively on
Hizbollah’s status.</P>
<P align=justify>Recent history should serve as a guide. The international
community has identified important goals but gone about achieving them in all
the wrong ways: UN Security Council Resolution 1559’s fundamental flaw was that
it aimed at internationalising the Hizbollah question without regionalising the
quest for a solution. It is not possible to remove Hizbollah’s arms without
dealing with the justifications it invokes for maintaining them; to remake
Lebanon by focusing on Hizbollah at the expense of broader questions related to
the confessional distribution of power; and to do all this by isolating and
targeting Syria, not involving it. Instead, continuous, robust and comprehensive
diplomatic effort is required on several levels simultaneously:</P>
<UL>
<LI>
<DIV class=Bullets-squares align=justify>resumption of an urgent internal
Lebanese dialogue on full implementation of the 1989 Taif Accords and
Resolution 1559 items;</DIV>
<LI>
<DIV class=Bullets-squares align=justify>swift return of displaced persons to
the South as prolongation of the current untenable situation risks producing
an internal explosion;</DIV>
<LI>
<DIV class=Bullets-squares align=justify>urgent donor and especially Arab
commitments to help with Lebanon’s reconstruction;</DIV>
<LI>
<DIV class=Bullets-squares align=justify>resolution of pending
Israeli-Lebanese issues so as to dry up the complaints that feed Hizbollah’s
militancy;</DIV>
<LI>
<DIV class=Bullets-squares align=justify>engaging Syria and Iran as a means of
inducing Hizbollah cooperation; and</DIV>
<LI>
<DIV class=Bullets-squares align=justify>reinvigorating the whole Israeli-Arab
peace process.</DIV></LI></UL>
<P align=justify>This last point is key. The accelerated plunge into the abyss
is the price paid for six years of diplomatic neglect; without a negotiating
process, regional actors have been left without rules of the game, reference
points or arbiters. In this respect, although their dynamics are different and
they need separate solutions, the Palestinian and Lebanese crises clearly
intersect. Only through a serious and credible rekindling of the long dormant
peace process can there be any hope whatsoever of addressing, and eliminating,
root causes.</P>
<P class=RecHeader1 align=justify><STRONG>RECOMMENDATIONS</STRONG></P>
<P class=RecHeader2 align=justify>To the Quartet (U.S., EU, Russia, UN), the
Governments of Lebanon and Israel, the Palestinian Authority, Hizbollah and All
Other Relevant Parties:</P>
<P class=Numbers1 align=justify>1. Deal with the Gaza and Lebanon crises
separately. </P>
<P class=Numbers1 align=justify>2. Address the Palestinian crisis by
pursuing a deal including the following elements: </P>
<BLOCKQUOTE dir=ltr style="MARGIN-RIGHT: 0px">
<P class=Bulletsa align=justify>(a) Hamas must release the Israeli
soldier it holds and reinstate the truce while the Palestinian Authority must
seek to stop all militias from firing rockets; </P>
<P class=Bulletsa align=justify>(b) simultaneously, Israel must end its
Gaza incursion, cease offensive military operations in the occupied
territories and release recently jailed cabinet members and parliamentarians
as well as other Palestinian prisoners (such as those who have not been
charged with an offence, have been convicted on minor charges or are seriously
ill or underage); and</P>
<P class=Bulletsa align=justify>(c) the international boycott of the
Palestinian Authority government should end. </P></BLOCKQUOTE>
<P class=Numbers1 align=justify>3. Seek an immediate Israeli-Lebanese
ceasefire with clear understandings that it will include the following
elements:</P>
<BLOCKQUOTE dir=ltr style="MARGIN-RIGHT: 0px">
<P class=Bulletsa align=justify>(a) an immediate, reciprocal cessation
of attacks;</P>
<P class=Bulletsa align=justify>(b) an early prisoner swap; and</P>
<P class=Bulletsa align=justify>(c) agreement by all parties on
strengthening the current UN presence in South Lebanon with a UN-mandated
multinational force charged with verifying adherence to the ceasefire and
working closely with the Lebanese army.</P></BLOCKQUOTE>
<P class=Numbers1 align=justify>4. Follow the ceasefire with urgent and
intensive diplomatic efforts to tackle all relevant root causes, with efforts
focused simultaneously on:</P>
<BLOCKQUOTE dir=ltr style="MARGIN-RIGHT: 0px">
<P class=Bulletsa align=justify>(a) an internal Lebanese dialogue on
full implementation of the Taif Accords and Resolution 1559 items,
including:</P>
<BLOCKQUOTE dir=ltr style="MARGIN-RIGHT: 0px">
<P class=Numbersi align=justify>i. eventual disarmament or integration
into the army of Hizbollah;</P>
<P class=Numbersi align=justify>ii. reforming the political system;
and</P>
<P class=Numbersi align=justify>iii. establishing a more credible,
national army and security doctrine that can ensure the country’s
defence;</P></BLOCKQUOTE>
<P class=Bulletsa align=justify>(b) prompt return of displaced persons
to the South;</P>
<P class=Bulletsa align=justify>(c) donor and especially Arab
commitments to provide significant and urgent financial assistance to help
rebuild Lebanon and alleviate its public debt;</P>
<P class=Bulletsa align=justify>(d) resolution of pending
Israeli-Lebanese issues, including:</P>
<BLOCKQUOTE dir=ltr style="MARGIN-RIGHT: 0px">
<P class=Numbersi align=justify>i. the fate of the contested Shebaa
farms, with formal agreement by Syria that Shebaa is Lebanese and by Israel
that it will withdraw;</P>
<P class=Numbersi align=justify>ii. Israeli incursions into Lebanese
water and airspace; and</P>
<P class=Numbersi align=justify>iii. cooperation on demining efforts;
</P></BLOCKQUOTE>
<P class=Bulletsa align=justify>(e) engaging Syria, reintegrating it
into the regional equation and discarding any agenda of externally-imposed
regime change in exchange for its commitment to halt destabilisation efforts
in Lebanon and for support on Hizbollah’s gradual disarmament or integration
into the Lebanese army;</P>
<P class=Bulletsa align=justify>(f) engaging Iran by addressing a broad
array of issues, including the nuclear question, Iraq, and the region as a
whole; and </P>
<P class=Bulletsa align=justify>(g) reinvigorating the Arab-Israeli
peace process in both its Palestinian and Syrian tracks.</P></BLOCKQUOTE>
<P class=ExSumend align=right><STRONG>Amman/Beirut/Jerusalem/Brussels, 25 July
2006</STRONG></P></DIV>
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