From tlyu at MIT.EDU Thu Oct 19 17:48:01 2006 From: tlyu at MIT.EDU (Tom Yu) Date: Thu, 19 Oct 2006 17:48:01 -0400 Subject: kfw-3.1-beta-2 is available Message-ID: -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 The MIT Kerberos Development Team is proud to announce the second *BETA* release of the next revision of our Kerberos for Windows product, Version 3.1. Please send bug reports and feedback to kfw-bugs at mit.edu. What's New: =========== Version 3.1 fixes bugs and adds minor functionality: * Improvements to the Network Identity Manager 1. A serious memory leak has been fixed 2. Principal names containing numbers are no longer considered invalid 3. Locales other than en_US are now supported 4. Arbitrary sort ordering of credentials 5. Support for FILE: ccaches 6. Credential properties may be selected by the user for display 7. User selected font support 8. Tool Tip support added to the Toolbar 9. Identities can be added without obtaining credentials 10. Kerberos 5 Realm editor has been added * The MSLSA: ccache is disabled in WOW64 environments prior to Microsoft Windows Vista Beta 2 (Windows XP 64, 2003 64, etc.) * The installers are built using the latest toolkit versions NSIS (2.18) and WIX (2.0.4220.0) Version 3.0 provided several often requested new features: * thread-safe Kerberos 5 libraries (provided by Kerberos 5 release 1.4.4) * a replacement for the Leash Credential Manager called the Network Identity Manager - a visually enticing application that takes advantage of all of the modern XP style User Interface enhancements - supports the management of multiple Kerberos 5 identities in a variety of credential cache types including CCAPI and FILE. - credentials can be organized by credential cache location or by identity - a single identity can be marked as the default for use by applications that request the current default credential cache - Network Identity Manager is built upon the Khimaira Identity Management Framework introduced this past summer at the AFS & Kerberos Best Practices Conference at CMU. - Credential Managers for Kerberos 5 and Kerberos 4 are provided. Credential Managers for other credential types including AFS and KX.509/KCA are available. Contact Secure Endpoints Inc. for details. - The Khimaira framework is a pluggable engine into which custom Identity Managers and Credential Managers can be added. Organizations interested in building plug-ins for the Network Identity Manager may contact Jeffrey Altman at jaltman at secure-endpoints.com * a Kerberos specific WinLogon Network Provider that will use the username and password combined with the MIT Kerberos default realm in an effort to obtain credentials at session logon Important changes since the 2.6.5 release: ========================================== * This release requires 32-bit editions of Microsoft Windows 2000 or higher. Support for Microsoft Windows 95, 98, 98 Second Edition, ME, and NT 4.0 has been discontinued. Users of discontinued platforms should continue to use MIT Kerberos for Windows 2.6.5. * Version 3.0 does not include any internal support for AFS. The aklog.exe utility now ships as a part of OpenAFS for Windows. The Secure Endpoints Inc. AFS credential manager for the Network Identity Manager has been incorporated into OpenAFS for Windows 1.5.9 and above. Downloads ========= Binaries and source code can be downloaded from the MIT Kerberos web site: http://web.mit.edu/kerberos/ Acknowledgments =============== The MIT Kerberos team would like to thank Secure Endpoints Inc. for its support during the development of this release. Important notice regarding Kerberos 4 support ============================================= In the past few years, several developments have shown the inadequacy of the security of version 4 of the Kerberos protocol. These developments have led the MIT Kerberos Team to begin the process of ending support for version 4 of the Kerberos protocol. The plan involves the eventual removal of Kerberos 4 support from the MIT implementation of Kerberos. The Data Encryption Standard (DES) has reached the end of its useful life. DES is the only encryption algorithm supported by Kerberos 4, and the increasingly obvious inadequacy of DES motivates the retirement of the Kerberos 4 protocol. The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), which had previously certified DES as a US government encryption standard, has officially announced[1] the withdrawal of the Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) for DES. NIST's action reflects the long-held opinion of the cryptographic community that DES has too small a key space to be secure. Breaking DES encryption by an exhaustive search of its key space is within the means of some individuals, many companies, and all major governments. Consequently, DES cannot be considered secure for any long-term keys, particularly the ticket-granting key that is central to Kerberos. Serious protocol flaws[2] have been found in Kerberos 4. These flaws permit attacks which require far less effort than an exhaustive search of the DES key space. These flaws make Kerberos 4 cross-realm authentication an unacceptable security risk and raise serious questions about the security of the entire Kerberos 4 protocol. The known insecurity of DES, combined with the recently discovered protocol flaws, make it extremely inadvisable to rely on the security of version 4 of the Kerberos protocol. These factors motivate the MIT Kerberos Team to remove support for Kerberos version 4 from the MIT implementation of Kerberos. The process of ending Kerberos 4 support began with release 1.3 of MIT Kerberos 5. In release 1.3, the default run-time configuration of the KDC disables support for version 4 of the Kerberos protocol. Release 1.4 of MIT Kerberos continues to include Kerberos 4 support (also disabled in the KDC with the default run-time configuration), but we intend to completely remove Kerberos 4 support from some future release of MIT Kerberos. The MIT Kerberos Team has ended active development of Kerberos 4, except for the eventual removal of all Kerberos 4 functionality. We will continue to provide critical security fixes for Kerberos 4, but routine bug fixes and feature enhancements are at an end. We recommend that any sites which have not already done so begin a migration to Kerberos 5. Kerberos 5 provides significant advantages over Kerberos 4, including support for strong encryption, extensibility, improved cross-vendor interoperability, and ongoing development and enhancement. If you have questions or issues regarding migration to Kerberos 5, we recommend discussing them on the kerberos at mit.edu mailing list. References [1] National Institute of Standards and Technology. Announcing Approval of the Withdrawal of Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) 43-3, Data Encryption Standard (DES); FIPS 74, Guidelines for Implementing and Using the NBS Data Encryption Standard; and FIPS 81, DES Modes of Operation. Federal Register 05-9945, 70 FR 28907-28908, 19 May 2005. DOCID:fr19my05-45 [2] Tom Yu, Sam Hartman, and Ken Raeburn. The Perils of Unauthenticated Encryption: Kerberos Version 4. In Proceedings of the Network and Distributed Systems Security Symposium. The Internet Society, February 2004. http://web.mit.edu/tlyu/papers/krb4peril-ndss04.pdf -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.3 (SunOS) iQCVAwUBRTfymabDgE/zdoE9AQJk+gQAl59c3ILPvaKlBg4KWWAR6IJNbghzEuec mbtG15DFWue94/z7h5wskQvMVGh4lyuHOmVk53K+8cZvnERTA/MizYiUk119mvAn d4ERzBVW92JW60txxQNZhJQZiOaJRquPA2L8rjfaQ8jG9f7YokU7HFAu45MGpd3M kpcXNTZjCO8= =rc1B -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From hartmans at MIT.EDU Thu Nov 9 11:18:21 2006 From: hartmans at MIT.EDU (Sam Hartman) Date: Thu, 09 Nov 2006 11:18:21 -0500 Subject: New Direction for Kerberos for Windows Message-ID: A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 188 bytes Desc: not available Url : http://mailman.mit.edu/pipermail/kerberos-announce/attachments/20061109/4dc2c5b4/attachment.bin From tlyu at MIT.EDU Thu Nov 9 13:05:21 2006 From: tlyu at MIT.EDU (Tom Yu) Date: Thu, 09 Nov 2006 13:05:21 -0500 Subject: kfw-3.1-beta-3 is available Message-ID: -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 The MIT Kerberos Development Team is proud to announce the third *BETA* release of the next revision of our Kerberos for Windows product, Version 3.1. Please send bug reports and feedback to kfw-bugs at mit.edu. What's New: =========== Version 3.1 fixes bugs and adds minor functionality: * Improvements to the Network Identity Manager 1. A serious memory leak has been fixed 2. Principal names containing numbers are no longer considered invalid 3. Locales other than en_US are now supported 4. Arbitrary sort ordering of credentials 5. Support for FILE: ccaches 6. Credential properties may be selected by the user for display 7. User selected font support 