Info regarding MIT 1.8 Crypto modularity feature.

[Use Nas]

I would like to have a framework on top of crypto implementation, which
virtualizes these implementations [ using virtual crypto interfaces ] and
based on the user input [ configurable option ], switch to specific type of
crypto implementation.

Thanks


On Tue, Aug 17, 2010 at 6:54 AM, Henry B. Hotz <hotz at jpl.nasa.gov> wrote:

>
> On Aug 16, 2010, at 9:05 AM, krbdev-request at mit.edu wrote:
>
> > Date: Mon, 16 Aug 2010 11:31:51 -0400
> > From: Zhanna Tsitkova <tsitkova at MIT.EDU>
> > Subject: Re: Info regarding MIT 1.8 Crypto modularity feature.
> > To: "jaltman at secure-endpoints.com" <jaltman at secure-endpoints.com>
> > Cc: "krbdev at mit.edu" <krbdev at mit.edu>
> > Message-ID: <74E2309B-04BF-4712-A59B-FE445293214B at mit.edu>
> > Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII; format=flowed; delsp=yes
> >
> > Well, we have discussed these scenarios internally and ended up with
> > "one crypto implementation per kerberos crypto library" scenario for
> > the reasons of better sense of security and integrity.
> > For example,  mixing FIPS 140.2 and non-FIPS modes - who wants to be
> > FIPS approved? - finance, government, heathcare  and friends.  It is
> > unlikely that any of them would consider refining and potentially
> > jeopardizing  their configuration to speed-up things for the sake of
> > slight (or even significant) performance gain. Or, at least, they
> > would definitely use different machines for these different tasks.
> > As for Shipping a binary that can support hardware and non-hardware
> > implemented encryption, this case is tougher one to ague with.
> > However, I think, if hardware accelerators are available, one will
> > always prefer to take advantage of them.
> > Finally, performance testing, in my opinion, is much cleaner when it
> > does not  resolve the specifics of the configuration setup during run-
> > time.
>
> I think these are all arguments that it's possible to live without run-time
> library selection, rather than arguments that users necessarily prefer being
> locked into a single selection.
>
> Ignoring implementation difficulty (which is a big deal, I know) I would
> always prefer to have the run-time option as long as the option never causes
> any run-time failures.  ;-)
>
> FIPS-mode seems like a special case.  A FIPS-approved library (well, at
> least openssl) is likely to have a non-FIPS mode which may be faster and
> probably supports additional encryption types (RC4, Camillia?).  I'd think
> it was trivial to select FIPS/non-FIPS at run time, and that might make it
> easier to flag non-FIPS to a user who is expecting FIPS mode.
> ------------------------------------------------------
> The opinions expressed in this message are mine,
> not those of Caltech, JPL, NASA, or the US Government.
> Henry.B.Hotz at jpl.nasa.gov, or hbhotz at oxy.edu
>
>
>
>
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