8. Tool Tip support added to the Toolbar 9. Identities can be added without obtaining credentials 10. Kerberos 5 Realm editor has been added * The MSLSA: ccache is disabled in WOW64 environments prior to Microsoft Windows Vista Beta 2 (Windows XP 64, 2003 64, etc.) * The installers are built using the latest toolkit versions NSIS (2.18) and WIX (2.0.4220.0) Version 3.0 provided several often requested new features: * thread-safe Kerberos 5 libraries (provided by Kerberos 5 release 1.4.4) * a replacement for the Leash Credential Manager called the Network Identity Manager - a visually enticing application that takes advantage of all of the modern XP style User Interface enhancements - supports the management of multiple Kerberos 5 identities in a variety of credential cache types including CCAPI and FILE. - credentials can be organized by credential cache location or by identity - a single identity can be marked as the default for use by applications that request the current default credential cache - Network Identity Manager is built upon the Khimaira Identity Management Framework introduced this past summer at the AFS & Kerberos Best Practices Conference at CMU. - Credential Managers for Kerberos 5 and Kerberos 4 are provided. Credential Managers for other credential types including AFS and KX.509/KCA are available. Contact Secure Endpoints Inc. for details. - The Khimaira framework is a pluggable engine into which custom Identity Managers and Credential Managers can be added. Organizations interested in building plug-ins for the Network Identity Manager may contact Jeffrey Altman at jaltman at secure-endpoints.com * a Kerberos specific WinLogon Network Provider that will use the username and password combined with the MIT Kerberos default realm in an effort to obtain credentials at session logon Important changes since the 2.6.5 release: ========================================== * This release requires 32-bit editions of Microsoft Windows 2000 or higher. Support for Microsoft Windows 95, 98, 98 Second Edition, ME, and NT 4.0 has been discontinued. Users of discontinued platforms should continue to use MIT Kerberos for Windows 2.6.5. * Version 3.0 does not include any internal support for AFS. The aklog.exe utility now ships as a part of OpenAFS for Windows. The Secure Endpoints Inc. AFS credential manager for the Network Identity Manager has been incorporated into OpenAFS for Windows 1.5.9 and above. Downloads ========= Binaries and source code can be downloaded from the MIT Kerberos web site: http://web.mit.edu/kerberos/ Acknowledgments =============== The MIT Kerberos team would like to thank Secure Endpoints Inc. for its support during the development of this release. Important notice regarding Kerberos 4 support ============================================= In the past few years, several developments have shown the inadequacy of the security of version 4 of the Kerberos protocol. These developments have led the MIT Kerberos Team to begin the process of ending support for version 4 of the Kerberos protocol. The plan involves the eventual removal of Kerberos 4 support from the MIT implementation of Kerberos. The Data Encryption Standard (DES) has reached the end of its useful life. DES is the only encryption algorithm supported by Kerberos 4, and the increasingly obvious inadequacy of DES motivates the retirement of the Kerberos 4 protocol. The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), which had previously certified DES as a US government encryption standard, has officially announced[1] the withdrawal of the Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) for DES. NIST's action reflects the long-held opinion of the cryptographic community that DES has too small a key space to be secure. Breaking DES encryption by an exhaustive search of its key space is within the means of some individuals, many companies, and all major governments. Consequently, DES cannot be considered secure for any long-term keys, particularly the ticket-granting key that is central to Kerberos. Serious protocol flaws[2] have been found in Kerberos 4. These flaws permit attacks which require far less effort than an exhaustive search of the DES key space. These flaws make Kerberos 4 cross-realm authentication an unacceptable security risk and raise serious questions about the security of the entire Kerberos 4 protocol. The known insecurity of DES, combined with the recently discovered protocol flaws, make it extremely inadvisable to rely on the security of version 4 of the Kerberos protocol. These factors motivate the MIT Kerberos Team to remove support for Kerberos version 4 from the MIT implementation of Kerberos. The process of ending Kerberos 4 support began with release 1.3 of MIT Kerberos 5. In release 1.3, the default run-time configuration of the KDC disables support for version 4 of the Kerberos protocol. Release 1.4 of MIT Kerberos continues to include Kerberos 4 support (also disabled in the KDC with the default run-time configuration), but we intend to completely remove Kerberos 4 support from some future release of MIT Kerberos. The MIT Kerberos Team has ended active development of Kerberos 4, except for the eventual removal of all Kerberos 4 functionality. We will continue to provide critical security fixes for Kerberos 4, but routine bug fixes and feature enhancements are at an end. We recommend that any sites which have not already done so begin a migration to Kerberos 5. Kerberos 5 provides significant advantages over Kerberos 4, including support for strong encryption, extensibility, improved cross-vendor interoperability, and ongoing development and enhancement. If you have questions or issues regarding migration to Kerberos 5, we recommend discussing them on the kerberos at mit.edu mailing list. References [1] National Institute of Standards and Technology. Announcing Approval of the Withdrawal of Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) 43-3, Data Encryption Standard (DES); FIPS 74, Guidelines for Implementing and Using the NBS Data Encryption Standard; and FIPS 81, DES Modes of Operation. Federal Register 05-9945, 70 FR 28907-28908, 19 May 2005. DOCID:fr19my05-45 [2] Tom Yu, Sam Hartman, and Ken Raeburn. The Perils of Unauthenticated Encryption: Kerberos Version 4. In Proceedings of the Network and Distributed Systems Security Symposium. The Internet Society, February 2004. http://web.mit.edu/tlyu/papers/krb4peril-ndss04.pdf -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.3 (SunOS) iQCVAwUBRVNt5abDgE/zdoE9AQIANgP8CdvQi8UFZT2oie5JX2ftfI+8sh8ywQ/P NvcRvZl/9+a1pEEUrW7zHtL565l827jV2zCQSnvp/dcDW7kZZ7gksxwK23qTsE7z K4Sn6jvhzQcXYr5/IKmwn88h/wTIn8gmzz6L6BHAjMvw+u+7c3jeUZii6wtgKnro 16MDisJnJ68= =e+TZ -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From tlyu at MIT.EDU Fri Nov 17 19:20:00 2006 From: tlyu at MIT.EDU (Tom Yu) Date: Fri, 17 Nov 2006 19:20:00 -0500 Subject: kfw-3.1-beta-4 is available Message-ID: -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 The MIT Kerberos Development Team is proud to announce the fourth *BETA* release of the next revision of MIT's Kerberos for Windows product, Version 3.1. Please send bug reports and feedback to kfw-bugs at mit.edu. What's New: =========== Version 3.1 fixes bugs and adds minor functionality: * Improvements to the Network Identity Manager 1. A serious memory leak has been fixed 2. Principal names containing numbers are no longer considered invalid 3. Locales other than en_US are now supported 4. Arbitrary sort ordering of credentials 5. Support for FILE: ccaches 6. Credential properties may be selected by the user for display 7. User selected font support 8. Tool Tip support added to the Toolbar 9. Identities can be added without obtaining credentials 10. Kerberos 5 Realm editor has been added * The MSLSA: ccache is disabled in WOW64 environments prior to Microsoft Windows Vista Beta 2 (Windows XP 64, 2003 64, etc.) * The installers are built using the latest toolkit versions NSIS (2.18) and WIX (2.0.4220.0) Version 3.0 provided several often requested new features: * thread-safe Kerberos 5 libraries (provided by Kerberos 5 release 1.4.4) * a replacement for the Leash Credential Manager called the Network Identity Manager - a visually enticing application that takes advantage of all of the modern XP style User Interface enhancements - supports the management of multiple Kerberos 5 identities in a variety of credential cache types including CCAPI and FILE. - credentials can be organized by credential cache location or by identity - a single identity can be marked as the default for use by applications that request the current default credential cache - Network Identity Manager is built upon the Khimaira Identity Management Framework introduced this past summer at the AFS & Kerberos Best Practices Conference at CMU. - Credential Managers for Kerberos 5 and Kerberos 4 are provided. Credential Managers for other credential types including AFS and KX.509/KCA are available from third parties. An AFS credential manager is included as part of OpenAFS for Windows 1.5.9 and above. Contact Secure Endpoints Inc. for details regarding other credential types. - The Khimaira framework is a pluggable engine into which custom Identity Managers and Credential Managers can be added. Organizations interested in building plug-ins for the Network Identity Manager may contact Jeffrey Altman at jaltman at secure-endpoints.com * a Kerberos specific WinLogon Network Provider that will use the username and password combined with the MIT Kerberos default realm in an effort to obtain credentials at session logon Important changes since the 2.6.5 release: ========================================== * This release requires 32-bit editions of Microsoft Windows 2000 or higher. Support for Microsoft Windows 95, 98, 98 Second Edition, ME, and NT 4.0 has been discontinued. Users of discontinued platforms should continue to use MIT Kerberos for Windows 2.6.5. * Version 3.0 does not include any internal support for AFS. The aklog.exe utility now ships as a part of OpenAFS for Windows. The Secure Endpoints Inc. AFS credential manager for the Network Identity Manager has been incorporated into OpenAFS for Windows 1.5.9 and above. Downloads ========= Binaries and source code can be downloaded from the MIT Kerberos web site: http://web.mit.edu/kerberos/ Acknowledgments =============== The MIT Kerberos team would like to thank Secure Endpoints Inc. for its support during the development of this release. Important notice regarding Kerberos 4 support ============================================= In the past few years, several developments have shown the inadequacy of the security of version 4 of the Kerberos protocol. These developments have led the MIT Kerberos Team to begin the process of ending support for version 4 of the Kerberos protocol. The plan involves the eventual removal of Kerberos 4 support from the MIT implementation of Kerberos. The Data Encryption Standard (DES) has reached the end of its useful life. DES is the only encryption algorithm supported by Kerberos 4, and the increasingly obvious inadequacy of DES motivates the retirement of the Kerberos 4 protocol. The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), which had previously certified DES as a US government encryption standard, has officially announced[1] the withdrawal of the Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) for DES. NIST's action reflects the long-held opinion of the cryptographic community that DES has too small a key space to be secure. Breaking DES encryption by an exhaustive search of its key space is within the means of some individuals, many companies, and all major governments. Consequently, DES cannot be considered secure for any long-term keys, particularly the ticket-granting key that is central to Kerberos. Serious protocol flaws[2] have been found in Kerberos 4. These flaws permit attacks which require far less effort than an exhaustive search of the DES key space. These flaws make Kerberos 4 cross-realm authentication an unacceptable security risk and raise serious questions about the security of the entire Kerberos 4 protocol. The known insecurity of DES, combined with the recently discovered protocol flaws, make it extremely inadvisable to rely on the security of version 4 of the Kerberos protocol. These factors motivate the MIT Kerberos Team to remove support for Kerberos version 4 from the MIT implementation of Kerberos. The process of ending Kerberos 4 support began with release 1.3 of MIT Kerberos 5. In release 1.3, the default run-time configuration of the KDC disables support for version 4 of the Kerberos protocol. Release 1.4 of MIT Kerberos continues to include Kerberos 4 support (also disabled in the KDC with the default run-time configuration), but we intend to completely remove Kerberos 4 support from some future release of MIT Kerberos. The MIT Kerberos Team has ended active development of Kerberos 4, except for the eventual removal of all Kerberos 4 functionality. We will continue to provide critical security fixes for Kerberos 4, but routine bug fixes and feature enhancements are at an end. We recommend that any sites which have not already done so begin a migration to Kerberos 5. Kerberos 5 provides significant advantages over Kerberos 4, including support for strong encryption, extensibility, improved cross-vendor interoperability, and ongoing development and enhancement. If you have questions or issues regarding migration to Kerberos 5, we recommend discussing them on the kerberos at mit.edu mailing list. References [1] National Institute of Standards and Technology. Announcing Approval of the Withdrawal of Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) 43-3, Data Encryption Standard (DES); FIPS 74, Guidelines for Implementing and Using the NBS Data Encryption Standard; and FIPS 81, DES Modes of Operation. Federal Register 05-9945, 70 FR 28907-28908, 19 May 2005. DOCID:fr19my05-45 [2] Tom Yu, Sam Hartman, and Ken Raeburn. The Perils of Unauthenticated Encryption: Kerberos Version 4. In Proceedings of the Network and Distributed Systems Security Symposium. The Internet Society, February 2004. http://web.mit.edu/tlyu/papers/krb4peril-ndss04.pdf -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.3 (SunOS) iD8DBQFFXlGzSO8fWy4vZo4RAiJDAKD7EvzMjTFncXamd+hW1HKGzbyjOQCeNZmH jd4D2wpJGSj4h7EuSq4HUdk= =tLDK -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From tlyu at MIT.EDU Wed Nov 29 18:23:07 2006 From: tlyu at MIT.EDU (Tom Yu) Date: Wed, 29 Nov 2006 18:23:07 -0500 Subject: Kerberos for Windows version 3.1 is released Message-ID: -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 The MIT Kerberos Development Team and Secure Endpoints Inc. are proud to announce the release of MIT's Kerberos for Windows product, Version 3.1. Please send bug reports and feedback to kfw-bugs at mit.edu. What's New: =========== Version 3.1 fixes bugs and adds minor functionality: * Improvements to the Network Identity Manager 1. A serious memory leak has been fixed 2. Principal names containing numbers are no longer considered invalid 3. Locales other than en_US are now supported 4. Arbitrary sort ordering of credentials 5. Support for FILE: ccaches 6. Credential properties may be selected by the user for display 7. User selected font support 8. Tool Tip support added to the Toolbar 9. Identities can be added without obtaining credentials 10. Kerberos 5 Realm editor has been added * The MSLSA: ccache is disabled in WOW64 environments prior to Microsoft Windows Vista Beta 2 (Windows XP 64, 2003 64, etc.) * The installers are built using the latest toolkit versions NSIS (2.18) and WIX (2.0.4220.0) Version 3.0 provided several often requested new features: * thread-safe Kerberos 5 libraries (provided by Kerberos 5 release 1.4.4) * a replacement for the Leash Credential Manager called the Network Identity Manager - a visually enticing application that takes advantage of all of the modern XP style User Interface enhancements - supports the management of multiple Kerberos 5 identities in a variety of credential cache types including CCAPI and FILE. - credentials can be organized by credential cache location or by identity - a single identity can be marked as the default for use by applications that request the current default credential cache - Network Identity Manager is built upon the Khimaira Identity Management Framework introduced this past summer at the AFS & Kerberos Best Practices Conference at CMU. - Credential Managers for Kerberos 5 and Kerberos 4 are provided. Credential Managers for other credential types including AFS and KX.509/KCA are available from third parties. An AFS credential manager is included as part of OpenAFS for Windows 1.5.9 and above. Contact Secure Endpoints Inc. for details regarding other credential types. - The Khimaira framework is a pluggable engine into which custom Identity Managers and Credential Managers can be added. Organizations interested in building plug-ins for the Network Identity Manager may contact Jeffrey Altman at jaltman at secure-endpoints.com * a Kerberos specific WinLogon Network Provider that will use the username and password combined with the MIT Kerberos default realm in an effort to obtain credentials at session logon Important changes since the 2.6.5 release: ========================================== * This release requires 32-bit editions of Microsoft Windows 2000 or higher. Support for Microsoft Windows 95, 98, 98 Second Edition, ME, and NT 4.0 has been discontinued. Users of discontinued platforms should continue to use MIT Kerberos for Windows 2.6.5. * Version 3.0 does not include any internal support for AFS. The aklog.exe utility now ships as a part of OpenAFS for Windows. The Secure Endpoints Inc. AFS credential module for KFW's Network Identity Manager is distributed as part of OpenAFS for Windows 1.5.9 and above. Downloads ========= Binaries and source code can be downloaded from the MIT Kerberos web site: http://web.mit.edu/kerberos/dist/index.html Acknowledgments =============== The MIT Kerberos team would like to thank Secure Endpoints Inc. for this release. Important notice regarding Kerberos 4 support ============================================= In the past few years, several developments have shown the inadequacy of the security of version 4 of the Kerberos protocol. These developments have led the MIT Kerberos Team to begin the process of ending support for version 4 of the Kerberos protocol. The plan involves the eventual removal of Kerberos 4 support from the MIT implementation of Kerberos. The Data Encryption Standard (DES) has reached the end of its useful life. DES is the only encryption algorithm supported by Kerberos 4, and the increasingly obvious inadequacy of DES motivates the retirement of the Kerberos 4 protocol. The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), which had previously certified DES as a US government encryption standard, has officially announced[1] the withdrawal of the Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) for DES. NIST's action reflects the long-held opinion of the cryptographic community that DES has too small a key space to be secure. Breaking DES encryption by an exhaustive search of its key space is within the means of some individuals, many companies, and all major governments. Consequently, DES cannot be considered secure for any long-term keys, particularly the ticket-granting key that is central to Kerberos. Serious protocol flaws[2] have been found in Kerberos 4. These flaws permit attacks which require far less effort than an exhaustive search of the DES key space. These flaws make Kerberos 4 cross-realm authentication an unacceptable security risk and raise serious questions about the security of the entire Kerberos 4 protocol. The known insecurity of DES, combined with the recently discovered protocol flaws, make it extremely inadvisable to rely on the security of version 4 of the Kerberos protocol. These factors motivate the MIT Kerberos Team to remove support for Kerberos version 4 from the MIT implementation of Kerberos. The process of ending Kerberos 4 support began with release 1.3 of MIT Kerberos 5. In release 1.3, the default run-time configuration of the KDC disables support for version 4 of the Kerberos protocol. Release 1.4 of MIT Kerberos continues to include Kerberos 4 support (also disabled in the KDC with the default run-time configuration), but we intend to completely remove Kerberos 4 support from some future release of MIT Kerberos. The MIT Kerberos Team has ended active development of Kerberos 4, except for the eventual removal of all Kerberos 4 functionality. We will continue to provide critical security fixes for Kerberos 4, but routine bug fixes and feature enhancements are at an end. We recommend that any sites which have not already done so begin a migration to Kerberos 5. Kerberos 5 provides significant advantages over Kerberos 4, including support for strong encryption, extensibility, improved cross-vendor interoperability, and ongoing development and enhancement. If you have questions or issues regarding migration to Kerberos 5, we recommend discussing them on the kerberos at mit.edu mailing list. References [1] National Institute of Standards and Technology. Announcing Approval of the Withdrawal of Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) 43-3, Data Encryption Standard (DES); FIPS 74, Guidelines for Implementing and Using the NBS Data Encryption Standard; and FIPS 81, DES Modes of Operation. Federal Register 05-9945, 70 FR 28907-28908, 19 May 2005. DOCID:fr19my05-45 [2] Tom Yu, Sam Hartman, and Ken Raeburn. The Perils of Unauthenticated Encryption: Kerberos Version 4. In Proceedings of the Network and Distributed Systems Security Symposium. The Internet Society, February 2004. http://web.mit.edu/tlyu/papers/krb4peril-ndss04.pdf -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.3 (SunOS) iQCVAwUBRW4WX6bDgE/zdoE9AQJmpgQAlR3HeYsMcaPF6wDoR8ZO7S2B01auCasD O+q0sxNE3QLZv1cNHKjIXnJ/hpJgR+dCTn3aEgI4zA54IEfVddRzrkOrne0Td3sS Pt8sPzIARyzSgLJTz20KAO/ZY2lN69E6AuxkTlVuq3BwJJ/qVQKnsy/OSzdSlhrp IJKQQ9f0nnI= =kuiL -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----